BHAVAN'S BOOK UNIVERSITY

MADHVA'S TEACHINGS in HIS OWN WORDS

B. N. K. Sharma

GENERAL EDITORS

K. M. MUNSHI

R. R. DIWAKAR

BHARATIYA VIDYA BHAVAN, BOMBAY.

आ नो भद्राः क्रतवो यन्तु विश्वतः ।

Let noble thoughts come to us from every side

—Rigveda, 1-89-i

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1970

BHARATIYA VIDYA BHAVAN

CHAUPATTY : BOMBAY 7.

GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE

THE Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan—that Institute of Indian Culture in Bombay-needed a Book University, a series of Books which, if read, would serve the purpose of providing higher education. Particular emphasis, however, was to be put on such literature as revealed the deeper impulsions of India. As a first step, it was decided to bring out in English 100 books, 50 of which were to be taken in hand almost at once. Each book was to contain from 200 to 250 pages and was to be priced at Rs. 2·50.

It is our intention to publish the books we select, not only in English, but also in the following Indian languages: Hindi, Bengali, Gujarati, Marathi, Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam.

This scheme, involving the publication of 900 volumes, requires ample funds and an all-India organisation. The Bhavan is exerting its utmost to supply them.

The objectives for which the Bhavan stands are the reintegration of the Indian culture in the light of modern knowledge and to suit our present-day needs and the resuscitation of its fundamental values in their pristine vigour.

Let me make our goal more explicit :

We seek the dignity of man, which necessarily implies the creation of social conditions which would allow him freedom to evolve along the lines of his own temperament and capacities; we seek the harmony of individual efforts and social relations, not in any makeshift way, but within the frame-work of the Moral Order; we seek the creative art of life, by the alchemy of which human limitations are progressively transmuted, so that man may become the instrument of God, and is able to see Him in all and all in Him.

The world, we feel, is too much with us. Nothing would uplift or inspire us so much as the beauty and aspiration which such books can teach.

In this series, therefore, the literature of India, ancient and modern, will be published in a form easily accessible to all. Books in other literature of the world, if they illustrate the principles we stand for, will also be included.

This common pool of literature, it is hoped, will enable the reader, eastern or western, to understand and appreciate currents of world thought, as also the movements of the mind in India, which though they flow through different linguistic channels, have a common urge and aspiration.

Fittingly, the Book University's first venture is the *Mahabharata*, summarised by one of the greatest living Indians, C. Rajagopalachari; the second work is on a section of it, the *Gita* by H. V. Divatia, an eminent jurist and a student of philosophy. Centuries ago, it was proclaimed of the *Mahabharata*: "What is not in it, is nowhere". After twenty-five centuries, we can use the same words about it. He who knows it not, knows not the heights and depths of the soul; he misses the trials and tragedy and the beauty and grandeur of life.

The *Mahabharata* is not a mere epic; it is a romance, telling the tale of heroic men and women and of some who were divine: it is a whole literature in itself, containing a code of life, a philosophy of social and ethical relations, and speculative thought on human problems that is hard to rival; but, above all, it has for its core the *Gita*, which is, as the world is beginning to find out, the noblest of scriptures and the grandest of sagas in which the climax is reached in the wondrous Apocalypse in the Eleventh Canto.

Through such books alone the harmonies underlying true culture, I am convinced, will one day reconcile the disorders of modern life.

I thank all those who have helped to make this new branch of the Bhavan's activity successful.

1, QUEEN VICTORIA ROAD,
NEW DELHI,
3rd October, 1951.

K. M. MUNSHI

FOREWORD

Śrī Madhva's Teachings In His Own Words is a small, but comprehensive, book on the great Vedānta Master, the diverse aspects of whose versatile genius and teachings are brought out here and supported with quotations from his works. We see here Madhva not merely as an opponent of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja and as a commentator of the major works of Vedānta, but also as a constructive exponent of the entire spiritual classics of India and as an initiator of socio-political and religious movements calculated to check disruptive foreign influences and specially as the dynamic founder of the surging devotional movement (e.g. of the Dāsa Kūṭa) of the Deccan with it spreading offshoots in the South and the North.

It is authentic epitome of Madhva lore,—the mature fruit of the life-long study of Mādhva literature and tradition by Dr. Sharma, who has written extensively on the subject and whose comprehensive work 'A History of the Dvaita school of Vedānta and Its Literature', shows the wide range of his scholarship. Even in this brief treatise the reader will find illuminating discussions (e.g. on the different types of Sādhana, Mokṣa etc.) which would make the reader feel grateful to the author and the Publishers. The book will be very useful to the student of Vedānta, at home and abroad.

Santiniketan,
West Bengal,
19th Dec. 1960.

DHIRENDRA MOHAN DATTA

PREFACE

The Vedānta has played the dominant role in Indian thought. Its study has always been credited with the highest spiritual benefit and invigorating effect upon the exercise of reason as a proper instrument of thought, in understanding the problems of philosophy. Many consider it as showing the way for a final synthesis of the logical and emotional approaches to reality, on the basis of intuition. No one, however, who does not possess at least a general knowledge of the main aspects of Vedāntic thought, represented by the great schools of Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, could aspire to have any adequate knowledge or appreciation of the resplendent beauty and richness of thought which it embraces; or estimate the heights and depths of thought it has reached, in the course of its long history. An exaggerated importance given to one particular aspect of Vedānta in modern times, has led to an utterly one-sided view of it among our educated men and women of today. Every true lover of Indian thought at its best, should, therefore, be beholden to the General Editors of the Bhavan's Book University Series, for their happy and thoughtful decision to publish, in their Series, authentic expositions of the thoughts of every one of the great founders of the various systems of Vedānta *in their own words.*

I am very much thankful to the General Editors for inviting me to contribute such a volume on the teachings of Śrī Madhvācārya. Apart from the general difficulty in condensing the boundless wisdom of these great masterminds of Indian philosophy, within a short compass, the task is particularly difficult in the case of a philosopher like Madhva, whose writings are characterized by an extreme compression of thought and brevity of expression, which is not the case with those of his compeers. Every reader of Madhva's work feels, in-voluntarily, that a greater measure of expansiveness of thought and amplitude of utterance on his part would have helped in

a better and a quicker appreciation of his thoughts by his present-day readers. His adoption of the metrical and the dialectic form of writing, according to exigencies, introduces another difficulty in our making his words speak for themselves and convey their intended sense fully and without supplying additional comments, to make the links of thought clearer.

It has, therefore, been found necessary to furnish both an introductory note and an explanatory comment, in connection with most of the passages dealt with in the following pages. I have selected the passages from as many of the works of Madhva as possible, both in prose and in verse, instead of confining them to one particular work or group of works. This has made the selection of materials more widely distributed and representative of his works, as a whole. Moreover, in the interst of getting the right type of texts, it was found impracticable to limit the choice to prose works alone. It would appear that Madhva himself warms up to his subject in his great metrical masterpiece the *Anu-Vyākhyāna*. Of necessity, then, many passages have been extracted from this great work of his, which is a model of clarity and brevity and to which every reader of Madhva should be introduced, in order to have an adequate appreciation of him.

Whatever the medium, Madhva maintains the same Sūtra-like crispness and brevity of style throughout. To give a metrical form to terse Sūtra-like utterances is perhaps a really difficult literary achievement. I have tried to present Madhva's thoughts in his own words, as clearly, cogently and effectively as I can, on the basis of the materials extracted here. It is by no means an exhaustive treatment of the subject of Madhva's teachings. Only the main aspects of his thought have been set forth. My aim here has been to give a connected picture of his thoughts as a whole so as to throw light on the architectonic unity of his system as represented by them; so that the reader may get a clear idea of the interrelation and bearings of his doctrines within the limited scope of this Volume

and be in a position to have a correct estimate of such aspects of his teachings as have a right to be regarded as his distinctive contribution to religion and philosophy.

In one sense, this brief exposition may be said to embody my own interpretation of Madhva's philosophy, as I have been impressed by it. Those who would like to know something about the historical and literary background of Madhva's Darśana, would find adequate information in the first Volume of my 'History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature' (1960). If the present work succeeds in communicating to its readers some measure at least of the satisfaction which its writer has derived in writing it, it will not have been written in vain.

Madhva's thought presupposes a deal of Advaita philosophy. It is, for this reason, hardly possible to present his philosophical tenets without reference to the principles and doctrines of the Advaita school. This would explain the many references to the views of the Advaita school by Madhva himself in his writings and in the explanatory Notes on the selected passages.

While an author should try to explain clearly and interestingly what he knows to his reader, mere clarity of thought and expression will not be sufficient to enable the reader to follw a discourse on a religious or a philosophical subject like the Vedānta, unless he possesses some general background of information on the basic concepts of Hindu religion nnd philosophy. Here, I feel, the author and the reader should be able to meet each other, at least halfway. In dealing with an abstruse subject like philosophy, one could not possibly avoid what Prof. Joad has so aptly styled 'the expression of obscurity'. But, I earnestly hope that I have not been guilty of the other drawback of 'obscurity of expression', in the pages that follow.

An asterisk marks each selected text from the works of Madhva. There are one hundred and fifty-five passages

in all. These texts are serially numbered. Every one of them is translated into English closely and faithfully. Care has been taken to make the translation not merely faithful to the original; but readable. The translation is put within inverted commas. The texts are mostly preceded and followed by introductory and explanatory notes and comments, wherever deemed necessary. Page references of texts are to the Belgaum edition of the Sarva-Mūla (Collected Works of Madhva), unless other editions are specified.

I thank Dr. D. M. Datta, Retired Professor of Philosophy, Patna College, most warmly for his kind and appreciative Foreword to this book.

My thanks are also due to my esteemed friend Sri C. R. Krishna Rao, Retired District Jūdge, Madras, for his kindness and courtesy in going thro' the manuscript of the work with me and giving me the benefit of his valuable advice and suggestions for its improvement, on many points. My friend Prof. K. T. Pandurangi of the Karnatak College, Dharwar, has also discussed some topics of the work with me, at my residence in Dharwar in 1959. My thanks are due to him for this. The two Appendices have been put in at the special suggestion of Sri R. R. Diwakar.

Ruparel College, B. N. K. SHARMA
Bombay-16.

CONTENTS

VII. SĀDHANA VICĀRA

VIII. MOKSA SVARŪPA

Dedicated to

the revered memory of

my great-grandfather :

Cochi Raṅgappācārya (1821-91)

(Raja Guru, Cochin State)

who had made outstanding contributions to

Śrī Madhva's Philosophy

by his

Candrikā-Bhūṣaṇam and other works.

1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The Background of Madhva's Darśana

Madhva's philosophy represents one of the main points of departure in the Vedānta system on the issue of Theism Vs. Monism. He appeared on the Indian philosophical scene after the systems of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja had been well-established. He did not feel satisfied with their interpretation of Indian philosophy with particular reference to its basic texts and traditions and wanted to propound a new system of his own. This new system was the result of his own excogitation. The reasons which led him to formulate a new Siddhānta were, thus, his doctrinal differences and ideological dissatisfaction with contemporary trends and schools of thought, within and without Hinduism and particularly with the system of Śaṁkara, which was the dominating philosophy of his time. In spite of the powerful Theistic revolt led by Rāmānuja, Madhva could not also see eye to eye with him on many points of Theistic doctrine. He therefore felt called upon to give a new lead to the country.

The thirteenth century, which saw the birth of Madhva, was a period of grave cultural unrest and political turmoil in Indian history. The Hindu Kingdoms and the people were passing thro' a catastrophic period, faced with the grim prospect of loss of political sovereignty and religious freedom. Disunity was rampant among the Hindu kingdoms. They were torn by internecine wars, even in the face of a common danger to their collective security. Destruction of temples and monasteries and forcible conversions to an invading faith were going on. Higher philosophy among the Hindus was dominated by a philosophical creed which with its emphasis on the self as an essentially inactive being and its extolling of Karma-Sannyāsa was leading the nation to an unconscious

M—2

pessimism of spirit; which he felt to be highly detrimental to the social and political future of his countrymen. Māyāvāda could not give the people the dynamic urge to unite to resist external aggression at the most critical juncture in the country's history. Acosmism and indulgence in hair-splitting logic of Anirvacanīyatā or Saptabhaṇgī were not the need of the times. The Hindu community had to be roused to a sense of reality of the world and the stability of Dharma, which were at stake. The people had to be awakened from the soporific effects of a world-negating philosophy, which in one form or another was devitalizing the nation—from the intelligentsia to the masses, slowly, but steadily. In earlier times, Hinduism had absorbed many an invading race that had entered the country; bnt in the medieval period it felt baffled and powerless against the powerful influx the invasion of Islam. It could not absorb these warlike tribes advancing thro' the country with a new militant monotheism.

Madhva felt strongly that Māyāvāda was a source of inner weakness to the country as a whole, in the socio-political climate of the times, apart from its philosophical untenability. With a prophetic vision he rose to strengthen the national conscience by turning it once more towards the buoyant realism of the Vedas, the transcendental Theism of the Upaniṣads and the emotional Theism of the Epics and Purāṇas. He wanted to give his countrymen a renewed faith in Theism which would rouse the people to a sense of the dignity of man as a real agent in the world and as the architect of his own future. He wanted men to respect the deliverances of their Sākṣī in respect of the reality of the world and its values of good and evil and pin their faith to a vigorous Hindu Monotheism which would keep intact the transcendence and immanence of the Upaniṣadic Brahman and fuse them with the concept of the "Bhagavān" of the Epics and Pūrāṇas—or the "God" who is

the object of our love and affection in virtue of the interest He takes in us and in the world that are His creation. With a passionate emphasis on ethical monotheism, Madhva counselled righteous war on all forces of evil and *adharma* tyrannizing over the people: नारायणद्विट्तदनुबन्धिनिग्रहं क्षत्रियाणां विशेषतोऽपि परमधर्मं * * * * * (*Gītā Tātparya*). There is no mistaking the earnestness of purpose behind this well-timed message to his countrymen.

There is reason to believe that Ānegondi of Pre-Vidyāraṇya days had come under the influence of Madhva and his immediate disciples. It is not without significance that the first two of his direct disciples had made it their favourite place of resort and were buried there, after their demise. It was in the vicinity of this region that the new Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar came to be founded, in Karnatak, eight years after Śrī Madhva's departure from the scene of his earthly life. It was no accident that the seed of hope for the rehabilitation of the social and political fortunes of the people planted by Madhva developed into the mighty kingdom of Vijayanagar symbolizing the hopes and aspirations of a harassed people regaining their strength and realizing their aspirations.

Date, Life and Personality of Madhva

Madhva places his own date of birth *after* 4300 years of the Kali era. Taking this as starting point and as a rough estimate, we can fix his date more precisely with the help of the evidence of the Śrīkūrmam inscription of his direct disciple, Narahari Tīrtha, who was Regent of Kaliṅga for some years and who mentions his Guru Ānandatīrtha (Madhva) in terms which clearly imply that he was in flesh and blood at the time. The Śrīkūrmam inscription is dated Śaka 1203, corresponding to 1281 A.D. There is also authentic literary tradition giving Madhva's span of life as seventynine years and stating further that he passed away in the cyclic year of Piṅgala:—

'एकोनाशीतिवर्षाणि नीत्वा मानुषदृष्टिगः ।
पिङ्गलाब्दे माघशुद्धनवम्यां बदरीं ययौ ॥'

(Aṇu-Madhva-Caritam)

[Having lived on earth for 79 years, he departed for Badarī on the ninth day of the bright half of Māgha, in Piṅgala.]

On these evidences, we can easilv fix his date as 1238-1317 A. D.[1]

Life

We have an authentic biography of Madhva, written within a few years of his departure, by the youngest son of one of his illustrious disciples. Following it, the main outlines of his life may be set down as follows.

Madhva was born in Tulunāḍ, of a humble Brahmin family, in the village of Pājaka; eight miles south-east of the modern town of Uḍipi, in the S. Kanara district of the present Mysore State. In his sixteenth year, the call of the spirit took him to Acyutaprekṣa, who came of the order of Ekānti-Vaiṣṇavas of the Ekadaṇḍī order. Madhva was admitted into the fourth order under the name of Pūrṇaprajña. His studies in the Śāstras had, in the meanwhile, convinced him of the inherent weakness of the Advaita philosophy and filled him with a keen desire to resuscitate the ancient Theism of the Vedaśāstras on the basis of a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of the texts. Some time after initiation was spent in the study of Vedāntic classics under Acyutaprekṣa, beginning with the *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman. Frequent disagreement of views between the teacher and the disciple terminated the studies, before long. Pūrṇaprajña was, soon after, made the head of his establishment by Acyutaprekṣa, who was probably beginning to be convinced that his new disciple was destined to make history for himself. On this memorable occasion,

1. For details see my '*History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature*' Vol. I, Booksellers' Pub. Co., Bombay, 1960.

Pūrṇaprajña was given another name "Ānandatīrtha" by which he calls himself in many of his works. The name "Madhva", by which he is more widely and popularly known, was adopted by him as being synonymous with it and for certain esoteric reasons.

South Indian Tour

After assuming headship of Acyutaprekṣa's Mutt, Śrī Madhva seems to have spent some time in teaching disciples and engaging outstanding scholars of the day belonging to the Buddhistic, Jain and Advaita Sampradāyas, round about his native region, in logical and philosophical discussions and vanquishing them in debates. Encouraged by these successes, he made up his mind to go on a S. Indian tour to seek a wider field for the propagation of his new ideas, which he had, by this time, developed into a more or less coherent system; tho' he had not yet reduced them to writing. He visited Kanyākumari, Ramesvaram and Srirangam, holding discourses on the *Brahmasūtras* and expounding their philosophy in a manner completely at variance with their received interpretations by Śaṁkara. His open criticisms of Śaṁkara's Bhāṣya on the Sūtras, on many of these occasions, side by side with their reinterpretation according to his new views, naturally roused a good deal of opposition to him from the leaders of the old school of thought. It is stated that at Kanyākumari he met with stiff opposition from an Advaitic monk of great learning who challenged him to write a fresh commentary on the Brahmasūtras before he ventured to criticize the time-honored one of Śaṁkara. Madhva assured him that he would be doing so, in good time. At Srirangam he came into contact with the followers of the Rāmānuja school and must have exchanged views with them, and noted his own points of agreement and difference with them. The S. Indian tour had, thus, strengthened his resolve to come

out with a new system of Vedānta in place of the existing schools. Its formal proclamation was, however, deferred till his return from his first N. Indian tour, which was undertaken, shortly after.

First North Indian Tour

The main aim of this tour was to go to Badarikāśrama and receive personal inspiration from a visit to the Vyāsāśrama. After staying for forty-eight days at Ananthamaṭha at Badarīnath, in fasting, prayer and contemplation and dedicating his *Gītā Bhāṣya* to the Lord, Śrī Madhva is reported to have had a call to visit upper Badarī—or the hermitage of Vyāsa. He went there all alone and by himself and returned after some months, glowing with a new inspiration from on high and wrote his Bhāṣya on the *Brahma-Sūtras*. Journeying thro' Bihar, Bengal, Orissa, Andhradeśa, Maharashtra and Upper Karnataka, the party returned to Udipi.

The Winning of Disciples

On his way back from Badarī, Śrī Madhva was challenged to scholastic disputations at various centres of learning by eminent scholars of the day, versed in the Ṣaḍ-darśanas. Prominent among these were Svāmi Śāstrin and Śobhana Bhaṭṭa. The former was, very probably, a native of Āndhra or Orissa. It is not so easy to decide the region to which Śobhana Bhaṭṭa belonged, from the vague description of him in the *Madhvavijaya* (ix, 120) as 'hailing from (the region of) the Godāvarī.[1] He is, however, acclaimed to have been an outstanding scholar of the day and a master of the six Darśanas. Both these became disciples of Madhva and were admitted to the ascetic order (later) under the names of Narahari Tīrtha and Padmanābha Tīrtha. The former is known

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1. Luckily, we have evidence from other early sources showing that he was a native of Uttara-Karnāṭaka. See my *History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature*, Vol. I, p. 292.

for his commentary on Madhva's *Gītābhāṣya* and *Karma-Nirṇaya* and was Regent of Kaliṅga between 1281-93. The latter has left commentaries on Madhva's *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, *Anuvyākhyāna* (on the Brahmasūtras) and on his *Daśa-Prakaraṇas*. He was the earliest major commentator on several of the works of Madhva. On his return to Uḍipi from his first north Indian tour, Madhva was also able to convert his Guru Acyutaprekṣa himself, finally, to his views.

The prestige of his new system had risen considerably on account of these achievements. His Bhāṣyas on the *Gītā* and the *Brahmasūtras* had made their mark and were widely recognized and respected. His earnestness of purpose, irresistible personality and invincible logic brought numerous adherents and converts from all parts of the country. To foster a sense of fellowship and unity among his followers, he installed a beautiful image of Śrī Kṛṣṇa at his mutt at Udipi which was made the rallying centre of his disciples and followers. He made some changes in the ceremonial code of his followers, introduced the system of Piṣṭapaśuyāgas in place of actual animal sacrifices in yajñas and imposed the rigorous observance of Ekādaśīs.

Second North Indian Tour

A few years later, Madhva went on a second N. Indian tour and returned after visiting Badarī, Delhi, Kurukṣetra, Banaras and Goa. His subsequent tours were mostly confined to his native district and to S. India. The years that followed brought further acquisition of followers. Many disciples from different parts of the country took Sannyāsa from him. The prestige of his system grew steadily in the meantime.

Fresh Literary Activity

Many new works of Madhva were now composed such as the Bhāṣyas on the ten major Upaniṣads, the ten

philosophical monographs (known as *Daśa-Prakaraṇas*), the *Anu-Vyākhyāna* (his masterpiece) and commentaries on the *Mahābhārata* and the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*.

Attempted Raid on His Library

The rising popularity and growing reputation of the new system were naturally resented by the custodians of the old faith. We have a report in the *Madhvavijaya* (xiii) of Madhva's having been challenged to a disputation at Udipi by one Puṇḍarīka Puri, who was worsted in the debate. His ally Padma Tīrtha, of the Cola country, it is stated, managed to carry away a valuable collection of source-books from Madhva's Library, which had been kept in the charge of a trusted disciple. It was, however, recovered subsequently by the intervention of King Jayasiṁha, Ruler of Kumbla.

Conversion of Trivikrama Paṇḍita

This led to a meeting between the Ruler and Madhva. This was followed by the historic disputation of Madhva with the Ruler's Court Pandit Trivikrama Paṇḍita, who was the foremost authority on the Advaita-Vedānta and a gifted poet. Trivikrama engaged Madhva in a vigorous disputation for fifteen days, at the temple of Viṣṇumaṅgala and was worsted at the end of it. He sought conversion of faith at the hands of Madhva and was readily admitted. He was commissioned to write a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, which he did and named it *Tattvapradīpa*.

Last Days of Madhva

Trivikrama's conversion was a great landmark in the history of Madhva's system. Many more joined his fold. Later, his own brother and seven others were ordained monks and these became the first heads of the eight Maṭhas of Udipi. The closing years of Madhva saw the composition of a few more works like the *Nyāya-Vivaraṇa* (on the

Brahmasūtras) the *Karma-Nirṇaya* and the *Kṛṣṇāmṛta-Mahārṇava*, a few Stotras, and miscellaneous works.

His mission was now almost complete. His message to the world had been delivered and had been well-received. He had written epoch-making commentaries and original works and had organized his followers, drawn from various parts of the country, into a compact community. He had sent out well-chosen veterans like Padmanābha Tīrtha, Narahari Tīrtha, Mādhava Tīrtha and Akṣobhya Tīrtha to preach and propagate his Siddhānta all over the country and establish centres of learning and propaganda.[1] It was now time for him to retire from the scene of his labours and leave them in charge of future work. Charging all his devoted disciples with the closing words of his favourite Upaniṣad, the *Aitareya*, not to sit still, but to go forth and spread the message of vedāntic Theism far and wide, Śrī Madhva disappeared from vision in his seventy-ninth year, on the ninth day of the bright half of Māgha, in *Pingala* 1317 A.D.

Madhva's Personality

Madhva was a many-sided personality. He enjoyed a long life of robust health. He believed in physical culture side by side with the intellectual and the moral. He took to various forms of sport and physical exercise in his youth, such as wrestling, swimming and even mountaineering, which he kept up to the very end. Hailing from the stock of Tulu Brahmins of the fair land of Paraśurāma, he had the handsome features of his people. Physical culture gave him a strong muscular frame. He was tall and strong-limbed with a graceful carriage and dignified bearing. Trivikrama Paṇḍita bears testimony to his

1. Later, this line of ascetics came to be presided over by Madhva's most distinguished commentator Śrī Jayatīrtha, from whom are descended the three principal Mādhva Maṭhas of the present-day, outside Tuḷunāḍ.

magnetic personality endowed with the traditional thirty-two *lakṣaṇas.* He had a deep sonorous voice and good musical talent, which he used to advantage in Vedic recitation and in singing the soulful strains of his own devotional compositions and in giving open-air discourses on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, with its rolling melody of verses (*M. Vij.* xiii, 40).

His life, as described in the *Madhvavijaya*, is the narrative of a born leader of men. His biographer had actually seen him in his lifetime (*M. Vij.* xii, 34) and barring a few miracles recorded by him, he does not go out of the way and make inartistic attempts to glorify him by the invention of episodes.

Madhva recognizes that the soul of man is potentially divine,: अप्रमेयेश्वरसरूपत्वात् । (G. B. ii, 18.); but man, in the ignorance of his true status, has so much lost his soul to his body and its cravings that he requires to be roused from his Avidyānidrā, by God Himself or His great Messengers, from time to time. It is only in this sense that great teachers of the world, who claim to be divinely inspired to lead their fellowmen from darkness to light, in times of great spiritual stress and moral crises of the world with a new vision of their own, have to be accepted as Messengers of God. It is in this sense that Madhva himself claims to be a "Prophet who has come to interpret the mind of the Lord" to his fellowmen. But despite the strength of burning conviction born of authentic religious experience, Madhva knew human nature too well to attempt the impossible of converting humanity as a whole. He did not therefore care to make any promise of Sarvamukti or set himself to extirpate other creeds and faiths. Variety is the spice of life and diversity of beliefs and ideologies, whether in religion, philosophy or politics, is as old as humanity. The rise and fall of ideologies is bound to go on till eternity.[1] The business of the true philosopher, prophet

or Saint is not, therefore, to attempt a regimentation of thought; but to show the way to all those who would care to see and profit by it. History has always shown that it is neither possible nor desirable to bring about absolute ideological unity among nations, be it in religion or in politics. Without day-dreaming about Sarvamukti, Madhva endeavoured to do his part in awakening the spirit of inquiry in man and make him think and act for himself.

He was the second great spiritual leader of India, in the middle ages, to traverse the length and breadth of Bharatakhaṇḍa on foot, with his trusted disciples, many times. One can imagine the difficulties of such a mode of travel and the risks and dangers involved in it, particularly at times when inter-state relations were frequently strained by hostilities and the political atmosphere was charged with religious persecution, wars and massacres. One cannot but admire the physical and moral courage shown by Madhva in braving these odds and covering the whole country from the north to the south and from east to the west, with a deep conviction in the unity of his motherland and her people, despite their diversity in language, habits, creeds and customs. The *M. Vij.* expressly states that his disciples came from 'different parts of India.' His followers today are to be found among speakers of eight different languages of India,—Tulu, Kannada, Konkani, Marathi, Telugu, Southern Saurāṣṭri, Bengali and Hindi,—a truly representative galaxy.

His visit to Vyāsāśrama referred to in the *M. Vij.* does not appear to be an entirely baseless invention. There can be no doubt that he did undertake this lonesome and hazardous journey on the Himalayas, in search of his

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I. cf. अनादिकालतो वृत्ताः समया हि प्रवाहतः
नचोच्छदाऽस्ति कस्यापि समयस्य * * * (AV.)

'Guru.' The incident has been described in the *M. Vij.* vi., with thrilling effect. One fact at least emerges from this particular incident narrated in his biography and that is that he had sought the sylvan retreats of the Himalayas to find some high source of inspiration to the new thoughts that had come to him and have a finishing touch given to them, before systematizing them. From his constant and repeated allusions to such an inspiration received by him, in his *Gitābhāṣya*, *Mbh. T. N.* and other works, we have to conclude that he did receive the inspiration he sought from his visit to the Himalayan retreats. Beyond this it is needless and impossible to go.

An interesting side-light is thrown by another incident in Madhva's life, narrated in the *M. Vij.* (x, 8-19) upon his knowledge of Persian (or Urdu), his courage and tact in handling difficult situations and his ability to rise equal to occasions with dignity and complete self-possession. The episode relates to his meeting with a Muslim Ruler of N. India (त्वरकराज:) during his second N. Indian tour. Political hostilities were on, at the time. Madhva and his party were forced to swim across the Ganges to the other shore. They were halted on reaching the shore and taken to the Ruler who called upon Madhva to explain his conduct in disobeying orders and crossing the river when hostilities were on. The biographer mentions Madhva's speaking to the Ruler in his own language (तद्भाषया चित्रवाक्यम्) and explaining his mission in the cause of Theism and passing on without any further hindrance.

Madhva as a Writer, a Thinker and a Mystic

Madhva was prolific writer in Sanskrit. He commanded prose and verse with equal ease. His prose is terse and telling. He errs on the side of brevity of expression and scrupulously avoids the ornate style. His verses have

solemnity, dignity and deep spiritual eloquence. He liked debates and disputations with scholars of the day and was an adept in logical and dialectical subtleties.

His insight into the problems of philosophy was deep and penetrative. His knowledge of the sacred literature of his country was accurate and exhaustive. He quotes *profusely* from an exceptionally wide range of works comprising the Mantras, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, Upaniṣads, Epics, Purānas, Pañcarātras and a variety of ancillary literature. Among Vedātins, he has drawn to the largest extent upon the Ṛg Veda. Other Indian philosophers before or after him have not quoted so much from the sacred writings. What astonishes one is the prodigious memory which enabled him to have such a vast range of literature at his fingers' ends, and cite from it so aptly and unerringly. In his *Mbh. T. N.* he makes special mention of his collection of mss; his works disclose his fine critical sense, which is all alert. They also show how closely he had read the chief expository and dialectical works of other schools of thought—such as the Bhāṣyas of Śaṁkara, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja and works like the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana, the *Pañcapādikā, the Iṣṭasiddhi, Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* and the great dialectical masterpiece of Śrīharṣā. His criticisms of these works are often implicit. His acquaintance with the original works of Buddhism, Jainism and other Darśanas was also firsthand and his criticisms of their tenets often distinctively original.

With all his encyclopaedic knowledge of the Śāstras and other Darśanas, he was no mere doctrinaire or logic-chopping philosopher. There is a deep mystic strain in his personality which comes out occasionally in his writings. Flashes of his mysticism are evident in his theory of the Adhyātmic interpretation of the Vedic hymns, his conception of 'Bimbaprati-bimbabhāva relation between God and the souls; in his doctrine of Parābhakti in Mokṣa (See

Texts Nos. 72-73) and in the outpourings of his heart to God in his *Dvādaśa-Stotra*. His views on 'Pratīkopāsanā' (See Texts Nos. 130-134) show the true mystic he was, who could see the presence of God in the symbols and media, where others could only envisage a super-imposition of the idea of God on the Pratīka. In his Bhāsya on the *Aitareya Up*, he says in the ringing voice of a great Mystic that the voice of the clouds, the music of the spheres, the fury of the winds, the roar of the waves of the ocean, the names of the gods and sages are the names of the Supreme and voice His eternal glory and majesty.

Such is the integrated personality of Madhva, the scholar, Saint, philosopher and mystic. Rightly was he named by his Guru, Ānanda Tīrtha[1]; for he conceived the Brahman as Bliss Infinite "Bhūmā," (पूर्णानन्द) the One without a Peer or Superior, Lord of All, Indweller in all and sustainer of all.

The Works of Madhva

Madhva is the most prolific writer among the great Bhāṣyakaras of the Vedānta system. He surpasses them all in the variety and range of subject-matter of his works. He has left thirty-seven works in all, of which only six are minor ones, comprising poems, Stotras and miscellaneous works. His major works can be grouped as follows (i) Commentaries on the Prasthānatrayī *i.e*, Gitā, Upaniṣads and Brahmasūtras (ii) Philosophical monographs *(Daśa-Prakaraṇas)*, some of which elucidate his logic, ontology and theory of knowledge; while some others are criticisms of select metaphysical doctrines of the Advaita Vedānta such as the concept of Upādhi, Mithyātva etc. (iii) His *Karmanirañya and Ṛg-Bhaṣya* develop his theory

1. 'आनन्दसंदायिसुशास्त्रकृत् स यत्' *(M. Vij.)*
'Author of a system of philosophy that confers eternal bliss.'

of the Adhyātmic interpretation of certain portions of the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas, by way of illustration.

(iv) His commentary on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* is a reinterpretation of the crucial verses and contexts of that Purāṇa which had been given a monistic turn by earlier commentators. With an astonishing wealth of interpretative literature drawn from the allied literature of the Pañcarātras, Madhva has brought out the unmistakable Theistic significance of such passages. (v) His epitome of the *Mahābhārata* in 32 cantos is his metrical masterpiece. It breaks new ground in the domain of Mahābhārata-exegesis, a subject which is just beginning to receive special attention from modern scholars. This work embodies also the technique and details of a 'higher criticism' of the Epic and its esoteric interpretation as a philosophical saga woven against a background of mytho-historical setting. Madhva has taken the opportunity to co-ordinate the principles of his theology with the Epic narrative and its significant contexts and turning-points. His work may be described as a monumental exposition of Dvaita theology. Its importance to text-criticism of Epic is also considerable; for, Madhva's text bears ample evidence of the use of critical apparatus based on the collection of mss., of different recensions of the Epic from different parts of the country (*Mbh. T. N.* ii, 7-8). In all this, he has more than anticipated the critical approach of the modern scholars to the various problems of the Epic. A close study of his epitome of the Epic is sure to be rewarding to those engaged in special studies on the Epic. (vi) Madhva wrote four separate works on the *Brahmasūtras* and two on the *Gītā*. His *Anuvyākhyāna* (in metrical form) is a companion volume to his Bhāṣya on the B. S. It is a critical and comparative exposition of his own Bhāṣya along with a critical examination of the interpretations of other schools, particularly of Śaṁkara, in all its shades. It also briefly

reviews important theories in logic, metaphysics and epistemology of other schools of Indian thought from the standpoint of philosophical Realism and Theism. In point of penetrative insight into doctrines and acuteness of logical analysis and criticism, it has few equals in Sanskrit philosophical literature. It is Madhva's *magnum opus.* His *Nyāyavivaraṇa* is a short *resume* of the adhikaraṇas of the B. S. and the principles of interpretation that lie at the back of the Sūtras. His *Gītā-Tātparya* is a supplement to his *Gītābhāṣya.*

It would be seen from this general description of his works that Madhva had gone far ahead of his predecessors and contemporaries in bringing the entire range and extent of Hindu thought and its sacred literature within the ambit of his systematization or Samanvaya. This is what distinguishes him from all those who had gone before him. They had missed or failed to emphasize the unbroken and unbreakable continuity of thought that runs thro' the entire Vedaśāstra and taken a partial and sometimes one-sided view of its teaching. Śaṁkara's exclusive fascination for the Upaniṣads had, in effect, cut off Hindu philosophy from its Vedic roots on the one hand and the cool sheltering foliage of the Epics and Purāṇas, on the other, with the result that it stood like a bare stump. It was thus completely isolated from both the earlier and later strata of Hindu Śāstras and found itself placed in an awkward position when it came to grips with those who denounced the Vedas openly as non-authoritative or else open to flaws. It was difficult to reconcile the high status given to the Vedas in Hindu tradition as "Apauruṣeyapramāṇa" with the obviously inferior status and role given to them as a body of texts relating to mere ritualism and sacrifice of animals to please a number of gods (Devas), who had no actual existence in reality! If a higher interpretation of the status and contents of the Vedas was possible, it would

be a decided advantage to Vedic philosophy as such to go in for it. Hints of such a higher (mystic) approach to Vedic lore were there in the hymns themselves and in the Gītā. By accepting the inferior attitude of the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā, it looked as if the philosophy of the day had given an indirect encouragement to anti-Vedic schools, which was highly detrimental to the interests of Vedic dharma and derogatory to its prestige. Madhva's inspiring call to the followers of Vedic dharma to harken to the voice of the Ṛṣis and go back to the ārṣa-tradition of Adhyātmic interpretation of the Vedas—(a call revived in modern times by Aurobindo Ghosh)—give a new point of justification for the rehabilitation of Vedic dharma upon which the hopes and aspirations of the country as a whole depended, in the medieval period.

Notwithstanding the exaltation of an abstract monism of Nirviśeṣa-Brahman as the highest reach of thought, a practical compromise with the Saguṇa-Brahman as the God of religion and theology was inevitable for most men and women who had to go in for the worship of Pratīkas, Avatāras and images. Such worship of the Saguṇa Brahman could not be a whole-hearted worship, in the event of a mental reservation lurking always at the back of the Upāsaka's mind, if he were to regard all such Upāsanās as in essence based on a deliberate superimposition (adhyāropa). [See Text No, 134.]. The unsophisticated could hardly understand the philosophical subtleties behind the concept of 'Adhyāropāpavāda' in Upāsanā. There can be no hide and seek in Upāsanā, which should be a frank, sincere and whole-hearted one. Divided allegiance between Saguṇa and Nirguṇa is not conducive to sincerity of thought or belief. It could give no consolation to be told *in camera* that the God one is asked to worship, meditate upon, love and surrender oneself to is 'after all, imaginary' and is to be 'transcended' by a

supra-rational state of consciousness that has no subject-object relation. Such excessive aberrations of intellectualism were bound to bring in a strong reaction. It came under Rāmānuja in the South and under Basaveśvara in upper Karnatak in the twelfth century. When its influence spread further down in Karnataka, Madhva rose to give it a new turn under his Vaiṣṇava Theism; which, in the succeeding centuries spread gradually in Maharashtra, Gujerat and upper and northern India as well.

Significance Of Madhva's Contribution to Thought

Madhva's sense of loyalty to Hindu Scriptural tradition was complete and unreserved. In this he stands almost alone. He would not cut himself away from any part of the national heritage, for any reason. Unlike some other commentator on the Vedanta, he refuses to give a secondary place to the "Vedas" as 'lower knowledge' (Aparā Vidyā), dealing only with Karma and Devatās and without any philosophical content. He is not also in favour of denying the authority of the Upaniṣads or the Epics and Purāṇas, like the founder of the Ārya Samāj. He stands for a change of attitude to the interpretation of the Hindu Scriptures as a whole. He wants them to be treated as an integral legacy and not as fractional revelations of truth and dharma. There is no doubt that this new attitude to the national heritage raised its prestige considerably at a time when it had fallen low on account of unsympathetic criticisms from within and without the Hindu fold. He may, therefore, be regarded as the greatest Samanvayācārya of the Hindu Scriptural tradition.

It was in the interests of such an integrated exposition of the national Scriptures that he introduced a number of theodicies and fictions of interpretation like भाषात्रय; रीतिशत, अभिमानि, व्यपदेश etc., in the course of his explanations

of intriguing texts and contexts. By hypothesis, his interpretation of the Vedas was not confined to any particular text: but was intended to cover the entire range of the Śāstra and based on the greatest common measure of agreement among its parts. By drawing his materials from tne entire range of Scriptures and by liberalizing the science of Vedic interpretation so as to bring it into line with the Upaniṣadic and Post-Upaniṣadic thought currents, Madhva demonstrated their running unity of thought and purpose (गतिसामान्य) in a manner that left no room for adverse critics to scoff or cavil at them. This closed the breaches within the body-politic of the Hindu Scriptures for many centuries to come.

Madhva was the first Indian philosopher to formulate the principles of an Adhyātmic (philosophical) interpretation of the Ṛg Veda and to work them out with reference to some forty Sūktas, by way of illustration. We have no complete or adequate records of such philosophical interpretation of the Vedic hymns commonly regarded as 'secular', beyond the scattered references in some of the hymns themselves and a few sporadic instances of such Adhyātmic interpretation, in Yāska and Sāyaṇa. But these are not based on any consistent theory of Vedic interpretation as such or the application of any particular technique of it. It was Madhva who supplied this want for the first time, in his c. on the *Ṛg. Veda* and in his *Karma-Nirṇaya.* It was left for Svāmi Dayānanda Sarasvatī to go ahead, on these and in full. In the present century, Aurobindo Ghosh, has gone the farthest in trying to plumb the depths of mystic interpretation of Vedic hymns, Madhva's influence on these two great modern representatives of the Ārṣa tradition of Vedic interpretation could hardly be denied. No doubt modern Indian and European scholars who are commonly regarded as authorities on Vedic exegesis continue to frown or look upon such 'visionary' interpreta-

tions of the Vedic hymns with amused interest. But, it is becoming increasingly evident nowadays that theirs is not the last word on Vedic interpretation. In the Vedic section of the All-India Oriental Conference, 1957, a fervent plea was made in the Presidential address for a more sympathetic and open-minded revision of attitude to Vedic interpretation hitherto in vogue. The Sāyaṇic tradition and the wholesale mythological interpretation of any and every hymn with the astonishingly poor apparatus of a few recurrent naturalistic and ritualistic standards, by Indologists, have come to be set aside by bold spirits like Prof. Maryle Falk and D. T. Tatacharya. A rigorous and consistent application of the principles of exegesis adumbrated by Madhva in his *Ṛg Bhāṣya* may yield more fruitful results in the direction of a complete and full-fledged Adhyātmic interpretation of the entire *Ṛg Veda*, in course of time.

Madhva has given to Indian thought many new metaphysical doctrines, concepts and categories of great intrinsic value aad far-reaching potency. His ontological classification of reality into "Svatantra" and "Paratantra" shows a true insight into philosophy as a science of metaphysical values and not as a mere inquiry into the number of ultimate reals. He was also the first to rationalize the conception of Substance and attributes in philosophy, with the help of his unique doctrine of "Viśeṣas" in terms of an identity-in-difference. His conception of Sākṣī", as an *a priori* principle of knowledge and validity in man, is another epoch-making contribution to Epistemology. He has also established the identity of this *a priori* instrument of knowledge and validity with the Ātman in his capacity as the self-luminous, knowing self. The place and function of "Sākṣī" in his philosophy are such that it carries within itself an experimental and intuitive confirmation of the truthfulness of the own direct experiences of external and

internal reality. This is what gives a completely rational basis, independently of any Scriptural sanction or appeal, to the belief in the reality of world experience, characteristic of Madhva's philosophical Realism.

It is the Sākṣī, again, that is summoned by him to disprove the doctrine of "Adhyāsa". The conception of Sākṣī along with the epistemological principle of "Upajīvya-Pramāṇa", (see Text 20), lies at the root of Madhva's general theory of reinterpretation of 'monistic' texts of the Upaniṣads, in terms of an *essential difference* between Jīvas and Brahman and of a *figurative identity* consistent with such a fundamental difference, established on the evidence of the "Sākṣyanubhava as the 'Upajīva Pramāṇa.'

He has also been the first Upaniṣadic commentator to explain cogently many a puzzling context in the Upaniṣadic cosmology, in the light of the "Adhidaivata" standpoint, understood in relation to the immanence of Brahman at the Adhidaiva-level.

He has also been the only commentator on the Vedānta who has tried to find a proper way of reconciling the existence of 'eternal substances' (*nityapadarthas*) like Jīvas, Ākāśa, Prakṛti etc., with the acceptance of the universal causation of Brahman. This he does thro' the help of his new doctrine of Creation defined as "Parādhīna-Viśesāpti" or metaphysical dependence of such reals for all their changing states and functions on Brahman [See Text No. 99]. By means of this doctrine, he has been able to bridge the gulf between 'eternals' also under the aegis of God, for every one of their determinations. The non-recognition on this idea in other systems of Vedānta introduces an element of irrationality in their doctrine of 'creation', with reference to the existence of certain substances that *have* to be accepted as *ex hypothesi* uncreated, in Vedānta.

Theological Element in Madhva's Darśana

It would be a very shortsighted estimate of Madhva's philosophy to regard it as "more of the nature of a theology".[1] There certainly are some theological features in his system, in regard to its identification of Brahman of the Vedānta with Viṣṇu and in some other respects. But, these cannot affect the true philosophical character of his system or take away its merits. As Hegel has it, the objects of philosophy are, on the whole, the same as those of Religion. "In both the object is truth, in that supreme sense in which God and God only is the truth".[2] However that may be, there cannot, in the nature of things, be a "pure" philosophy unmixed with "theology", at least in the Vedānta; if, by the term "Vedānta", we should understand a system based on the Prasthānatrayī. There are numerous points at which theology and philosophy intersect each other in the "Vedānta": even as the philosophical systems of many Western thinkers are coloured by Christian doctrines and dogmas. It should, however, be possible to keep these two aspects apart, at least in judging the Vedāntic systems of any Ācārya, including Madhva, from a purely 'philosophical point of view'. In the following pages, I have attempted to show how far this could be successfully carried out, in presenting Madhva, from a mainly philosophical standpoint.

So long as the ideal of Mokṣa dominates Indian philosophy, and insofar as the Vedānta itself accepts the need for a separate means of knowledge for the realization of the extra-empirical, in the form of a "Revelation", which is as much *a relational way of knowing*, as any other, it is not possible to keep out 'theology' altogether from coming in at times and furnishing its own details, in

1. P. Nagaraja Rao, *Introd, to Vedānta*, p. 158.
2. *The Logic of Hegel*, W. Wallace, p. 5.

respect of "Cosmogony", "eschatology", "theosophy" "means of realization", "Vidyās", "Upāsanās", the nature of the "Life Beyond" etc., to supplement reason and fill its gaps. Even intuitive experiences of sages recorded in the Upaniṣads are not free from the colourful details of their own personal realizations which draw upon "theological" imagination, freely (See Vāmadeva's report of his realization, in the *R. V.* and *Bṛh. Up.*). The Saguṇa-Brahman, which occupies a considerable portion of the canvas in Advaita metaphysics, is indubitably a theological concept. So are the acceptance of numerous "Devas" with their specific functions and jurisdiction over the cosmos (*B.S.* i, 3,33 and Śaṁkara thereon) and the doctrine of "Krama-Mukti" with its inevitable sojourn in "Brahmaloka". (*B.S.* iv., 3, 7-11). That such ideas have only a "Vyāvahārika" status and significance, in the system, makes no difference to the fact that they are admitted in all good faith and are considered useful and necessary. After all, there is no independent proof other than "Scripture" that these things are or take place, as they are depicted; or that they cannot be otherwise. Reason can only lay down the general principles; it cannot vouch for the details. That is why Saṁkara himself declares, significantly, that we can only interpret Scripture: but cannot ask for the why and wherefore of its deliverances.[1] There is nothing to be surprised at, then, if Madhva also, for his part, thought it fit to incorporate some of these and a few more details, which he considered necessary and worthy of utilization, from the national heritage.

Still, to many, Madhva's "Vaiṣṇavism" present a difficulty. Why does he make such a fetish of the status of Viṣṇu as the supreme being? The modern scholars'

1. आम्नातस्यैवार्थं वक्तुं प्रभवामः । नागमं पर्यनुयोक्तुम् ।

objection to Madhva's "sectarian theology" rests mainly on this ground. The answer to this question might be given from two standpoints—a philosophical and a historical. The 'philosophical' answer would turn on the principles of evidence of the Hindu Scriptures regarding the nature and status of the 'gods' in relation to One Supreme Being and its "identity". We cannot, of course, enter into the further ramifications of this point, here.

Coming to the 'historical' reasons for Madhva's predilections for a Vaiṣṇava Theism, we may say, without any fear of contradiction, that he saw much more clearly than Śaṁkara or Rāmānuja had done before him, that "Viṣṇu" had struck deep roots in the Indian spiritual soil and was the link that connected the Vedic with the Upaniṣadic and the Upaniṣadic with the Epic and Purāṇic phases of Hindu thought.[1] The Hindu mind had been religiously conditioned right from the Vedic times. It had a distinctive predilection for a close, religious and personal relation with the Deity rather than for an abstract identity with a pure being to be reached by abstract thought or speculative reason alone. The deification of Buddha in Mahāyānism, the personal devotion to Jina or to the Tīrthaṁkaras in Jainism, the failure of the Godless ritualism of the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā and the agnosticism of the Sāṁkhya were all conclusive proofs of the fact that Philosophy had no chance of survival in India unless it entered Into a friendly alliance with Theism. Śaṁkara's acceptance of the "Ṣaṇmatas" within the aegis of his advaita-Brahmavāda was standing proof of the inevitable reign of religion in contemporary philosophy. The

1. cf. 'वेदे रामायणे चैव पुराणु भारते तथा ।
आदावन्ते च मध्ये च विष्णेः सर्वत्र गीयते' ।। (*Harivamśa*)

"In the *Vedas*, *Rāmāyana*, *Purānas* and *Bhārata*, Viṣṇu is praised everywhere, in the beginning, in the middle and in the end. He is, therefore, their central theme."

decline of the sacrificialism of the Brāhmaṇas was practically due to this deficiency. It is difficult to determine when, precisely, the Avatar theory came to be accepted in Hinduism, for the first time. Its acceptance in the Gītā, a work of the early Bhāgavata school, according to many, was a turning point in the history of Vaiṣṇavism. It opened up immense possibilities of expansion and growth to the Vaiṣṇava movement. Therein lay its strength, over Śaivism "which did not accept the concept of Avatāras"[1], and thereby lost a good deal in the way of mass appeal. In the two great national Epics of India, "Viṣṇu" remains the central figure of popular affection. He is also the Supreme Being in the Gītā वासुदेवः सर्वम् vii, 19. These facts gave Vaiṣṇvism a special hold on the popular feeling, imagination and affection, which śaivism, in spite of its equally pronounced form of Theism and its "poetry, mysticism and religion combined into a unity"[2], could not successfully vie with. It had to be content with a few strongholds in the Tamil country and in Upper Karnatak and Kashmir. Even there, it is noteworthy that it had to share its honours with Vaiṣṇavism. The bulk of the devotional literature produced in the middle ages in Sanskrit and in the regional languages also registers an appreciable inclination of the balance in favour of Vaiṣṇavism. Without denying the forcefulness and vitality of Śaiva Theism, Madhva preferred to utilize the resources of Vaiṣṇava Theism by reason of the continuity and intimacy of its historical and doctrinal ties with the Hindu scriptural tradition, when the occasion arose for him to reinforce Vaidika Hinduism and strengthen it from within, at a time when its life and solidarity were being threatened by the militant advance of an alien faith.

These were the reasons and no crude sectarianism of

1. P. Nagaraja Rao, *Introd, to Vedanta*, p. 178.
2. *Op. cit*. p. 176.

any kind that inspired Madhva to integrate his new philosophical Realism with the principles of ancient Vaiṣṇavism, in the interests of Hindu revival which he wanted to bring about in the country, to meet the new situation which he saw developing all round. At the same time, the fact that he was the only Vaiṣnava Ācārya that gave full canonical recognition to the worship of Śiva as a part of his creed and in a spirit of genuine devotion arising from the basic principles of his own philosophy,—rather than as a concession to the idols of the tribe, should be sufficient to clear our mind of any presumption of sectarian theology in his acceptance of Vaiṣṇavism.

II. CONCEPTION OF REALITY

1. *स्वतन्त्रमस्वतन्त्रं च प्रमेयं द्विविधं मतम् । (*Tattvaviveka* 1.)

"There are two orders of reality—the Independent and the dependent".

This brief but profound statement of Śrī Madhva sums up his ontology. Starting with the fact of knowledge as an uncriticizable certainty of experience, we are confronted with diversity in the world around us. The presence of the other selves like us is also borne in upon us. We apprehend 'reality' *not* as 'one'; but as 'many'. So far as our convictions, tests and reasonings go, they remain *as real as ourselves.* Some philosophers have sought to reduce the 'many' to an 'appearance'. But the theory of 'appearances' is capable of cutting both ways. It might reduce everything, including ourselves, to an appearance—landing us in a blank nihilism. It is no sufficient answer to this that an appearance is inconceivable without at least a 'perceiver'. In advancing such an argument, we are only relying on the logic of experience. The same logic would show us that an appearance presupposes or requires not *merely* a perceiving self; but a substratum on which appearances could be superimposed and a prototype of the thing so superimposed. Without these three requisites no sound theory of appearances can be demonstrated. Philosophers who would fain dismiss the panoramic reality of the Universe as an 'appearance' would have to tackle this problem convincingly. There is no point in summoning to aid a series of endless superimpositions stretching back to eternity to account for the present appearance. It would be less cumbersome to abandon the theory of 'appearance' and accept direct contact of the mind and the senses with external reality. This does not mean that there are no illusory experiences in our lives. There certainly are. But they are only

exceptions occurring occasionally. If all experiences are to be regarded as 'appearances' in the last analysis, there would be no distinction left between truth and falsity and no verifiable criterion of true experiences at all. That would be defeating the very purpose of philosophy.

The aim of philosophy, according to Madhva, should be not merely to realize the distinction between appearance and reality but to understand and realize the more important distinction between the 'Independent Reality' and 'dependent realities'. He is not an uncritical realist who takes everything to be real. He is not also a sentimental idealist who denies all but one reality. He is a rational realist who admits whatever is established on the uncontradicted evidence of Pramāṇas—the senses, the mind and the Sākṣī, in addition to reason and Revelation. He introduces a new element of value into the theory of Pramāṇas, as such, through his concept of Sākṣī, whose nature and scope would be explained later. This Sākṣī is man's highest instrument of all valid knowledge and experience. The knowledge derived through senses is open to examination and introspection by Sākṣī, and once it is 'passed' by the Sākṣī, it remains incontrovertible and uncontradictable. This point will be adverted to, later. Thus, it is on the evidence of 'Sākṣī-pratyakṣa' which is essentially an internal experience of judgment and values that the reality of world- experience, in the broadest sense of the term, is upheld by Madhva. Once the epistemological necessity to recognize the principle of Sākṣī is conceded and once the unerring nature of its verdicts is established, the reality of world-experience and its values, of our own existence as individuals and of others besides ourselves, entitled to a similar claim, would all follow, as a matter of course. It is also through this Sākṣī, one might venture to add, that one becomes conscious, and aware, however dimly, of the presence of a higher power than ourselves, in this vast and

mysterious Universe. [See Text 29.] Science has no doubt, reduced much of the inscrutable mysteries of nature. But there are still many things in nature which defy scientific explanation and understanding. Science might not be able to prove the existence of God. What is more to the point is that it cannot also disprove His existence. Metaphysics steps in where science halts baffled.

The richness and diversity of the universe is a fact of experience. But the reals constituting this universe are not in a chaotic mess. There is order, regulation, mutual adjustment and harmony in life. This shows that there is no unrestricted independence to all to act as they please. But the very principle of dependence presupposes an Independent central principle which explains, controls and interrelates the dependents into a "Universe".

This is sufficient reason, says Madhva, for recognizing the existence of a 'Svatantra-tattva', called God or Brahman, for want of a better name, in religion and philosophy.

2. *बहुचित्रजगद्बहुधाकरणात् परशक्तिरनन्तगुणः परमः ।

(*Dvādaśa-Stotra*, iv, 3).

"The Supreme Being should be accepted as the Creator, sustainer etc., of this vast universe of stupendous organization".

The dependents could not obviously control one another without one ultimate and independent principle connecting all of them. This is the principle which Bhīṣma was emphasizing to Yudhiṣṭhira, in his famous discourse in the *Mahābhārata*, where he lays special emphasis on 'that principle which is the moving-force of the rest':

बहुनां पुरुषाणां तु यथैका योनिरुच्यते ।
तथा तं पुरुषं विश्वमाख्यास्यामि गुणाधिकम् ॥

This distinction between the Independent principle behind the Universe and the dependent ones in it is, thus,

an absolute fact which cannot be transcended in experience at any time, says Madhva, However, since the same verse from Bhīṣma's exhortation to Yudhiṣṭhira has been explained by Śaṅkara differently in his B.S.B. (ii, 1, 1), Madhva gives his own revised interpretation of it, bringing out the deep Theistic implications of the verses in question, as revealed by some of the very significant expressions used in that context such as:— गुणाधिकम्; ममान्तरात्मा तव च:

3. *व्यवहारभिदापि गुरोर्जगतां न तु चित्तगता स हि चोद्य परम् ।
बहवः पुरुषाः पुरुषप्रवरो हरिरित्यवदत् स्वयमेव हरिः ।।

(*Dvādaśa-Stotra*, iii, 7).

"It is not acceptable to Vyāsa that the distinction between the independent Brahman and the dependent souls is merely phenomenal; for he declares the Supreme, in all seriousness, to be the controller of the many Puruṣas and superior to them in so many ways."

The dependent reals, by their very nature, can have no absolute or unlimited sway or jurisdiction over one another. If they should have such sway, it would lead to their trying to overrule one another and that would lead to unending strife and disorder, in the world. It is thus, very necessary, in the interests of rational philosophy, to dichotomize reality as a whole, into 'Sva-tantra' and 'Para-tantra', says Madhva :—

4, *जीवस्य जीवान्तरनियामकत्वेऽनवस्थितेः, साम्यादसंभवाच्च न जीवः ।। अनीश्वरापेक्षत्वाच्च ।।

(*B. S. B.* 1, 2, 17).

"There would be an endless regress if one finite self (real) were accepted as endowed with an intrinsic right to control another. For that again would be similarly liable to control by another finite being and so on. So long as both (or all) are finite, such control would be inconceivable. The difficulty can only be overcome by positing an Iśvara to regulate the inter-relations of the Jivas."

It is, no doubt, possible to adopt other classifications of reality, in terms of 'living and non-living'; 'positive and negative'; 'sentient and insentient' and so forth. But such classifications would, in the last analysis, be *irrelevant to the aim of philosophy* conceived as a Mokṣa-Śāstra. Only a proper philosophical classification of reality into 'Svatantra' and 'Paratantra' could deliver the goods, in philosophy. It is in this sense that the Upaniṣads teach us that '*by knowing the One all else is known*'. This assumes the existence and reality of both 'the One' and 'the all', Hence, the only possible relation between the One and the many would be the metaphysical dependence of the many on the One and *not* their superimposition on the One. For, in that case, the knowledge of the One and its realization would, instead of *leading to the knowledge of the many* (as required by the terms of the statement in the Sruti), *destroy* the perception of the many and thereby put an end to their very existence, as it happens in the case of illusory appearances which are destroyed when true knowledge of the substratum is attained. Madhva, therefore, examines the famous passage in the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* where the thesis of 'एकविज्ञनेन सर्वविज्ञानम्' acquiring the knowledge of the many thro' the knowledge of the One, is taught; and gives his own revised interpretation of it and shows the logical and other difficulties that would arise, if it is understood as establishing the thesis that the many are false and the One alone is real:

5. *एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं च, प्राधान्यात्, किंचित्सादृश्यात्, कारणत्वाच्च । न तु, तदन्यस्य मिथ्यात्वात् । न हि सत्यज्ञानेन मिथ्याज्ञानं भवति । विरोधात् तयोर्ज्ञानयोः ।।

(*Viṣṇu-tattva-nirṇaya*, 24)

"The knowledge of the many thro' the knowledge of the One, so prominently taught in the Upaniṣads, is to be understood in terms of the pre-eminence of the One; or in virtue of some similarity (of nature between them); or on

account of the One being the cause (or sustaining principle) of the many and such other grounds. The teaching of the Upaniṣad does not support the deduction of the falsity (*mithyātva*) of the many. For, the knowledge of the One (real) is here, solemnly said to *produce* the knowledge of the many and not to annul it. On a monistic view, as the real and the false would be mutually contradictory and exclusive, knowledge of the One would not *produce* the knowledge of the many".

Thus, by going into the implications of the proposition as it is put by the Upaniṣad, Madhva shows that its proper interpretation would be to hold that the many is dependent on the One and therefore the knowledge of the One viz., the Independent Real would lead to the knowledge of the many as dependent upon it. He thus points out that it is not necessary to repudiate the reality of the many in order to maintain the Oneness of Brahman. The reality of the many is not in any way incompatible with the reality of the One. The ultimate object of philosophy is to be able to realize the true status of the metaphysical dependence of all finite reality comprising the Cetana and Acenta world upon the One Infinite, Independent Reality known as God. This alone can be the saving knowledge for us. Cf. तमेवं विद्वान् अमृत इह भवति । 'By knowing him *in this way*, one becomes released'.

6. *य एतत्परतन्त्रं तु न्त्यिमेव हरेः सदा ।
वशमित्येव जानाति संसारान्मुच्यते हि सः ।।

(*Tattvaviveka*)

"Whosoever realizes all finite reality to be essentially dependent on the Supreme is released from Samsāra".

It is not to be supposed that only non-eternals are dependent on the Supreme Being. Dependence is a metaphysical relation which is applicable to both eternal and non-eternal substances among the finite. It is needless to point out that in Indian philosophical tradition, certain

substances are accepted as eternal. Among these may be mentioned time, space, matter and souls. These are viewed as *ex hypothesi* uncreated, as it is difficult to conceive of their creation and it would involve other serious difficulties to regard them as created. Following this correct Vedāntic tradition[1], Madhva brings these eternal and uncreated substances also under the power of the Supreme Being. The eternals and the non-eternals in finite reality are alike dependent on God's will and are governed by it. This dependence of the finite (whether eternal or other) is expressed not Merely by creation; but by other equally important determinations of the Paratantra. This is impressively brought out by Madhva in the following passages :—

7.* सत्ताप्रधानपुरुषशक्तीनां च प्रतीतयः ।
प्रवृत्तयश्च ताः सर्वा नित्यं नित्यात्मना यतः ।
यथा नित्यतयानित्यं नित्यशक्त्या स्वयेश्वरः ।
नियामयति नित्यं च नर्ते त्वदिति च श्रुतेः ।।

(*AV.* ii, 2, p. 19)

For translation and comments See Text no. 99.

The classification of reality into two orders—Svatantra and Paratantra—has an intimate bearing on the problem of reconciling the One and the many, which has loomed large in philosophy. For reasons which will be explained later, Madhva is not in favour of adopting the method of Śaṁkara viz., of maintaining the reality of the One at the expense of the many—i.e., by dismissing the finite, in the last philosophical analysis, as 'mithyā' or unreal. That would, says he, do inexcusable violence to the evidence not only of the senses but of the Sākṣī,—not to speak of reason and revelation as well. This point would be made clear in our treatment of Pramāṇas. Anyway, the solution proposed by Madhva of reconciling

1. Cf. नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम् (*Kaṭha Up.*)

the One with the many on the basis of the metaphysical dependence of the latter on the former (Cf. *Tattantradvād aitadātmyam* Madhva, *Chān. Up.* C.) is entitled to the serious consideration of all those who believe in reasoned thought. There is no necessity to deny the reality of world-experience in order to preserve the trans-empirical oneness of Brahman. The finite reality would not, by reason of its metaphysical dependence, constitute any challenge to the ideology of the oneness of the Absolute. The Upaniṣadic Brahman would remain the One without a second—not in a dry numerical sense; but in a richer and deeper sense of being the active source of the rich multiplicity of finite reality and the sustaining principle behind it.[1] There is no need, on this view, to explain away the finite reality as an "appearance" which has merely a semblance of reality derived through a superimposition of the reality of its substratum on itself: यत्सत्यतया मिथ्यासर्गोऽपि सत्यवदवभासते as Śrīdhara explains the point. It will be seen that in Madhva's view the relation between the Svatantra and the Paratantra is a real and true relation (of *ādhipatya* and *adhīnatva*)[2] about which there is no mistake or make-believe. The finite is given its due place *vis-a vis* the Infinite. It is not banished into the realm of the illusory. It lives, moves and has its being in the Infinite. The Infinite is present in the finite and sustains it *constantly*, in whatever state it may be, passive or active. The object of philosophical knowledge is to render this abstract truth into a living realisation for ourselves. This is the aim of all Vedānta and the ultimate purpose of all its deliverances, howsoever diversely expressed in words. It will not be out of place here to quote the illuminating comments of Madhva' great com-

1. सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।
2. See B.S.1, 3, 16 and 43.

mentator Jayatīrtha, who brings out the richness, elevation and depth of thought contained in the Mahāvākyas of the Upaniṣads, which despite their diversity of approach, converge to the same point of the transcendent majesty of the Svatantra-tattva that is eternal, blessed, sovereignly good and is the author and finisher of all things and which is the *milieu* in which all things subsist :

सर्वाण्यपि हि वेदान्तवाक्यान्यसंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरं सकलदोषगन्ध-विधुरं परं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्ति । तत्र (1) कानिचित् सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्व-सर्वान्तर्यामित्वसौन्दर्यौदार्यादिगुणविशिष्टतया (2) कानिचित् अपहतपाप्मत्व-निर्दुःखत्वप्राकृतभौतिकविग्रहरहितत्वादिदोषाभावविशिष्टतया (3) कानिचित् अतिगहनताज्ञापनाय वाङ्मनसागोचरत्वाकारेण (4) कानिचित् सर्व-परित्यागेन तस्यैवोपादानाय अद्वितीयत्वेन (5) कानिचित् सर्वसत्ताप्रतीति-प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तताप्रतिपत्यर्थं सर्वात्मकत्वेन, इत्येवमाद्यनेकप्रकारैः परमपुरुषं बोधयन्ति ॥

(*NS.* p. 124 Bombay Edn.)

[All Upaniṣadic texts without exception, speak to the glory of Brahman which is the abode of infinite attributes and free from all imperfections. Of these some (1) represent It as endowed with attributes like omniscience, lordship, inner rulership, beauty, goodness etc. (2) Others represent It as free from such limitations as sin, misery, liability to physical embodiment and so on. (3) Yet others speak of It as beyond the reach of mind and speech, to bring home to us Its comparative inaccessibility to human reason and understanding. (4) Others depict It as the only One that exists, in order that we might all seek It to the exclusion of everything else. (5) Others represent It as the Self of all, that It might be taken as the source of all existence, consciousness and activity in the universe.]

III. PRAMĀṆA VICĀRA

Pramāṇa-Vicāra or an inquiry into the nature of proofs is the starting point in Tattvaśāstra. Systems of Indian philosophy have all recognized the importance of Pramāṇa-vicāra. Each system of philosophy is expected to formulate clearly its theory of Pramāṇas and show how its various doctrines are established on the basis of these Pramāṇas. Madhva says:

8.* मानन्यायैर्मीमांसा मेयशोधनम् । (*AV* p. 3)

"Philosophical inquiry is the testing of truth in the light of proofs."

Madhva accepts in his theory of knowledge a scheme of three Pramāṇas or means of valid knowledge: Sense-perception, Inference and Scripture. These three are widely accepted in principle, by other schools of thought also. There are, however, some vital points regarding the nature, scope and function of these Pramāṇas, on which Madhva's views differ from those of others.

9.* यथार्थं प्रमाणम् (*Pramāṇa Lakṣaṇa*) "A Pramāṇa is what comprehends an object of knowledge as it is.[1]"

'Pramāṇa', according to Madhva, is not merely the means of correct knowledge but 'truth' itself. He defines Pramāṇa, compactly and comprehensively as 'Yathārtham.' This definition covers both valid knowledge and the means thereof. This is rendered possible by the morphology of the term 'Pramāṇam" where the suffix 'lyut' (*ana*) signifies both the root meaning (*bhāva*) and the instrumental sense (*karaṇa*). The definition also brings all valid knowledge, including memory, under the scope of 'Pramāṇa'. This is an additional advantage. Some schools of Indian philosophy so define Pramā (valid knowledge) as to *exclude*

1. Cf. the definition of 'Knowledge' (*aṟivu*) in the *Tirukkural* exactly on the same lines.

memory. Madhva protests against this denial of validity to memory and argues a strong case for it. We will be left with no convincing proof of our having had particular experiences, if the validity of memory is impugned. Hence, he brings it under the scope of 'Pramāṇam."

The field of Sense-perception is necessarily limited. We cannot, obviously, be satisfied with it alone or depend entirely upon it for the commerce of life. We have to supplement it by other means of knowledge, open to us—such as inference and verbal testimony. The definitions of Pratyakṣa (Sense-perception) Anumāna (inference) and Āgama (Scripture) need not detain us. What is of special importance to philosophy about Pramāṇas is the question of the nature, meaning and scope of their validity.

Valid and Invalid Knowledge

10.* प्रत्यक्षवच्च प्रामाण्यं स्वत एवागमस्य तु ।

Anuvyākhyāna, p. 3)

"The validity of Āgama and inference is intrinsic, as in respect of Sense-perception."

Validity is generally defined in terms of correspondence with objective reality. Though such validity is generally assumed to be intrinsic to knowledge(in Vedānta), the Advaita school is not in favour of recognizing the absolute validity of Pratyakṣa. According to it, Pratyakṣa (Sense-perception) can only be given a sort of provisional validity (Vyāvahārika-prāmāṇya), which is to be stultified at the dawn of Advaita-Sākṣātkāra, which puts an end to all world-experiences, together with its dualities of *Prumātṛprameyapramāṇavyavahāra* (knower, known and knowing). Madhva refutes this doctrine of degrees of validity and the distrust of Pratyakṣa which it carries with it. The Advaitins argue that the validity of ense-perception is, at the best, for the time being

(प्रत्यक्षस्य वर्तमानमात्रग्राहित्वात्). There is no guarantee of its remaining uncontradicted. Madhva observes that it is meaningless to speak of degrees of validity in 'Pramāṇa'; for, 'Pramāṇa' means *yathārtham;* or what comprehends a thing as it is. It is not possible to subscribe to the self-validity of knowledge and in the same breath to speak of the sublation of such knowledge, be it Protyakṣa, Anumāna or Śabda. This does not, however, rule out illusory perceptions or false inferences etc. Thc principle of non-contradiction applies only to valid knowledge. Where the conditions of correct knowledge are fulfilled and chances of error carefully eliminated, the knowledge arising must be accepted as valid once for all. There is no objection to instituting the most rigorous tests. Take the erroneous perception of silver in shell. When it stands corrected by closer inspection, all reasonable doubts are set at rest and the knowledge finally arising that it *is* shell is entitled to validity, without further ado. One cannot go on indulging in interminable doubts of subsequent stultification in such cases! It is such *sound* Pratyakṣa (दृढदृष्टम्) that Madhva has in view, when he claims that the world of experience established by sense perception is real and valid, based as it is on the consolidated experience of humanity. The question of how much of our knowledge in sense perception represents the actual objective content and how much of it is supplied by the mind or is contributed by extraneous factors has no concern with the Indian monist who does not admit the factual reality of the mind or of the extraneous factors like the wavelengths of light and the position of the observer's body.

There is, thus, no reason to discredit the reality of an objective world outside our minds and its experience by individuals. Our senses are so constructed as to give us knowledge of external reality adequate to our needs and

environment. Such knowledge is knowledge of the objects and under normal conditions they are not to be called into question. It is meaningless, says Madhva, to talk of the unknowability of the thing-in-itself without reference to a knower or a particular space-time setting and other relative factors. The thing-in-itself, far from being an abstraction, is a unity of countless Viśeṣas. Perception, according to the space-time setting and the exigencies of the percipient, takes note of such aspects and relations of things as are brought into focus. The assumption, that if a thing's appearing to have a certain property is caused in part by outside factors then it does not really have it, is false.

Instruments of Knowledge

It is for these reasons that Madhva introduces a well thought-out qualifying adjunct of 'flawless' in his definitions of the pramāṇas :

11.* निर्दोषार्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षम् । निर्दोषोपपत्तिरनुमा ।
निर्दोषः शब्द आगमः (*P.L.*).

"Perception is the *flawless* contact of sense-organs with their appropriate objects. Flawless reasoning is inference. Flawless word, conveying valid sense, is Āgama."

The term 'flawless' in each of these definitions invites attention to the specific conditions under which alone the (Anu) pramāṇas become valid means of knowledge. In the case of Pratyakṣa, the right kind of rapprochement between the sense-organs and the objects as well as other conditions of suitable distance, angle of observation, adequate light and so on are meant to be conveyed by the term 'nirdoṣa' These conditions are applicable to the object the sense-organs and their contact as well. Perception becomes faulty thro' excessive remoteness, nearness or smallness of objects or of intervening obstructions or being mixed up with things similar to them or thro' similarity to others. Knowledge, arising when all these conditions o

flawlessness are fulfilled, is bound to be true and valid: *yathārtham.* It cannot be set aside. Our knowledge of the world, derived from such means under normal conditions, is entitled to acceptance.

The Sākṣi and Sāksi-Pratyakṣa

It has been stated earlier that the concept of Sākṣī occupies the key position in Madhva's thought. His philosophical Realism is built on its foundation. It is a distinctive feature of his theory of knowledge. We do not meet with a like theory, in any other system.

The cognitive senses are of two kinds—the intuitive faculty (Sākṣī) of the cognitive agent, which is identical with himself and the ordinary cognitive senses and the mind.

The acceptance of Sākṣī is rendered necessary, says Madhva, by the very limitations of other means of knowledge open to us viz., the mind, and the senses. Our experience shows that knowledge derived through the sense organs, marks of inference and verbal testimony and interpreted by the mind, is not always free from doubt, miscarriage or misapprehension. It goes wrong sometimes, though not always and stands in need of correction by subsequent evidence, in the form of better Pratyakṣa or other means. But we cannot take for granted the correctness of the correcting evidence itself, without further evidence or tests. These tests again would stand in need of other tests in their turn, with the result that we would be faced with an endless regress It would be arbitrary to say that, in most cases, it is not necessary to go beyond three or four stages to make sure of validity. That is hardly correct. Different persons require different degrees of certification of validity of their knowledge. What satisfies one might not satisfy another. The question therefore, arises: where are we to stop the tests of corres-

pondence etc., and pass a judgment of validity? Even the appeal to non-contradiction would be of no avail; since non-contradiction in the sense of a particular knowledge having remained uncontradicted so far, is no proof of its non-liability to contradiction in future. The question is which is that point where, after all tests are concluded, knowledge terminates in absolute certainty,— with complete assurance of uncontradictability? Where most philosophers have fallen back, baffled at this question of all questions, Śri Madhva, alone, in his theory of knowledge, has boldly taken the bull by the horns. He points to the principle of Sākṣī as the terminus of all tests and processes of reasoning, where a belief in the validity of a particular knowledge or experience becomes converted into a logical certainty and intuitive conviction. These points are convincingly demonstrated by him in his *Anuvyakhyana*:

12.* न ज्ञानदृष्टिमात्रेण प्रामाण्यं तस्यं दृश्यते ।
अतो न सर्वमानानां प्रामाण्यं निश्चितं भवेत् ।।
साक्षिणा निश्चितं यत्र तत्प्रामाण्यं स्वलक्षणम् ।
न चैवाखिलमानानि निश्चिनोत्यखिलो जनः ।।
तस्मादनुभवारूढं किमर्थमपलप्यते ? (*AV.* iii, p. 94).

"The mere awareness of a knowledge does not necessarily reveal its validity. Such validity is not realized at the very outset, in sensory and other forms of knowledge. It is only when it is intuited by the Sākṣī, with or without the aid of tests that the true nature of validity, comes to be clearly and fully realized and manifested. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to draw a distinction between ordinary sensory, mental and other forms of Vṛtti-jñāna (cognitive states of the mind) and the judgments of the Sākṣī, in accordance with the facts of our own experience".

In the foregoing passages, Madhva establishes a clear-cut distinction between Vṛtti-jñāna and ākṣi-jñāna. All

knowledge at the sensory and mental level comes under Vṛtti-jñāna which is a mental state partaking of the nature of a peculiar kind of modification of the mind-stuff (*antaḥ-karaṇapariṇāmarūpa*). The perception and judgments of the Sākṣī are, on the other hand, of the essence of Caitanya or Pure consciousness and therefore self-luminous in regard to their nature and content of validity. The reason for making such a distinction in knowledge is that our experience shows that we do not become convinced of the validity of every kind of knowledge that comes to us through the sensory and mental channels and which are also at times open to error. There are, however, certain intimate experiences such as of pleasure and pain which, in the language of Decartes, are "clearly and distinctly apprehended as true", about whose reality we are never, at any time, assailed by doubt. Such experiences should be placed on a different footing altogether. No doubt, the former kind of knowledge is also apprehended by the Sākṣī; but there the Sākṣī merely takes the knowledge to be valid in a general way, subject to its being flawless and without entering into more details then and there. But, when faced with conflicting testimony or new facts challenging the first impression, the Sākṣī feels the need to look more closely into such cases. It then institutes suitable tests of validity and if it feels satisfied and convinced by the results of the tests, it accepts the knowledge as valid.

13.* सुदृढो निर्णयो यत्र ज्ञेयं तत्साक्षिदर्शनम् ।
यत्क्वचित् व्यभिचारि स्यात् दर्शनं मानसं नु तत् ।
मानसे दर्शने दोषाः स्युर्न वै साक्षिदर्शने
अतोऽदोषप्रतीतस्य सत्यत्वं साक्षिणा मतम् (*AV.* p. 49).

"The perception by the Sākṣī is that in our experience, which is not open to sublation and which is decisive in character. Knowledge, acquired through sensory channels and the mind and subject to discrepancies, is to be

regarded as a modification of the mind-stuff. This latter is liable to correction and sublation; while the former is not.

What is thus established by the flawless verdict of Sākṣī, must be regarded as true and valid for all time."

The above passages explain the reasons for attributing to Sākṣi-pratyakṣa the quality of infallibility and self-validation, which are denied to sensory and mental perceptions. The mind and the senses, being materially constituted, are liable to err and are open to misconceptions, albeit rarely. But the experiences and judgments of the Sākṣi stand on a higher footing. They could not be doubted. They have never been shown to have been mistaken or invalidated, at any time within one's conscious experience. The proof of this is furnished by the most intimate and poignant experiences of pleasure, pain, dread and such other inward experiences about whose reality none of us has had any occasion to entertain the least doubt, afterwards.

Madhva shows further that Sākṣī comes in not only as an indispensable complement of sensory and other means of knowledge, open to us; but that it is, in all cases, the true and highest principle of validation :

14.* ज्ञानस्य ग्राहकेणैव साक्षिणा मानता मितेः ॥ (*AV*. p. 49).
"The very validation of knowledge depends upon the Sākṣī which is the ultimate principle that knows the knowledge,"

The above statement of Madhva makes two points (1) that in all cases of knowledge, the fact of the knowledge is established not by the knowledge itself; but by the evidence of Sākṣī. The reason for this is that all Vṛtti-jñāna (mental and sensory) is material in essence and has no power to reveal its own existence; (2) that all such Vṛtti-jñāna (mental and sensory) can, by no means,

manifest its own validity, to itself. We require a non-material form of knowledge to do this. Such a one can only be the Sākṣī and no other. It may be explained here "Sākṣi" is not something other than the Ātman. Sākṣī. in Madhva's epistemology, is the name of the spiritual sense organ of the self through which it intuits its experiences. But this instrument of intuition is not something different from the self (*pramātā*).[1] The distinction is only one of reference and not of essence. Such a distinction is made possible, according to Madhva, by the special thought-category of Viśeṣa, accepted by him. [See Texts 50; 91-92].

Madhva does not accept the contention of some schools of Indian philosophy that all knowledge is self-luminous, true and valid. He recognizes the need for tests or *parīkṣā* in respect of sensory and other forms of Vṛtti-jñāna before they could be pronounced to be indubitably valid. His approach to the problem of knowledge is thus strictly scientific and realistic. Some other philosophers have held that both knowledge and its validity are inferentially established and never directly apprehended. This is not supported by experience. Some others feel that if validity does not belong to knowledge by right, it can never be given to it. If its validity is dependent upon its capacity to satisfy tests, we would be in for an endless regress of tests. A test is in the nature of a reasoning and unless its own validity is established, it could not validate another. This objection would not apply to Madhva's position that in respect of sense perception and other forms of Vṛtti-jñāna, their validity is established by Sākṣī after appropriate tests:

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1. सुखादिविषयं स्वरूपभूतं चैतन्येन्द्रियं हि साक्षीत्युच्यते ।
तदभिव्यक्तं ज्ञानं चेति ।। (*NS*. p. 258).

15.* न परीक्षानवस्था स्यात् साक्षिसिद्धे त्वसंशयात् (*AV.* p. 49).
परीक्षादेश्च सत्यत्वं तेन ह्येव मतं भवेत् . (*AV.* p. 14b)

"There is no question of regress of tests in respect of the decisions arrived at by the Sākṣī (regarding the validity of particular tests); for the simple reason that the judgment of the Sākṣī regarding the result of the test is infallible. The Sākṣī is competent to know its own flawlessness and the validity of the tests applied, without recourse to further tests."

In apprehending knowldge, Sākṣī presumes its validity, subject to the condition of its being free from any flaws in the instruments of knowledge etc. Where it feels impelled to go into the point further, it resorts to tests. The purpose of these tests is to make sure of the absence of such flaws and *not* to apprehend validity; for the validity of knowledge is, like the fact of knowledge, apprehended by Sākṣī itself, directly.

The Sākṣī is thus the inner tribunal of all knowledge and validity. Without the acceptance of such a principle, experience would cease to have any meaning:

16.* तस्मान्न तं विना किंचित् स्मर्तुं द्रष्टुमथापि वा ।
शक्यं * * * *
अतोऽदोषप्रतीतस्य सत्यत्वं साक्षिणा मतम् ।। (*AV.* p. 14b).

"Without recognizing the Sākṣī, it would be idle to talk of knowledge of any kind. Whatever then is proved to exist on the flawless evidence of Sākṣī must be accepted as real and true and not subject to sublation. We think, reason and feel pleasure and pain. These are as self-evident to the Sākṣī as its own existence."

Unless epistemology is equipped with such a principle of validation, there would be no finality about our logical, scientific and artistic judgments. All purposeful activity and organised life would be exposed to a ceaseless flux of uncertainty:

17.* कोऽपि ह्यर्थो न निश्चेतुं शक्यते भ्रमवादिना ।
भ्रमत्वमभ्रमत्वं च यदैवानुभवोपगम् ।
एकस्य भ्रमता तत्र परस्याभ्रमता कुतः ?
भ्रमत्वमभ्रमत्वं च सर्वं वेद्यं हि साक्षिणा । (*AV*. p. 30b)
साक्षिणा निश्चितं यत्र तत्प्रामाण्यं स्वलक्षणम् । (*AV*. p. 49)

"It would be impossible for one who believes the Sākṣī to be susceptible to error, to determine the truth of any fact of knowledge. The fact that some of our apprehensions are found to be correct and others erroneous could be explained on the basis of the acceptance of Sākṣī. For, it is the Sākṣī that has got to be convinced of defects in the instruments of knowledge or the fact of sublation, if a particular cognition is to be rejected as erroneous: and of correspondence or coherence, if it is to be accepted as correct. Unless the Sākṣī is in a position to perform these functions unerringly, there would be serious damage to any kind of regulated life. For organised life based on निष्कम्पप्रवृत्त (unwavering efforts) cannot be carried on merely on the basis of vague presumptions of validity or of doubtful cognitions. The activities emerging from the judgments of Sākṣī cannot rest on any but the firmest foundations of certainty. Such judgments would necessarily mean that the Sākṣī is equipped with an inherent capacity to know the true from the false. And this capacity can never forsake it without reducing the Sākṣī itself to a nullity."

The non-acceptance of Sākṣī as the standard of reference in epistemological certainty would lead to disastrous consequences. It is a truism in modern philosophy that our laws of reasoning cannot themselves be established by reasoning. They must be intuitively perceived to be true. Principles such as those of induction are in fact so perceived and regarded as self evident. They are there in all the processes and activities of our normal daily life, no less than in the

region of abstract thought. Madhva's doctrine of Sākṣi is based precisely on such considerations as the limitations of sensory and other channels of knowledge and the imperative need for an *a priori* principle of validation of our scientific, artistic and other judgments. No sound theory of knowledge can be said to be complete without such a final principle of validation. It is indeed an outstanding contribution of Madhva to the epistemological problem. He deserves great credit for having realized the magnitude and urgency of this aspect of the problem of knowledge and given it top priority in his exposition.

18.* सुखदुःखादिविषयं शुद्धं संसारगेष्वपि ।
निर्दोषत्वादिनियमात् तद्बलिष्ठतमं मतम् ।। (*AV.* p. 15)

"Even in the case of Samsārins, there is a pure sense-organ which cognizes pleasure, pain etc. This should be deemed essentially flawless and therefore superior to the materially constituted sense-organs. It is this one that is called Sāksi."

This passage elucidates the nature and function of the Svarūpendriya of the self, known as Sākṣī. The reason for accepting the existence of such an additional *indriya* is that the direct apprehension of pleasure, pain, desire etc., without the elaborate process of reasoning etc., presupposes a suitable sense-organ for the purpose. Moreover, it is not only in waking life that we have such experiences. Even in Suṣupti, where the external senses and the mind are not functioning, there is the perception of happiness, of time etc. Since direct perception of any of these cannot be accounted for without the help of a suitable *indriya*, we have to posit the existence of a Svarūpendriya with which the self intuits these. Since the perception of pleasure, pain, desire etc., by this *sākṣīndriya* is *never subject to contradiction*, it has to be accepted as essentially '*pure*' and *infallible.*

Corollaries of the Doctrine of Sākṣī

Having established the doctrine of Sākṣī on firm foundations, as above, Śrī Madhva proceeds to show that the reality of world-experience would follow as a natural corollary from it. That, in turn, would render the theory that world-experience is unreal (*mithyā*), being the result of a beginningless Adhyāsa, baseless :

19.* अन्यथा श्रुतियुक्त्यादिप्रमाणैश्च सहैव तु ।
अकस्माद्विनिवृत्तिश्च किं विश्वस्य न शक्यते ।
इतः पूर्वं तथाभावाद्यदि नासंसृतेर्गतिः ।
वाक्यानुमादितश्चेत् स्यात्, तत्प्रामाण्यं च साक्षितः ।
* * * एवमेव हि ।
सर्वकालेष्वपि स्थैर्याद् व्यभिचारमपोह्य च ॥
एवमक्षजमानत्वसिद्धां विश्वस्य सत्यताम् ।
किमिति स्थापयेन्नायं निर्दोषज्ञानशक्तितः ? (*AV*. p. 14b)

"If the competence of Sākṣī to grasp validity in terms of absolute uncontradictability is not accepted as an axiomatic truth, there would be nothing to prevent the negation of Brahman, as of world-experience, here and now, all of a sudden. If it is argued that this is not possible because Scriptures declare Brahman to be an uncontradicted reality and that even the world-appearance is terminatet only when God wills it, it would presuppose a firm faith in the uncontradictable validity of such Scriptural statements or the reasonings in their favour. In any case, it is the Sākṣī that would have to be assured of the validity of such evidences. If it is therefore, competent to have such an assurance in their case, a similar competence to it to be assured of the reality of its own experience of the world and its values could hardly be denied, by any reasonable person. If then, the Sākṣī, as Praāmāṇya-grāhaka, is competent to directly apprehend the incontestable validity of Pramāṇas, it would do so, without exception, in all cases of valid experience. If it

does not possess such competence, it could never aspire to have any direct knowledge of the uncontradictable reality of Brahman taught by the Scriptures. In the absence of such knowledge, it may even be assailed by legitimate doubts about the reality of Brahman. If realization gives it such knowledge, it means an admission of the proposition that the realization of a fact by the Sākṣī carries with it an implicit assurance of the uncontradictable reality and validity of that fact. This is precisely what is meant by saying that Sākṣī-pratyakṣa is self-luminous, self-certifying and uncontradictable. If one should however maintain, without going up to the level of Sākṣī, that since Brahman has not been contradicted so far, it might be presumed to be really so, it would merely be a supposition which may or may not be true. If an inference is attempted to that effect, one may, on the same ground predicate the unsublatable reality of Mūlāvidyā too. It would be ruinous, therefore, for the Brahmavādī to make any invidious distinction in the Sākṣī's capacity to be assured of the absolute validity of its judgments, be they about the reality of Brahman or about that of world-experience."

20.* शुद्धः साक्षी यदा सिद्धो दुःखित्वं बाध्यते कथम् ?
यत्स्वरूपग्रहे मानं तद्धर्मे न कथं भवेत् ? (A.V. p. 299)

"Thus, once it is established beyond question that the Sākṣī is inviolable in respect of its judgments of validity, the reality of its experience of the bondage and misery of Samsāra, would follow as a logical deduction. The proof of the existence of a thing is also the proof of its possessing its attributes.*"

If the direct experience of the Sākṣī are proved to have been illusory experiences, either by Scripture or by some sort of transcendental perception, later, it would

* This statement, as it occurs in the A.V., bears upon a different subject-matter.

simply mean that the Sākṣī has been mistaken in its earlier judgment about their factual reality. It has been shown that this would cut at the very root of the conception of Sākṣī and its *raison d'être.*

Validity cannot be Temporally Limited (Vyāvahārika)

Madhva concludes his exposition of the nature of validity as established by the principle of Sākṣī, with an examination of the doctrine of "Vyāvahārika-Prāmāṇya" according to which Pratyakṣa (including Sākṣī-pratyakṣa) has only a *relative* and *not an absolute* validity. The Advaita school seeks to resolve the contradiction between the reality of world-experience established by sense-perception and Sākṣi and the disappearance ol all duality after the realization of oneness with Brahman (supposed to be) taught in Scripture, on the basis of this hypothesis.

Srī Madhva disputes this contention that the validity of Pratyakṣa is not on a par with that of the Śrutis. *Validity is a question of fact and it admits of no degrees.* One must, therefore, look for some other way of reconciling the statements of Śruti regarding Brahmic realization with the validity of world-experience established by the Sākṣī. Any attempt to impugn the validity of Sākṣī, out of deference to Śruti, would be disastrous to the validity of the Śruti itself; for the validity of even the Advaitic realization would have to be ultimately grounded on the direct experience of the Sākṣī! If the Sākṣī could be mistaken in one case, he could be equally mistaken about the other:

21.* प्रामाण्यस्य च मर्यादा कालतो व्याहता भवेत् ।
कालान्तरेप्यमानं चेदिदानीं मानता कुतः ?
तात्कालिकं प्रमाणत्वमक्षजस्य यदा भवेत् ।
एंक्यागमस्य किं न स्यात् ; तस्याप्येतादृशं यदि ।
ऐक्यप्रमाणमिथ्यात्वं यदा ; विश्वस्य सत्यता । (*AV.* p. 33b)

"It would be contradictory to impose any temporal

limit on the validity of Perception and restrict it to the "present" moment (of perception). If perception is to be invalidated later, how could it have any validity even now? If the validity of sense perception regarding the reality of world-experience, endorsed by Sākṣī, were to be limited to the time of perception alone, the validity of the identity-texts (Advaita-Śruti) would have to be similarly limited to the time of *their* perception by the Sākṣī. They would then have no absolute validity. If limitation means sublation, world-experience would re-emerge after the identity-texts have ceased functioning."

The pith of the above argument is that validity being a question of fact, it has nothing to do with the permanence or otherwise of objects. A thing might exist only for a few seconds. It would, none the less, be an uncontradicted fact, which could never be *sublated.* Sublation or *bādha*, according to Advaita, is negation of factual existence *(svarūpeṇa)* with reference to the past, present and future *(kālatrayasattāniṣedha).* The so-called Vyāvahārika-prāmāṇya does not admittedly deny such sublation of world-experience. It makes no difference to the fact of sublation by what particular knowledge the sublation is effected. What matters is that it is sublated. In these circumstances, Vyāvahārika-prāmāṇya turns out to be nothing more than a euphemism for "invalid". It is therefore a palpable contradiction to say that Pratyakṣa is valid at the time *(tatkālikam)* and in the same breath to maintain that it is *sublated.* It makes no difference to the fact of sublation by what precise knowledge it is done, whether by another empirical one or by a trans-empirical one viz., knowledge of Brahman. That apart, one might wonder if the identity-texts themselves could have an absolute validity, if perception (sensory or the Sākṣin's) is limited to the present instant and incapable of grasping absolute validity. If the validity of Advaitic texts is

realized in an absolute sense, the principle of there being only one absolute would be violated. If the realization of their meaning by the Sākṣī carries no assurance of absolute validity, they would be open to sublation, in which case world-appearance would recrudesce.

Relative strength of Pramāṇas. Primacy of साक्षी

What are we to do when Scripture, which we all acknowledge as supernatural and inspired, appears to conflict with reason and perception? This is the next important question which Madhva discusses, in his theory of knowledge. All schools of Vedānta are agreed on the superior status of Āgama as 'inspired' and *apauruṣeya*. Does this mean that perception and inference are *ipso facto* invalid, if in conflict with the deliverances of Āgama? This is a moot point in Vedāntic philosophy and exegesis. The Advaita school has naturally tried to turn the universal acknowledgment of the sanctity of Scripture to its advantage by making a distinction between Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika reality and holding that Vyāvahārika-experiences are sublated and transcended by the experience of non-duality, which is the purport of the Upaniṣads.1

Madhva shows that such a conclusion is not justified. The sanctity of Scripture can never take away the validity of Perception of Inference *in their own right, at any level.* The question cannot be decided on irrelevant grounds of the prestige of Śrutis or sentimental regard for them. The proper criterion to be applied in all cases of conflict of Pramāṇas is to determine which of the two pramāṇas is "Upajīvya" or furnishes the basic data and which is the "Upajīvaka" or the one proceeding on the basis of the data "given" by the Upajīvya. The Upajīvaka is *ipso*

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1. Cf. पारमार्थिकमद्वैतं प्रविश्य शरणं श्रुतिः ।
विरोधादुपजीव्येन न बिभेति ॥ (Śrīharṣa)

facto bound to respect the data furnished by the Upajīvya and cannot fiy in the face of it or set it at naught. This is an incontrovertible principle of all scientific thought and interpretation. The interpretation of Scripture is not exempt from this universal principle:

22.* प्रत्यक्षादेरागमस्य प्राबल्येऽपि, नोपजीव्यप्रमाणविरोधे प्रामाण्यम्;
विषयाभावेन स्वस्यैवाप्रामाण्यापत्तेः (*V.T.N.* 19b)

"Though Āgama, as a rule, enjoys a higher status than perception or inference, it is so only in the absence of conflict with its Upajīvyapramāṇa or the evidence by which its data is established. If the evidence by which a given datum is established is invalidated, the datum itself would cease to exist and no further statements about it could have any force."

The identity texts stand in need of Jīva and Iśvara as their basic data. The former is established by Sākṣi-pratyakṣa and the latter might be established by causal argument. In any case, a person who has established the existence of Īśvara, to his satisfaction, on the basis of a causal argument, as the all-creator etc., and who is aware through his own Sākṣī-experience that he is *not* endowed with such powers, would, by the same token, know his distinction from Īśvara. An identity-text, in these circumstances, would be powerless to convince him of his oneness with Īśvara; for it would be faced with a clear conflict with its own Upajīvya-pramāṇas whereby the very existence of the Jīva and Īśvara is established. It may be pointed out further that it is not the bare existence of Jīva or Īśvara that is established by the Upajīvyapramāṇas here, but the Jīva and Īśvara *as defined above*. Any identity between *such beings* would, therefore, be in glaring conflict witn Upajīvyapramāṇas.

23.* तत्प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धार्थे नागमस्यापि मानता ।
उपजीव्यमक्षजं यत्, तदन्यत्र विपर्ययः ।
लौकिके व्यवहारेऽत्र प्रत्यक्षस्योपजीव्यता ॥ (*AV.* p. 49)

"Where Pratyakṣa is the Upajīvya (prop) of Āgama, the latter tho' normally superior, cannot upset the former. Where on the other hand, Āgama happens to be the Upajīvya of perception (as in respect of the perception of certain defects in the Avatāras of God), there Pratyakṣa has no validity as against Āgama, which represents Īśvara as free from all defects.[1] But in respect of the Jīva and other entities, it is perception that is the Upajīvya of Āgamas, in their descriptions of the identity of the ātman with Brahman. Hence, the principle of *bādhyabādhaka* cannot be taken to be unrestricted in its application."

Here Madhva boldly shows how even the Śruti has to respect Upajīvyapramāṇa and cannot ride rough-shod over it :

24.* उपजीव्यविरुद्धं तु कथमैक्यं श्रुतिर्वदेत् ? (*AV.* p. 29)

"How can the Śruti declare an identity (of Jīva and Brahman) which is in contradiction with the *Upajīvapramāṇa* or basic proof of the Sākṣī"?

In whatever form the identity of Jīva and Brahman might be taken to be predicated in Scripture—whether by making the Jīva the subject of the proposition and predicating identity with Brahman, or by the reverse process or by making both the subject and making their identity the predicate, violation of the Upajīvyapramāṇa would be inescapable. Hence, such propositions cannot be accepted at their face value.

25.* न दुःखानुभवः क्कापि मिथ्यानुभवतां व्रजेत् ।
यदि दुःखानुभूतिश्च भ्रांतिरित्यवसीयते
अदुःखिताश्रुतिः केन न भ्रांतिरिति गम्यते ?
श्रुतिस्वरूपमर्थश्च मानेनैवावसीयते ।
तच्चेन्मानं गृहीतं ते किं दुःखानुभवे भ्रमः ?

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1. आगमैकप्रमाणेषु तस्यैव ह्युपजीव्यता (*AV.* p. 15.)

In respect of matters vouchsafed exclusively by Scripture, ग़ (Āgama) is itself the Upajīvya.

न च बाधविशेषोऽस्ति यद्बाधितमेव तत् ।
बाधो यद्यनुभूतेऽर्थे कथं निर्णय ईक्षते ? (*AV*. p. 30b)

"If the experiences of the joys and sorrows of life could turn out to be illusory in any instance, how is one to be certain that the identity-texts, which are taken to convey that the Jīva free from pain becomes Brahman, might not be equally susceptible to error? The Śruti as such and its particular import have, after all, to be cognized by the Sākṣī; which must, therefore, be in a position to be assured of the validity of the purport of the Śruti. As it is the same Sākṣī that form similar judgments of validity with regard to the experiences of the joys and sorrows of life coming thro' its own direct intuitive faculties, how could its judgment be dismissed as unreliable in respect of empirical reality alone? There can be no stultification of the judgments of Sākṣī in respect of its intimate and immediate experiences of the joys and sorrows of existence. If such stultification is recognised, there would be no hope of any certainty whatsoever, in knowledge."

These psssages tell us clearly about the unique position which the Sākṣī should hold in any reasoned theory of knowledge, as the final appellate authority upon which the reality of all valid experiences must rest, at all levels of consciousness *and super-consciousness*. Even the truth of Advaita-Sākṣātkāra (if there be such a thing) has to be experienced and endorsed by the Sākṣī. Such a unique principle of validation must necessarily remain infallible in all *its* judgments. Once this is conceded, as it must be, the reality of world-experience as an uncontradicted fact would follow as a corollary. That would be sufficient vindication of Madhva's realism.

Primacy of Pratyakṣa

The world, according to Madhva, is a fact of experience

It is, no doubt. imperfect, finite and changing. But it is none the less real as a fact. Its multiplicity, its division and its dispersal in space and time are all true of it. They are not erroneously superimposed upon the Ātmic consciousness, as a result of Avidyā. Hence, there is no *mistake* in our perception and experience of the world as an objective reality. Thro' excessive attachment to things of the world and thro' a misplaced assumption of independence of initiative and conduct, we become entangled in the world of Saṃsāra and in the chain of birth and death. This bondage of the soul to the ills of embodied existence is *also a fact and a reality.* It is not a mere projection of the mind or a waking dream. Release from this Saṃsāra does not, therefore, involve in Madhva's philosophy, any *negation* of the fact of an objective world or of the soul's actual connection *with it* and its varied experiences *in it* until release. It is *here* that we come upon the parting of the ways between the philosophies of Śaṃkara and Madhva. Saṃkara introduces his famous doetrine of reality and assigns to the world of normal experience the status of a "Vyāvahārikasatya" (empirical being). Madhva is *not* satisfied with this sort of reality to the world. The reason is that according to Advaitic thought "the empirical reality of the world is *negated* when perfect insight or intuition of the oneness of all is attained"[1]. It is further contended by the Advaita system that "the world we see and touch is only a world reflecting the conditions of our minds. What is perceived and shaped into meaning depends on the powers of apprehension we employ and the interests we possess. The knowledge we obtain thro' the senses and reason cannot be regarded as complete or perfect". This is the familiar line of idealistic argument. Madhva, as a realist, maintains that the relativity of knowledge to

1. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, Radhakrishnan. 1955, p. 87.

physical and psychological factors, which are extraneous to the object of perception, is no ground to discard the claims of Sense-perception to give us correct knowledge of reality so far as it goes :

26.* न च प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमन्येन केनापि बाध्यं दृष्टम् । चन्द्रप्रादेशत्वादिविषयं तु, दूरस्थत्वादिदोषयुक्तत्वादपटु । न च जगत्प्रत्यक्षस्य अपटुत्वे किंचिन्मानम् ॥ (*Td.* p. 7)

"Sense knowledge is its own standard of truth. It cannot be stultified by inference or scripture. The moon's limited size and such other defective preceptions are accountable as being due to distance and other abnormal conditions. But, so far as the most rigorous tests could go, there is nothing to warrant a wholesale rejection of the evidence of sense-perception, regarding the existence of a world outside our minds."

The existence of perceptual errors and illusions is no valid ground for rejecting all perceptions as invalid, as the Advaita seeks to do, in its famous inferential proof of the *mithyātva* of the world.[1] Madhva points out that an analysis of perceptual illusions would itself disclose the existence of a realistic residue in all of them. They do not justify a wholesale repudiation of perception as essentially misleading. Modern physics also does not prove that we do not perceive physical objects as they are; tho' it may cast doubts on the adequacy of the picture commonsense realism gives of the external world. As Prof. Joad rightly observes, "If subjective idealism is correct in what it asserts, the physicist's world—no less than the methods by which he explores it, consists of ideas in minds. If this is so, no conclusion at which he arrives by assuming matter to be real can possibly be

1. विश्वं मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात्, जडत्वात् परिच्छिन्नत्वात् शुक्तिरूप्यवत् ।
"The universe is unreal because it is perceivable, insentient, and limited, like the silver-in-nacre."

2. *Guide to Philosophy*, p. 59.

true"[2] Max Born, in his recent work "Physics in my Generation", (London, 1956) makes a significant observation that "the scientist must be a realist. He must accept his sense impressions as more than mere hallucinations,—as messages of a real outer world".[1]

Bheda-Srutis are Invulnerable

A smooth idealistic interpretation of the Upaniṣads is prevented by the presence of numerous texts and contexts in them supporting the reality of the world and its values and the difference between Jīvas and Brahman. Advaita philosophers have devised an explanation to overcome this difficulty. They propose that all those texts and contexts which proclaim the reality of the Uuiverse and the difference between Jīva and Brahman are to be viewed as "modes of restatement" (*anuvādaka*) of empirical facts which are to be refuted by those denying reality to the world of differences. Madhva shows the untenability of this sort of explanation:

27* प्रत्यक्षानुमानसिद्धत्वे च भेदस्य, तद्विरोधादेवाप्रामाण्यं अभेदागमस्य । तेन अभेदागमस्य प्रामाण्याभावे, नानुवादकत्वं भेदवाक्यानाम् । न हि बलवतोऽनुवादकत्वम्; दार्ढ्यहेतुत्वात् ॥
(*V.T.N.* p. 19b).

"What has *not* been otherwise established by appropriate evidence can never be 're-stated'. It must, therefore, be conceded that difference between Jīva and Brahman is given by the independent authority of Pratyakṣa and inference. In that case, identity-texts would be unable to set aside this difference, which has been duly established by Pratyakṣa and inference. The Bheda-Śrutis would then be adding to the weight of the earlier perception and inference about the reality of the difference between Jīva and Brahman."

1. *Op. cit.* p. 106.

Thus, the attempt to devalue the Bheda-Śrutis, as 'merely repetitive' of empirical truth, cannot be sustained.

28.* न च जीवेश्वरभेदः सिद्ध इत्यनुवादकत्वं भेदवाक्यानाम् ।
आगमं विना ईश्वरस्यैवासिद्धेः ॥ (V.T.N. 19b)

:"Bheda-Śrutis could not be regarded as repetitive of empirical differences unless the distinction between Jīva and Īśvara is already established on independent authority. And there is no way of establishing Īśvara except through Scripture."

Before the difference between Jīva and Īśvara taught in Upaniṣadic texts like "Dvā suparṇā" (*Muṇḍ. Up.*) could be put down as *merely repetitive*. a prior knowledge of the two, through other means of knowledge, is necessary. It is here that the difficulty comes in. For, (according to strict Vedāntic views) the existence of God can only be known through Scripture. The same Scripture that tells us about the existence of God, His greatness and majesty, tells us also that He is infinitely superior to the Jīvas and is their *antaryāmī*, too. How, then, can any identity-text weaken this Scriptural teaching? If. on the other hand, we should rely on Sākṣi-pratyakṣa to give us the necessary prior knowledge of God and soul and their mutual difference, the difficulty would still remain; for, as has been shown, the verdict of Sākṣī being final, identity-texts would be powerless to upset it.

29.* अनुमानसिद्धेश्वराच्च भेदोऽनुभवत एव सिद्धो जीवस्य ।
असर्वकर्तृत्वेनानुभवात् । न चानुभवविरोधे आगमस्य प्रामाण्यम् ।
आगमप्रामाण्यानुभवस्याप्यप्रामाण्यापत्तेः ॥ (V.T.N. p. 19b)

"The difficulty would persist even if we try to establish Īśvara through inference. For, then, the Jīva would only be too clearly conscious of his immeasurable difference from the Supreme Being, inferentially established as the author of the Universe. Such a personal conviction of the Sākṣī would suffice to show that their identity could

never be the purport of the Scriptures at all. If Ṡcripture should override Sākṣyanubhava, there would be nothing to guarantee its own validity, which has itself to be apprehended by the Sākṣī."

Thus there is no side-stepping the incontrovertible reality of the world and its values established by flawless perception, inference and Scriptures and endorsed by the testimony of Sākṣī.

30.* अतः प्रमाणसिद्धत्वे तदपलापायुक्तेः, अप्रमाणसिद्धत्वे च भेदप्रमाणस्यानु वादित्वाभावाच्च, न भेदवाक्यानां दौर्बल्यम् ॥

(*V.T.N.* p. 20).

"If the difference between Jīva and Brahman is admitted to be established by valid means of proof, it could never be disproved by identity-texts. If not established by valid means of proof, then the Bheda-Śrutis could not be treated as repetitive of such difference. Thus, in either case, Bheda-Śrutis could not be treated as "weaker" (*durbala*) than identity-texts."

This passage shows the difficulties involved in setting aside all Bheda-Śrutis in the Upaniṣads as repetitive of facts empirically known. Nothing could be gained by using the expression 'empirical' evasively. How is the knowledge of the difference between Jīva and Brahman (which is supposed to be repeated) *first obtained*? Is it obtained thro' valid Pramāṇas or not? In the former case, the identity-texts would be powerless to oppose them as they would stand discredited by opposition to the Upajīvya or basic Pramāṇa by which the difference is *exhypothesi* established. In the latter alternative, the Bheda-Śrutis could not be regarded as repetitions of any difference already established by any valid pramāṇas. They would then become original and independent testimony of difference, in their own right.

The attempt to side-step the Bheda-Śrutis, with the help of the doctrine of Vyāvahārika-prāmāṇya, fails, in the end.

In judging the purport of the Śāstras, we should not, therefore, arbitrarily dismiss the Bheda-Śrutis as of inferior status, merely repetitive of empirical truths and therefore not concerned with any factual reality of ultimate significance. As a matter of fact, they gain an added significance in that they corroborate and reinforce the evidence of sense-perception, reason and Sākṣyanubhava about the reality of the world and its values, of "the starry heavens above and the moral law within".

It would, therefore, be unwise to cling to a few, "identity-texts" in the Upaniṣads, on the sole ground that they teach something new and alluring. "Apūrvatā" or novelty has, no doubt, been recognized as a "mark of purport" (*tātparyaliṅga*). But then, it should be remembered that even this criterion is not and cannot be exempt from the logical requirement that it should *not be contradicted by other available Pramāṇas.* If this principle is not adhered to, Apūrvatā might lead one astray into all sorts of baseless and breath-taking novelties in the name of metaphysical speculation :

31.* सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धवचनानामेव प्राबल्याङ्गीकारे, 'इदं वाऽग्रे नैव किञ्चनासीत्' 'असतः सदजायत' इत्यादीनामेव अविचारेण प्रतीयमानस्यार्थस्य सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वात् तत्र सर्वागमनां महातात्पर्यं प्रसज्येत । (*V.T.N.* p. 20b)

"If we insist on investing the identity-texts which are opposed to the teaching of all other available Pramāṇas with a superior status, then, one might go a step further and swear by texts in the Upaniṣads like: 'In the beginning there was *nothing* at all.' 'The existent came out of the non-existent' etc., and hold fast to a nihilistic metaphysics, as the most novel and alluring metaphysics and end up by

interpreting the entire Vedānta in conformity with it. It would be no argument against this that nihilistic metaphysic stands discredited by logic; for that precisely would be its merit and strength! We cannot, therefore, be carried away by mere Apūrvatā, regardless of other Pramāṇas involved."

How Then to Interpret the Identity-Texts ?

We have therefore to take a balanced view of the facts at our disposal and find a solution for the seeming contradictions of the empirical and trans-empirical data, on the basis of Sākṣī,—the ultimate source and guarantor of all knowledge and the touchstone of all truth and validity at all levels—empirical and trans-empirical. If we deny authority to the Sākṣī, there would be no proof of the existence of any experience, be it empirical or trans-empirical.

32.* सार्वज्ञ्यादिगुणं जीवाद्भिन्नं ज्ञापयति श्रुतिः ।
ईश तामुपजीव्यैव वर्तते ह्यैक्यवादिनी ॥ (*A.V.* p. 2)

"The Śrutis proclaim that there is a Supreme Lord of the Universe, possessed of all auspicious attributes like omniscience and different from individual souls. Obviously, the identity-texts have to presuppose and depend upon these (for their data) in predicating an identity of essence between them. In these circumstances, this conflict of the identity-texts with their "Upajīvya-pramāṇa", would obviously stand in the way of our taking them in their *literal sense*".

33.* यजमानप्रस्तरत्वं यथा नार्थः श्रुतेर्भवेत् ।
ब्रह्मत्वमपि जीवस्य प्रत्यक्षस्याविशेषतः ॥ (*AV.*, p. 2)

"Just as in the Śruti text "the Sacrificer is a bundle of grass"[1] the literal sense is not the intended sense, similarly

1. 'यजमानः प्रस्तरः *T. B.* iii, 3, 7.

identity of essence between Jiva and Brahman could not be the intended purport of such Śrutis as are apparently so worded. In both the cases, the conflict with Pratyaksa would be the same,"

In this passage Śri Madhva draws attention to established principles of Vedic interpretation formulated by the Mimāṁsā and other Śāstras, which should guide us in interpreting texts that happen to be couched in loose, intriguing or ambiguous terms. We have to keep in mind the peculiar modes of thought and expression characteristic of the mystic approach to philosophical truths and their exposition, met with in the sacred writings. The task of correctly understanding the heart of the Scriptures is no easy one.[1] It cannot be achieved by merely looking up a Sanskrit dictionary. Jaimini lays down in his *Mīmamsa Sūtras* (i, 4, 23-29), several points of view which regulate the primary, secondary, figurative and esoteric interpretations of Vedic texts and contexts. Similar lines of figurative interpretations of Vedāntic texts are met with in the *Upaniṣads*[2] and *Brahmasūtras*[3] as well. Madhva's approach to the interpretation fo the identity-texts of the Upaniṣads, which are in clear conflict with Sākṣī and Upajīvya-pramāṇas, is also based on similar points of view. Some of these are broadly indicated by him as follows:

34.* सादृश्याच्च प्रधानत्वात् स्वातंत्र्यादपि वाऽभिदाम् ।
आहुरीशेन जीवस्य न स्वरूपाभिदां क्वचित् ॥ (*A.V.* p. 30b)

"Śrutis sometimes describe the Jīvas as non-different from Brahman, in virtue of some broad similarities of their attributes, or the outstanding prominence and metaphysical independence of Brahman (besides which

1. Cf. कश्छन्दसां योगमावेद धीरः (*R. V.* x 114.9).
2. Cf. *B.S.* ii, 3, 29.
3. *Chān.* Up. v, 1, 15.

naught else seems to exist or matter). Such descriptions should not, however, be understood literally, in terms of any identity of essence between them."

35.* स्वातन्त्र्ये च विशिष्टत्वे स्थानमत्यैक्ययोरपि ।
साद्दश्ये चैक्यवाक् सम्यक् सावकाशा यथेष्टतः ।।

(*A.V.* p. 2)

"Texts proclaiming identity between Jīva and Brahman admit of other reasonable interpretations in terms of the metaphysical independence and primacy of the Supreme, identity of place or interest, similarity of attributes and so on".

The language of identity is not unusual in Śrutis and Smṛtis which describe the close intimacy of mystic communion of the human soul with God, in which the human self is so thoroughly and overpoweringly "possessed" by the Divine Self and flooded by It. The sense of the absolute metaphysical dependence of the finite upon the Infinite is also a ground for such language of identification to be employed. Cf.

पुरुष एवेदं सर्वं तद्विश्वमुपजीवति ।

'All this is verily Puruṣa; for upon Him everything depends.' See also Vāmadeva's claim: "I have been Manu, Sūrya and Kakṣīvān" *Brh. Up* 1, 4, 10.) Prahlāda's declaration in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* "I am God Himself". Also *Gitā* xiv. 2 and *Bhāgavata*, i, 5, 20.

Before concluding the discussion of the proper interpretation of identity-texts, Madhva points out that it is not possible to think of any other interpretation of texts which proclaim the difference between the Jiva and Brahman and the reality of the world. They have necessarily to be taken in their express and literal sense. We cannot, for example, say that this difference is only phenomenal (*vyāvahārika*) and therefore unreal, being a product of ignorance or Avidyā :

36.* अवकाशोज्झिता भेदश्रुतिर्नातिबला कथम् ?
अज्ञानासंभवादेव मिथ्याभेदो निराकृतः । (*AV*. p. 2)
निर्विशेषे स्वयंभाते किमज्ञानावृतं भवेत् ?
मिथ्याविशेषोऽप्यज्ञानसिद्धिमेव ह्यपेक्षते ॥ (*AV*. p. 2; 2b)

"The Bheda Śrutis do not admit of any other explanation. They would keep their vantage. The theory of *unreal difference* stands refuted on account of the untenability of Ignorance obscuring Brahman. For, when Br ahman that is by definition devoid of all *viśeṣas* (shades, attributes etc.), shines in self-luminosity, there is nothing in it that could be concealed by ignorance. The assumption of unreal aspects *in it*, to render the work of Ignorance intelligible, would again presuppose the presence of an earlier Ignorance".

In the above passages, Madhva shows that texts which proclaim the difference between Jiva and Brahman and the reality of the world have to be given full weight. They cannot be *explained away* as conferring a lesser kind of reality known as "Vyāvahārikabheda" or 'empirical difference.' For, not until the thesis of oneness is proved would one be justified in resorting to such an explanation. We have seen, however, that the evidence of Sākṣi-experience and Upajivyapramāṇa are decidedly against the thesis of monism. Moreover, in the final analysis, Vyāvahārikabheda has to be admitted as "*bādhya*" or sublatable. Sublation, as defined by genuine Advaitic tradition and texts, is negation of *factual existence* with reference to all the three periods of time: past, present and future.[1] This would make it clear that 'empirical being', as it is termed, is not the same as factual reality; but something imposed by 'ignorance',—something that is only *assumed to exist* (till true knowledge dawns). In all seriousness, then, it is as much an 'appearance' as the "Prātibhāsika"—

1. त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वम् ।

reality, (of illusory appearances)—though longer-lived. Anyway, the concept of unreal difference (*mithyābheda*) would be inexplicable without exposing Brahman (or Ātman) to some sort of temporary obscuration by Ignorance. It is here that the greatest difficulty arises. The Ātman or Brahman is, by definition, essentially *Nirviśeṣa*—(devoid of all aspects, attributes etc.), and *Svaprakāśa* (self-luminous). It is absolutely impossible for such a being to be obscured by any veil of ignorance, with reference to any part, *aspect* or attribute of its being and become *a witness of plurality and diversity.* Without becoming a witness of "the imperfect, finite and changing" world, it would be impossible to "criticize ourselves or condemn the world"[1] If we are to assume the existence of unreal distinction of aspects in Brahman (or ātman) to facilitate and render intelligible the obscuration of a self-luminous being, of *certain 'aspects' alone, of its own nature and being*, such an assumption itself would need the help of Ajñāna. There would, thus, be a regress of inter-dependence between such 'imaginary distinctions' (*mithyāviśeṣas*) and Ignorance,—not to speak of other logical defects. The theory of "Vyāvahārikabheda" could not, therefore, be convincingly demonstrated. It cannot, therefore, be accepted as a satisfactory explanation of the diversity of experience.

The reality of bondage is in no way incompatible with human effort to get rid of it. In fact, it is what makes release from bondage and strenuous spiritual effort towards its achievement more meaningful and understandable. It is only on the view that worldly bondage of souls is real that even Divine grace could be shown to have a real or necessary connection with its removal:

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1. S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* p. 89.

37.* अतो यथार्थबन्धस्य विना विष्णुप्रसादतः ।
अनिवृत्तेस्तदर्थं हि जिज्ञासात्र विधीयते ॥ (*AV.* p. 2).

"The Śāstras enjoin inquiry into Brahman because the bondage of selves in Samsāra is real and cannot be destroyed without the grace of Brahman."

For comments see Text Nos. 64-65.

IV. CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD

Starting from the foundations of Sense-perception and Sākṣyanubhava and inference resting on them and interpreting the truths of Scripture in accord with the authority of Sākṣipramāṇa and Upajīvya-pramāṇa, Śrī Madhva arrives at a realistic metaphysics in which God, as Svatantra, occupies the central position, with matter and souls keeping their legitimate positions under Him. This reality as a whole is expressed in a system of *fivefold distinction*, which gives it its philosophical designation of "Prapañca":

38.* प्रकृष्ट: पञ्चविधो भेद: प्रपञ्च: । (*V.T.N.* p. 27)

"This valuable fivefold difference is "*Prapañca*".

The word "*Pra-pañca*" is derived from the substantive "*Pañcan*" with the suffix "*ḍa*" (*a*) signifying 'kind'. The prefix "pra" denotes 'excellence' or value. It is excellent in the sense that knowledge of this fivefold difference constitutes right knowledge that leads to Mokṣa.

39,* जीवेश्वरभिदा चैव जडेश्वरभिदा तथा ।
जीवभेदो मिथश्चैव जडजीवभिदा तथा ।
मिथश्च जडभेदोऽयं प्रपंचो भेदपंचक: ।। (*V.T.N* p. 27).

"This fivefold difference is the difference that exists as between Jīvas, Jaḍas (material principles) and Brahman on the one hand and mutually among Jīvas and Jaḍas themselves on the other."

40.* परमेश्वरेण ज्ञातत्वात् रक्षितत्वाच्च न द्वैतं भ्रान्तिकल्पितम् ।
न हीश्वरस्य भ्रान्ति: ! (*V.T.N.* p. 27).

"This scheme of Pañcabheda is not illusory—as it is cognized by God, maintained and controlled by Him; for there can be no illusions for God".

In this passage Śrī Madhva controverts the position that the world is an illusory projection of the cosmic mind. Onr sacred literature is full of references to the

creation, preservation, regulation and control of the world of matter and souls by a Supreme Being. The material world is the field or environment provided for the spiritual evolution of souls. God cannot possibly have given us an illusory environment to develop in. Nor could He be mistaken in perceiving the world in which we live, move and have our being and taking the trouble to help, guide and control our lives therein, in various ways. There is enough evidence in the Scriptures that *God perceives us and the world in which we live* (Cf. *Svet. Up.* i, 3 ; iii, 12 ; v. 5) *as factual realities. What is thus directly perceived by a cosmic mind cannot be illusory*:

41.* न च मायाविना माया दृश्यते; विश्वमीश्वरः ।
सदा पश्यति, तेनेदं न मायेत्यवधार्यताम् । (*V.T.N.* p. 28)

"A magician does not perceive his own magical creations. God perceives the Universe, always. So, it is not illusory like a magician's projections."

This passage reinforces the above argument by showing the difference between a real creation and a false appearance, such as is projected by a magician. A magician does not actually see such objects as magical elephants projected by him. But God *sees* the world *as the world* and sustains it (*Gita* : गामाविश्य च भूतानि धारयामि xv. 13).

42.* भ्रान्तिकल्पितत्वे च जगतः सत्यं जगद्द्वयमपेक्षितम्—
अधिष्ठानं च सदृशं सत्यवस्तुद्वयं विना ।
न भ्रान्तिर्भवति क्वापि ।। (*V.T.N.* p. 28).

"If this universe is to be regarded as imagined by our delusion (as the illusory snake in the rope), it would require the acceptance of a real universe (as the prototype of the imagined one) and a real substratum (i.e., to say, two reals)". "No theory of illusions can be demonstrated *without at least two reals*: a substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the

illusion and a prototype *(pradhāna)* of the superimposed object (*āropya*).

Even if *this world*, as we all experience it, is to be treated as an appearance superimposed on Ātmic consciousness, the laws of illusions would require that there should be (i) a prototype of the superimposed world, in reality, somewhere, bearing a close similarity to the substratum of the illusion. In the absence of such a prototype-world existing and having been experienced, no illusion could arise. In trying then, to dismiss *this world* as an illusory appearance, we would be driven to posit some *other world in its stead* as the real world. That would put the illusionist in the unenviable position of the ghost in the parable of the oilcake.[1]

43.* आत्माज्ञानात्मकत्वे च जगतः, आत्मनो भिन्नत्वेन न दृश्येत (*VTN*. p. 28).

"If the world-appearance were due to the transformation of the nescience (ajñāna) that conceals the true nature of the ātman, it (the world) would *not* be perceived as *different from the ātman*".

This passage shows that since the world is perceived by us as different from ourselves as the perceivers, it cannot be regarded as superimposed on our own perceiving consciousness. No one sees the substratum and the superimposed object separately, in an illusion. We do not, surely, perceive ourselves as the world of objects.[2] On the contrary, we perceive it as something *other than* and *outside* of us. This shows that there is no truth in the

44.* देहात्मत्वं यदि; न तत् * * ॥
मम देह इति ह्येव, न देहोऽहमिति प्रमा ।

1. पिण्याकयाचनार्थं गतस्य खारितैलदातृत्वाभ्युपगमवत् ! For an explanation of the parable *see* Col. Jacob *Laukikanyāyāñjali*, p. 35.
2. Cf. उपलब्धिव्यतिरेकोऽपि बलादभ्युपगन्तव्यः उपलब्धेरेव । Śaṁkara, *BSB*., ii, 2. 28.

contention that the self is superimposed on the not-self and *vice versa*.

उपचारश्च कृष्णोहमिति कर्दमलेपने ।
कथं न भेदो देहादेरात्मनो न प्रतीयते ?
जातमात्रा मृगा गावो हस्तिनः पक्षिणो झषाः ।
भयाभयस्वभोगादौ कारणानि विजानते ।
अस्मृतौ पूर्वदेहस्य विज्ञानं तत्कथं भवेत् ?
यदा देहान्तरज्ञानं देहैक्यावसितिः कुतः ?
व्याप्तत्वादात्मनो देहे व्यवहारेष्वपाटवात् ।
भेदज्ञानेऽपि चाङ्गारवह्निवत् स्वाविविक्तवत् ।
भवन्ति व्यवहाराश्च, नहि प्रत्यक्षगानपि
अर्थान् यथानुभवतः प्रतिपादयितुं क्षमाः ॥ (*AV*. p. 33).

"The presumption that we identify our body with the soul is *not* true; for every one of us has the valid experience 'this is my body'. The ascription of the attributes of the body to the self is by way of Upacāra (courtesy). The difference of the self from the body and its organs is certainly felt by all. Even animals, birds and aquatic creatures, from the moment of birth, understand and react intelligently to their physical and emotional stimuli. How is such reaction on their part explicable, save on presumption that they remember a past life? And when that is so, how much more should it be true that they have such knowledge of the difference between them and their bodies *in their present lives also?* As the self pervades the whole body, there is a natural difficulty in expressing the perception of the difference between it and the body. clearly, in one's dealings, tho' it is inwardly realized,—as in the case of red-hot coal pervaded by fire. This inability is reflected in our linguistic usage of identity. But that is no proof of *adhyāsa* or superimposition. People are not always in a position to express their inmost experiences, vividly and accurately in language".

This passage disputes the popular view that we are in the grip of an illusion of identity between our body and

soul. Our behaviour and our manner of speaking, at times, as if the self is the body are due to the permeation of the self in the body and our consequent inability to tell them apart and our great affection for our bodies. Even a mother of twins is, at times, unable to explain to others, how precisely one of the twins, differs from the other, tho' she realizes their difference, intuitively, herself. Texts in our Śāstras which deprecate the 'identification' of the body and the soul are, therefore, to be taken us emphasizing the need for a *clear aud maturer* realization of their mutual distinction, than is generally to be met with. For, it is such mature understanding, rather than a general awareness of it, that is necessary and competent to confer true peace and happiness on aspirants.

45.* अनित्यत्वविकारित्वपारतन्त्र्यादिहेतुत: ।
स्वप्नादिसाम्यं जगतो; न तु बोधनिवर्त्यता ॥

(*V.T.N.* p. 25)

"World-experience is sometimes likened in our Śāstras to dreams etc., not on account of its factual unreality ; but in virtue of the impermanent and changing character of the world and its dependent nature".

It is therefore to be given an indisputable reality in the sense of being '*anāropitam*' (non-superimposed and '*pramitiviṣayaḥ* (being an object of valid experience), albeit impermanent and subject to change and modifications. Its reality is naturally based on the concept of 'difference' which, in its fivefold aspect, constitutes the "Pra-pañca", as already explained.

The Concept of Difference Explained

The concept of 'difference' (*bheda*) has, however, been severely criticized by many eminent dialecticians of the Advaita school—such as Maṇḍana, Vimuktātman and Śrīharṣa. Śrī Madhva has taken due note of all their criticisms, in formulating his own conception of 'difference'.

with the help of a new category of "Viśeṣa", which he uses to overcome the difficulties which are supposed to stand in the way of an intelligible conception of 'difference' in relation to objects:

46* पदार्थस्वरूपत्वात् भेदस्य । न च धर्मिप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया, भेदस्य अस्वरूपत्वम्; ऐक्यवत् स्वरूपस्यैव तथात्वात् ।
(*V.T.N.* p, 21)

"Difference is of the nature of thing (*dharmi*). It cannot be argued that difference cannot be viewed as the nature of things, as it is apprehended only relatively to the perception of a given object and that from which it differs. Just as identity of Jīva and Brahman, tho' the same as the nature of the Ātman, is yet apprehended only in relation to the terms: Jīva and Brahman, similarly, in the case of difference".

47.* प्राय: सर्वतो विलक्षणं हि पदार्थस्वरूप दृश्यते
(*V.T.N.* p. 21)

"In most cases, the nature of things is revealed in perception, as different from all else, in a general way".

48.* यदि न स्वरूपं भेद:, तदा, पदार्थे दृष्टे, प्राय: सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं तस्य न ज्ञायेत । अज्ञाते च वैलक्षण्ये, आत्मनि घट इत्यपि संशय: स्यात् । नहि कश्चित् तथा संशयं करोति
(*V.T.N.* p. 21).

"If difference were *not* the nature of things, then, when an object is perceived, its distinction from all else (in a general way) would *not* be known. In that case, the perceiver himself might come to have a doubt whether he is his own self or the perceived object! But no one falls into such error or doubts. This shows that difference is realized in the first perception of things, at least in a general way."

49.* ज्ञात्वैव प्राय: सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं, कस्मिंश्चिदेव सदृशे संशयं करोति । अतो नान्योन्याश्रयता (*V.T.N.* p. 21).

"Normally, one does comprehend a given thing as in a general way different from all else and comes to have a

doubt only with *particular reference to some specific object*, whose difference is missed, on account of similarity or other counteracting forces. Hence, there is no room for inter-dependence or other logical difficulties in the conception of difference as constituting the nature of things."

50.* एकस्मिन्नेव वस्तुनि विशेषस्तैरप्यंगीकृत एव । 'नेति नेती' त्यत्र सर्ववैलक्षण्याङ्गीकारात् ॥ (*V.T.N.* p. 21).

"This difference, tho' partaking of the nature of things, is yet colourfully identical with it and thro' such colourful identity it is mentally and linguistically differentiated from the object, wherever exigencies require it. "Viśeṣas" are the basis of such colourful identity. They help to distinguish without introducing an actual difference. This has to be conceded even by Advaitic philosophers in interpreting a text like "Neti Neti" ("not this, not this") describing Brahman as other than everything else,—such otherness itself, being non-different from Brahman. But for the play of "Viśeṣas", the proposition "Neti neti ityātmā" would become tautologous. Hence, the concept of difference is *not* open to question."

Difference is thus the nature of the thing (*dharmisvarupa*) itself. It is perceived simultanously with the perception of an object. In one and the same act of perception, an object and its individuality, (which is the same as its difference from all else) are both perceived. in a flash as it were. On account of this flash-like simultaneity of perception, there is hardly any time, at the moment, to frame suitable linguistic expression of the exprience of 'difference'. When we know a thing, we know *qua* distinct from others, in a general way. Closer thought and attention reveal further items of difference and more specific details of distinction, according to selective interest and attention. If no difference as such is revealed in the very primary perception of a thing,

one might as well be open to mistake the object to be himself. 'Difference' being a fact of experience, cannot be dismissed as unaccountable and therefore illusory. Where existing theories or logical devices are unable to explain the relation between 'the thing' and its 'difference' from others, one should explore the possibilities of a fresh theory to explain the point, rather than repudiate the fact of difference itself as an illusory something! Madhva offers his theory of "Saviśeṣbheda" between the object and its difference, as a way out of the riddle. Acceptance of "Saviśeṣābheda" would show that the so-called 'thing-in-itself' (of Kant) is but an empty abstraction of the philosopher.

V. JIVAS

Jiva Svarūpa

The difference between the real and the apparent "self" is a commonplace in metaphysics. Hume's criticism of the notion of 'self' has reduced it to a series of ideas or experiences which cannot, in any case, be said to belong to or inhere in some unifying foundation. The Nairātmyavādā of Buddhism had long ago anticipated this line of argument and its conclusions. It is nothing new to Indian philosophy. Nevertheless, the difficulty of demonstrating the true nature of the self by the methods of the sciences cannot be disputed. The self, in the last analysis, is a personality which eludes the methods of the sciences. It is not amenable to them. Hence the contention of the Vedānta that it is not open to reasoning but to intuitive experience. Madhva holds the self to be established by Sākṣyanubhava. His definition of the self is:

51.* "अहमित्येव यो वेद्यः स जीव इति कीर्तितः ।
स दुःखी स सुखी चैव स पात्रं बन्धमोक्षयोः ।।"

(*V.T.N.* p. 26).

"He who enjoys the happiness and suffers the ills of life, who is eligible for bondage and release, is the Jīva. He is indeed in a position to know himself, in all his states, as "I am".

This implies that the Jīva is a permanent entity which endures in and thro' its changing states of consciousness and experiences, which constitute the sum total of its life, here and in the hereafter. The pragmatic necessity of assuming a permanent self can well be understood in the light of the primary instinct *to be and to survive.* That is why our Upaniṣads emphasize the indestructibility of the self and its attributes as well (*Bṛh Up.* अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा). These attributes of the self are the potential powers of

conscious life here and in the 'beyond.' Without such a continuity and survival of individual consciousness, the goal of Mukti would be void of meaning and purpose.

Plurality of Selves is Intrinsic

The next important question about the self is its plurality: Is there but one soul in the world or are there many of them? The Advaita philosophy of Śaṁkara unhesitatingly rejects the doctrine of plurality of selves. But almost all other systems of Indian philosophy such as Jainism, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the theistic schools of Vedānta of Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka, Vallabha and Caitanya hold that plurality of selves is not *merely* an empirical fact. The theistic faiths of Christianity and Islam, also, accept this position.

It is as difficult to define precisely what distinguishes one self from another, as to define what the self is over and above the succession of its experiences. If we could, nevertheless, persuade ourselves of the existence of a permanent self as the psychological backbone of our empirical experiences, it is no more difficult to go further and believe in and concede trans-empirical existence to ourselves and to other beings like ourselves, whose psycho-physical existence is, in many ways, borne in upon us. There is thus a *prima facie* case for the plurality of selves:

52.* आत्मस्वरूपभेदस्य निर्दोषत्वेन . . . . *U. Kh.* 11).
"The doctrine of multiplicity of selves is not open to any objections." At any rate, the onus of disproving plurality of selves would rest on those who are enamoured of the 'one-self' theory (*ekātmavāda*). No doubt, the *Ekātmavāda* makes an appeal to the ideal of unity or oneness of existence. But Theism would prefer to find this unity of cosmic life in a transcendent principle which is immanent in the cosmos and which coordinates the working of all

lesser principles in their respective spheres, into a cosmic unity which is called God or Brahman.

Madhva finds the basis of the doctrine of plurality of selves in the intrinsic diversity of their *essences*, which he shows to be the *inevitable presupposition of the* (Hindu) *theory of Karma.* It is accepted that the inequalities of individual equipment and endowment are regulated by one's past life and its Karma. But, by its very nature, the Karma theory would be powerless to explain the *why of such inequalities, in the remotest past, without recourse to the hypothesis of an intrinsic peculiarity (anādiviśeṣa) that is uncaused.* It is this *anādiviśeṣa*, says Madhva, that distinguishes one soul from another :

53.* यद्यनादिर्विशेषो न, साम्प्रतं कथमेव सः ?
आकस्मिको विशेषश्चेददृष्टे क्वचिदिष्यते ।
सर्वत्राकस्मिकत्वं स्यात्, नादृष्टापेक्षिता क्वचित् ।
अदृष्टाच्चेद्विशेषोऽयमनादित्वं कुतो न तत् ?

(*AV.* iii. p. 49).

"Unseen merit, which accounts for similar merit in the present, should presuppose a like merit. This series should regress *ad infinitum.* If it breaks down in any particular instance, the principle of unseen merit might as well be dispensed with, even at the outset. If it holds good in all cases without exception, *as far back as human thought could reach*, it is a clear admission of the fact that such unseen merit is *ingrained in the nature of individuals*".

Plurality of selves cannot be merely contingent upon the accidents of psycho-physical embodiment or differences of Karma. Even the Karma theory would be unable to explain why particular selves are susceptible to particular Karmic propensities and tendencies for good or evil. There is no place for accidents in a moral universe. Everything is

governed by definite causes. If the individual peculiarities of equipment etc., are finally to be attributed to some inexplicable *adṛṣṭa* or unseen merit that is also beginningless and uncaused, it would be as good as admitting that the plurality of selves is, in the last analysis, intrinsic and beginningless.

Since plurality of selves is a valid hypothesis, the continuity of such plurality of souls in the released state, also, would, by no means, be an illogical deduction. Madhva adduces the disparity of Sādhanas practised by different orders of beings, as an additional ground for the persistence of plurality in the released state:

54.* युक्तं च साधनाधिक्यात् साध्याधिक्यं सुरादिषु
(*A.V.* p. 45).

"Variations in results, in accordance with diversity of means, is inevitable in release."

The uniqueness of each individual experience, which forms the content of personality, is a sufficient reason, according to Madhva, for the acceptance of Jīva-bahutva-vāda (plurality of souls) and the distinctiveness of each individual. It is this incommunicable individuality of experience which distinguishes one person from another. We may describe our experiences to another, in speech or writing; but we cannot transmit to or share the *identical experience* with another. Our experience is *sui generis*. So long as this impenetrable barrier remains, no amount of appeal to a supposed superconscious experience of bare unity, at some level of Yogic realization, would convince one that plurality of souls is *not* an ultimate truth. It is an open secret that there is no unanimity in the deliverances of Mystics and Yogins, regarding the ultimate state.

The Sāṁkhyas were the earliest systematic thinkers of ancient India to adduce reasons for the acceptance of the doctrine of plurality of selves. They took their stand on

the diversity of individual experiences and the obvious disparities of character, environment, endowment etc., among creatures. Madhva goes one step further and bases his argument for the plurality of selves, finally, on the *absence of anusandhāna* (direct experience) of *another's axperiences as one's own*. This is the ultimate basis of his Jīvasvarūpabhedavāda.[1]

Difference among Jivas not "Aupādhika"

Adherents of Ekātmavāda, on the other hand, resort to the theory of Upādhis" or 'conditioning factors' of embodiment etc., to explaln the diversity of experience, without assuming the individuals themselves to be essentially different and many. Madhva is unable to endorse this view of mere Aupādhikabheda among souls, as it merely begs the question of basic difference among them, at every step, which it seeks to dismiss as unreal. He also finds it open to many serious logical defects of interdependence etc :—

55.* उपाधिभेदांगीकारे, हस्तपाद्युपाधिभेदेऽपि तद्गतसुख दुःखादिभोक्तुर्यथा भेदो न प्रतीयते, एवमेव शरीरादिभेदेऽपि भोक्तुर्भेदो न दृश्येत। सर्वदेहगतसुखदुःखादिकमेकेनैव भुज्येत ॥ (*V.T.N.* p. 29).

"If the differences among souls are not intrinsic but merely due to conditioning factors (upādhis), then, just as, in spite of the differences caused by Upādhis such as hands and feet, one does not experience any difference of identity of the person who experiences the joys and sorrows engendered in one thro' them, even so, one should not be experiencing any difference of identity of the person who experiences, in respect of the joys and sorrows connected with various *other* bodies".

This passage emphasizes the fact that if basic identity

1. Cf. व्यवस्थाशब्देन अनुसन्धानभावाभावयोर्विवक्षितत्वात् (Jayatīrtha, *VTNt.*)

of essence or Caitanya were a fact, it would necessarily prevail over all upādhis and it should be possible for one individual to experience the joys and sorrows connected with all other bodies, also, *as his own experience.* But, while it might be possible for us to sympathize with others' sorrows and feel happy in their happiness, it is impossible for any of us, Yogis and Mystics not excepting, to enter into intimate personal relation into them *as our own immediate experiences.* This is where Aupādhika-bhedavāda of Ātmans breaks down.

There are other difficulties also which this theory is unable to face, Madhva points out;

56.* किं चोपाधिरात्मन एकदेशं ग्रसत्युत सर्वमात्मानम् ?
एकदेशांगीकारे, सावयवत्वम् । सावयवस्य चानित्यत्वम् ।
सर्वग्रासे च नोपाधिर्भेदकः स्यात् । (*V.T.N.* p. 29).

"It would be inconvenient for one who looks upon the multiplicity of souls as the outcome of conditioning factors, to define whether the Upādhi touches only a part of the One Self or the whole of it. Any acceptance of 'parts' in the One self, would make it non-eternal. If the Upādhis envelop the *whole self*, there would be no 'unconditioned self left, to be distinguished from the conditioned."

It is, thus, difficult to conceive of any intrusion of Upādhis on an undivided and indivisible essence of pure consciousness that is ātman, and its finitization into a plurality of selves thro' Upādhis.

57.* उपाधिकृतांशकल्पने, तदुपाधिकृतत्वे आत्माश्रयत्वम् ।
उपाध्यन्तरकल्पनेऽनवस्था (*V.T.N.* p. 29).

"There would be the fault of *ātmāśraya* or making use of a concept even before it is actually established, if it is held that the Upādhi touches the ātman at a certain point that is brought into existence *by itself.* If it is at a point created by the interposition of *another and a prior Upādhi*

and that by a still earlier one, there would be a regression of Upādhis."

58.* अज्ञानसिद्धौ मिथ्योपाधिसिद्धिः अज्ञानं विना मिथ्यात्वासिद्धेः । न च मिथ्योपाधि विना अज्ञानसिद्धिः । मिथ्योपाधिभिन्नस्यैवाज्ञत्वात् ॥ (*V.T.N.* p. 28).

"[As the Upādhis themselves are not real but unreal ones imposed by ignorance] there can be no operation of false Upādhis without the (prior) establishment of the principle of Ignorance clouding the Ātmic consciousness; and there could be no establishment of that without the establishment of the possibility of Upādhis touching the ātman at any point of his being."

There is similar difficulty in stating which precise (aspect of the) ātman viz., the Śuddha-Brahman, or the pure-caitanya or the conditioned self that this Ignorance *invades*;

59.* शुद्धस्यैवाज्ञत्वे, मुक्तस्याप्यज्ञत्वप्रसक्तेः । (*V.T.N.* p. 28).

"It the pluralising Ajñāna is unconditionally present in the pure Brahman or the Cinmātra, even the released soul would be liable to such Ignorance".

60.* स्वाभाविकत्वात्, सत्यत्वात्, . . . अनिवृत्तिप्रसक्तेश्च ॥ (*V.T.N.* p. 28).

"Since what exists in the Śuddha Brahman or Ātman would be necessarily unconditioned and would inevitably persists for ever, ignorance in such Śuddha-Brahman or ātman would be non-terminable."

61.* अतश्चान्योन्याश्रयता (*V.T.N.* p. 29).

"If, to avoid such difficulties, we hold that it is the Jīva (and not either the Śuddha-Brahman or the Cinmātra) that is finitized by false Upādhis and pluralised by Ignorance, there would be logical inter-dependence between the establishment of Ignorance and false Upādhis. as already shown".

This interdependence could not be avoided by

assuming that Upādhis would attach themselves to *different individuals according to their respective Karmas*: for;

62.* सिद्धौ च कर्मभेदस्य स्यादुपाधिविभिन्नता ।
तत्सिद्धौ चैव तत्सिद्धिरित्यन्योन्यव्यपाश्रयः ॥ (*U.Kh*.p. 10)

"Unless Karma is (already) individualized, the Upādhis cannot get individualised (as pertaining to *this* or *that Jīva*) and unless Upādhis step in to differentiate (among) the Jīvas, Karma cannot be properly individualized and allocated to 'different Jīvas'. This would involve a vicious reciprocity."

It would not be possible to explain the plurality of selves merely on the basis of the diversity of their Karmic effects; for, such Karmic distinctions themselves would presuppose certain corresponding Upādhis operating on them and the relation of these Upādhis with *particular* individuals would have to be determined by *their* respective Karmic distinctions and Upadhis acting on one another, as far back as thought could reach. That would be a tacit admission of the view that plurality of selves is without a beginning. It would be less cumbersome, then, to admit frankly, and at the outset, that it is intrinsic and not Aupādhika.

Madhva's Theory of Bondage—"Svabhāvājñānavāda"

The conclusion that *plurality of selves is intrinsic* and natural to them does *not* necessarily imply that the *bondage of souls is also intrinsic* to their nature (svarūpa) and therefore *unriddable*. Madhva's criticism of Brahmājñānavāda does not mean that he does not recognize the principle of Ajñāna, in his system. What he is opposed to is Brahmājñānavāda; not Jīvājñānavāda. The former, as has been shown is opposed to the spirit of the Śrutis and logically unsustainable.[1] The latter is free from such defects and should, therefore, be accepted, instead:

1. cf. दुर्घटत्वमविद्याया (भूषणम्; न तु दूषणम्)—*Iṣṭasiddhi*

63.* स्वभावाज्ञानवादस्य निर्दोषत्वान्न तद्भवेत् ॥ (*A.V.*, p. 2).
"The theory that Ajñāna has the Jīvas for its locus and acts as a veil around them is not open to any of the difficulties that beset other theories such as Brahmājñānavāda."

Madhva calls his theory of bondage by the name of "*Svabhāvājñānavāda*". This term "Svabhāva" here, has been explained by his commentator. Jayatīrtha, in six different ways. (i) The first of these is as given in the translation of the above verse of the AV. (ii) Taking "Svābhāva" to mean what *is* in fact and not what is imagined by ignorance, it means that Ajnāna, which is the cause of the soul's bondage, exists in reality and is not merely something that is imagined to exist; (iii) 'Svabhāva' again signifies "Independent Being" or God; or (iv) the Jīva's own nature of metaphysical dependence. Ajñāna of the true nature of God and of one's own dependence, is Svabhāvājñāna. (v) It is also explained as Ajñāna that is induced *in* the Jīva *by* the independent Being (God).

Madhva contends that even tho' the Jīva is a self-luminous being, still, it is not inconceivable that he should be subject to ignorance of *his own true nature* and *of the nature of God* and of his true relation to Him, as he is a *dependent* and finite being. The difficulty of incompatibility of ignorance obscuring certain aspects of a self-luminous being, pointed out in respect of Brahmājnānavāda, would *not* arise in *this theory*, as the Jīvas are, by definition, "Sa-viśeṣa" (having aspects). It is by the help of such "Viśeṣas" that while some aspects of the self are unobscured, yet others are. This is where Madhva's theory has an advantage over the Advaitic theory of the self as "nirviśeṣa" (aspectless).

64.* प्रमादात्मकत्वात् बन्धस्य (*B.S.B.* i. 1, 17).

"Bondage is of the nature of Ignorance".

As the ātman's nature is one of knowledge (*jñānasvabhāva*), this ignorance which, in spite of his self-luminosity, is able to obscure a portion of that knowledge etc., of his own nature and of God cannot be treated as penetrating his very nature. It must remain in some sense, external to his nature. Yet, if it is external to him, how does it obscure his Svarūpa, at least in some respects? To explain this knotty point, Madhva introduces the will of God or his inscrutable power (*acintyabhutaśakti*) which is also called by the name of 'Māyā' (or His Māyā) of which the entanglement in Prakrti is only the next stage:

65.* स्वगुणाच्छादिका त्वेका परमाच्छादिकाऽपरा

(*B.T.* x, 81, 13).

"One of these veils is that which obscures the Jīva's own qualities and the other obscures from him the true nature of God".

Thus, according to Madhva, the obscuration of the soul leading to bondage is, in the last analysis, to be referred to the inscrutable power of God, who actuates the latent power of Prakṛti known by various names such as Māyā and Avidyā in the Śāstras. Tho' it is in the nature of Māyā to obscure, yet the intervention of the Lord is *necessary* for its functioning as a principle of obscuration, in so far as Prakṛti and its powers are insentient (*jaḍa*) and therefore '*asvatantra*' (incapable of independent movement).

That we do not here and now enter into the fullest experience of our true selfhood as one of knowledge and bliss is indeed a matter of common knowledge. We may legitimately *infer* from this that there is something which acts as a veil of obscuration of our own essential nature of self-luminosity from ourselves. Such obscuration cannot, however, be put down to the influence of Kāma, Karma etc. alone; for these are themselves the effects of earlier causes of like nature and they themselves are dependent

principles' and there is no reason why the soul should have succumbed to their attraction, surrendering his self-luminosity. In any case, they would not be an adequate explanation of the obscuration of the self, felt even in Suṣupti and Pralaya, when there is no operation of Kāma or Karma, Vāsanās etc. Hence, it is obvious that there is *some other principle* (over and above all these) that is preventing the self from realizing its true nature in full, here and now. This is the principle of Prakṛti (Jaḍa) which presses down the Jīvas from beginningless eternity and obscures their natures at the will of the Lord and not by its own power, as already explained. Thus, Madhva finds the ultimate explanation of the bondage of souls in the power of Prakṛti controlled by the inscrutable and mysterious Will of God (अचिन्त्याद्भुतशक्ति). This is in complete accord with the views of our great Theistic Scriptures like the *Gita*, about the origin of bondage :

दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया
मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते ॥ (vii, 14)
संसारमोक्षस्थितिबंधहेतुः । (*Svet. Up.* vi 16)

पराभिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ ॥
(*B.S.* iii, 2, 5)

बन्धको भवपाशेन भवपाशाच्च मोचकः ।
कैवल्यदः परं ब्रह्म विष्णुरेव सनातनः ॥
(*Skānda Purāṇa*)

The essence of such a theory is that it is realistic. It is not obliged to dismiss any stage of bondage as unreal. It accepts the kartṛtva (doership) and bhoktṛtva (enjoyership) of Jīvas as actually existing in them, tho' dependent on God (See *B.S.* ii, 3, 33). But instead of realising that these capacities of Jīvas are derived from the Supreme Being, the Jīvas, in their ignorance, look upon them as self-derived. This is Avidyā. Such Avidyā is *real* both in itself and as pertaining to the self. Similar is the case

with our *buddhi*, senses, bodies and their objects of enjoyment. These are also as much real as anything else ; but God-given. We, however, in our ignorance look upon them as entirely under our control and as *our* 'possessions'. The fact, however, is that they are our possessions subject to the Lord's wish. These various 'possessions' tho' essentially different from the essence of selfhood are not apprehended by the selves as clearly and vividly distinguished from 'self' (on account of intimate permeation of the self and on account of deep attachment to these, as already pointed out). Hence, on account of their inextricable association, the self comes to regard the joys and sorrows engendered by them as his own and is affected by their effects in terms of regarding himself as fortunate or unfortunate and having a feeling of shrinking or expansion of his personality as a result. This leads to love and aversion and similar pairs of opposites in successive efforts to seek what is agreeable and avoid what is disagreeable in the embodied state. Every successive step is thus directed by the misplaced sense of values. This is the essence of what is known as Samsāra. leading to countless births and deaths in the cycle of life. It is only the true knowledge of the human soul's relation to God that can redeem it from this bondage.

66.* न च कर्मविमामलकालगुणप्रभृतीशमचित्तनु तद्धि यतः ॥

(*Dvadaśa Stotra* iii, 6)

"The true and final explanation of bondage is therefore the Will of the Lord and not merely Karma, Ajñāna, Kāla, Guṇas etc.; for these are insentient by nature and hence dependent on something else (viz., God)."

Removal of Bondage

There is no need to despair that bondage would be indissoluble, if it is real. There is no logical difficulty or

philosophical inconsistency in recognizing the termination of real bondage through proper means. Madhva accepts the view of Śaṁkara that the real is unsublatable: सच्चेन्न बाध्येत. Insofar as world-experience is unsuperimposed (*anāropitam*), as already established, it is real within the meaning of unsublatability (*abādhyatva*). Impermanent it is; butsublatable (*bādhya*) it is *not*. For "*bādhya*" orl sublation is possible only of that which has no factual existence, at any time. The world is factually existent. It is not necessary that it should also be *eternal*. The real *may be* eternal or non-eternal, as the case may be. A short-lived real is no less real than the longlived one or even the eternal. A rose may blossom, exude fragrance and fade off, after a time. That is not to say that it is 'contradicted'. It is a misuse of language and thought to dub the impermanent 'unreal' or "*mithyā*' in the sense o *bādhyatva* or sublatability. Sublation is negation of factuaf existence with reference to the past, present and future (*kālatrayasattāṣedha*). Such negation is impossible in regard to the impermanent. It is possible only in the case of the "unreal" or the illusory: which only *appears* to exist in illusions, The difference between the real and the unreal lies in this that the former is presented in valid experience and the latter in illusions. Change is not unreal, as it is testified to by valid experience. Such change is necessarily in respect of name and form. "The world of objects is subject to mutation" and "is as real as the perceiver".[1] This is Madhva's view and that is why he does not regard it as "mithyā". The growing tendency among many modern interpreters of Advaitic thought to make "mithyātva" synonymous with "anityatva" (impermanence) and "pariṇāmitva" (change), while it is not *faithful to Śamkara's view*, is an indirect tribute

1. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, Preface to '*Śamkara's Teaching's in His Own Words*,' pp. 20-21.

to the reasonableness of Madhva's interpretation of the term "*an-ṛtam*", by which the world is sometimes referred to, in the Sāstras as "changing" (pariṇāmattaḥ):

67.* (ऋ गताविति धातोस्तु) पूर्वविगतवत् सदा ।
स्थितेर्ब्रह्मर्तमित्युक्तमनृतं परिणामतः (*Td.* p. 6).

"Brahman is known as "*ṛtam*", as it remains in the same state always; what is changing (i.e., the world) is "*an-ṛtam*" (non-permanent)."

Since the soul's bondage is, in the last analysis, to be referred to the Divine will obscuring the intrinsic self-luminosity of Jīvas, its removal and the illumination of the souls is also ascribed to the Divine will, in the last analysis, in Madhva's system. It is this intimate and direct relation of the Divine will with the soul's bondage and its reclamation therefrom that gives Divine grace its unique place, in this system. That is why Madhva says:

68.* * * * इत्यादेर्न हरिं विना ।
ज्ञानस्वभावतोऽपि स्यान्मुक्तिः कस्यापि हि क्वचित् ॥
(*A.V.* p. 1.)

"(In view of these facts) there is no possibility of release even by the power of knowledge, as such, without the grace of God".

This gives us the clue to the right understanding of what appears at first sight to be a dogmatic utterance, in Kaṭha Up:—"Whomsoever He chooses, by him alone He is attainable. The (Supreme) Ātman reveals to him his form विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम् । This is where philosophy meets mysticism, in Madhva's thought.

69.* जिज्ञासोत्थज्ञानजात् तत्प्रसादादेव मुच्यते (*AV.* p. 1.)

"Release from Samsāra is possible only through God's grace. It is bestowed on those who have had a direct vision of God. Such vision is vauchsafed to those who

have constantly meditated on Him in loving devotion, after going through the discipline of sincere study of Śāstras and cogitation, termed "Jijñāsā", which sets one's doubts at rest, and clears the ground for meditation."

It is only the highest form of devotion (bhakti) that moves God to shower His grace on the individual. Only when such complete grace is conferred on the soul does the dissolution of bondage become complete. Madhva's commentator rightly points out that the reference to the nullification of some portion of the soul's 'Prārabdha Karma', by the grace of God after the attainment of Aparokṣajñāna, in B.S. iii, 4, 16, confirms the point that it is not Karma or Avidyā alone that ultimately prevents the Jīva from realizing his own blissful nature and his intrinsic relation to God as His Pratibimba or image; but something over and above them, viz., God's own power (Paramācchādikā). The Gordian knot is thus to be cut by God Himself. Thus, the role of God's grace in drawing aside the final curtain that stands between man and his Maker, is altogether unique, in this system. By its side even Jñāna takes a second place. Madhva makes it clear that even after Avidyā is dispelled by true knowledge, full and complete manifestation of the innate bliss of selfhood is possible only after God Himself (as the Bimba or 'Original') removes the last veil of obscuration which His own power has thrown round the Jīva from time immemorial. Thus, without denying the importance of Jijñāsā (Śravaṇa, manana) nididhyāsana and Aparokṣajñāna in the scheme of Sādhanas, Madhva has emphasized the need for a new synthesis between spiritual enlightenment and divine grace in ushering in the final stage of man's self-realization and God-realization. It may be noted that the words of the Brahmasūtra iii, 2, 5 (ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ) occurring in the Sādhanādhyāya, lend significant support to Madhva's point of view.

Bhakti and Jñāna are Aspects of the Same Approach

70.* ज्ञानस्य भक्तिभागत्वात् भक्तिर्ज्ञानमितीर्यते ।
ज्ञानस्यैव विशेषो यद्भक्तिरित्यभिधीयते ।
परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वे विशेषौ ज्ञानगौ यथा ।
स्नेहयोगोऽपि तद्वत् स्याद्विशेषो ज्ञानगो यतः ।
इत्यभिप्रायतः प्रायो ज्ञानमेव विमुक्तये
वदन्ति श्रुतयः सोऽयं विशेषोऽपि ह्युदीर्यते ।
भक्तिर्ज्ञानमिति क्वपि ॥ (*A.V.* iii, 4, p. 51).

"Jñāna is a constituent of Bhakti. So, the latter is often referred to as "Jñāna" itself. Where the distinctive aspect of attachment is sought to be emphasized, their fusion is designated by the term Bhakti. As mediacy and immediacy are but integral aspects of 'knowledge', Scriptural texts which refer to Jñāna as the means of release have to be interpreted as inclusive of both the aspects thereof. Similarly, in the present case, wherever Scripture speaks of Jñāna as the means of release, the inclusion of Bhakti within the sense of the word Jñāna is certainly intended and presupposed. For clearness, sometimes, the two are also separately referred to as means of release."

In this passage Madhva gives a new and refreshing lead in tackling the problem of relative position of Bhakti and Jñāna as means of release and determining their mutual relation. Bhakti in fact is deep love of God inspired by and based upon an adequate knowledge of His majesty. It is a blend of both. He does not look upon them as unrelated much less mutually exclusive. They invariably go together in true Bhakti. This will be clear from his definition of Bhakti:

71.* माहात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वस्तु सुदृढः सर्वतोऽधिकः ।
स्नेहो भक्तिरिति प्रोक्तस्तया मुक्तिर्नचान्यथा ॥
(*Mbh. T. N.* i. 86).

"That firm and unshakable love of God, which rises above all other ties of love and affection based upon an adequate knowledge and conviction of His great majesty, is called "Bhakti". That alone is the means of Mokṣa".

This crisp and sententious definition of Bhakti is expanded by Madhva's commentator Jayatīrtha, with his wonted lucidity: 'Devotion to the Lord is that ceaseless flow of love of God, unimpeded by a thousand obstacles, exceeding beyond measure the love and attachment which one usually cherishes for one's own self and for one's earthly belongings and fortified by a deep knowledge and conviction of the Lord being the abode of infinite and illimitable auspicious attributes of a spotless nature'.

Such sublime devotion as this could only be an expression of that eternal and intrinsic bond between the human soul and the Divine, which is termed "Bimbapratibimbabhāva" in Madhva's philosophy. It is such a devotion alone that is competent to manifest, in full, the soul's true relation to its maker. Till it is attained, the spirit of man remains groping in the darkness of bondage (B.S. iii, 2, 29).

Stages of Bhakti

Spiritual knowledge or realization. according to Madhva, is not a mere cold intellectual apprehension of Reality. It is a vivid perception of the supreme Reality as the pivot of one's own reality, consciousness and bliss *(Sarvasattāpratītipravṛttinimittam)*, with the utmost warmth of love and attraction for one's own Bimba that the soul is capable of, which is known as Bhakti. Such Bhakti, according to Madhva, both *precedes* and *follows* the attainment of knowledge:

72.* भक्त्या ज्ञानं ततो भक्तिस्ततो दृष्टिस्ततश्च सा ।
ततो मुक्तिस्ततो भक्तिः सैव स्यात् सुखरूपिणी ॥

(*A.V.*, iii, 4, p. 51).

"From Bhakti one reaches (mediate) knowledge, thence again ripe Bhakti, thence vision and thence again very ripe devotion to the Lord. Then comes Mukti (release) and thereby Bhakti again, which is of the essence of bliss and an end in itself".

Highest Bhakti an End in Itself

A very striking and almost unique feature of Madhva's philosophy of Bhakti is that it is viewed, not as a means to an end, *but as an end in itself*. The light of Bhakti shines brightly not only on this side of release, but on the other side of it as well. For, *the relation between the individual and the Supreme Being is not something that is destroyed by release*. For, this relation itself is not something that is extrinsic to the nature of the soul; but something that is rooted in its very nature and being (svarūpa). And Mukti is shaking off what is extrinsic to one's nature and reposing in one's own intrinsic nature. The intrinsic spiritual relation between the human spirit and God is so dynamic in its magnetism that the attraction of the former to the latter becomes more fully manifested in release than in Samsāra. It finds expression there, in a thousand ways, *which are beyond our understanding and analysis from here*. It is not open to us, in Samsāra, to peep into the released state and try to describe in detail the behaviour of the blessed ones in release towards the Lord or towards one another. That state of blessedness is something beyond our comprehension in its richness and glory (cf. Gītā vi, 21). Says Madhva of this state:

73.* हरेरुपासना चात्र सदैव सुखरूपिणी ।
न तु साधनभूता सा सिद्धिरेवात्र सा यतः ॥

(*B.S.B.*, iv, 4, 21).

"The worship of the Lord there is an unalloyed bliss in itself. It is not a means to any further end. It is an end in itself and a fulfilment of our selfhood".

This leads us into the deepest recesses of Mysticism with reference to the concept of Mokṣa. The released, as conceived by Madhva, may, without impropriety, be described as a mystic brotherhood resting in the eternal peace and contentment born of the unalloyed bliss of communion with God, lacking nothing, wanting nothing. Just as the powers of Yogic Siddhis do not tempt the true Yogin, even so, the highest class of souls are not tempted by the prospects of Sālokya and other rewards (*Bhāg.* iii, 29, 13. नैकत्वमप्युत । दीयमान न गृह्णन्ति quoted by Madhva in his *Gitā-Bhāṣya* ii, 52). These facets of Madhva's conception of Bhakti, in relation to Mokṣa, reveal the supreme heights to which the Ācārya has risen and wants us to aspire to, in the realm of Bhakti. This transcendental aspect of Bhakti emphasized by him seems to have made a deep impression even upon Śrīdhara Svāmin, the great Advaitic commentator on the *bhagāvata* and upon the Mystics of Maharashtra and on the Bengal School of Vaishnavism, whose writings disclose a warm advocacy of Siddhirūpā-bhakti in release.

The same idea is brought out by Madhva in his Bhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtra*: अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम् (iii, 2, 19) :—

74.* नित्यसिद्धत्वात् सादृश्यस्य नित्यानन्दज्ञानादेः, न भक्ति-ज्ञानादिना प्रयोजनमित्यतो ब्रवीति–अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम् । अम्बुवत् स्नेहेन ।
गहणं ज्ञानम् । भक्ति विना न तत्सादृश्यं सम्यगभिव्यज्यते ।।

"It should not be supposed that since the Jīva's resemblance to God (as His Pratibimba) and his essential nature of consciousness, bliss etc., are all intrinsic to him, there

is no need for Bhakti, Jñāna and other Sādhanas to manifest them. It is to remove this misconception that the Sūtrakāra observes: अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम् । i.e. intrinsic as it is, the soul's essential nature does not become fully manifested, unless the Jñāna and other Sādhanas practised by him are united with a tenacious and clinging attachment (to the Lord) resembling the viscosity of water."

This is indeed a strikingly original explanation of the phrase "*ambuvat grahaṇam*" used in the above Sūtra. It is most appropriate to the context of the Sādhanādhyāya in which the Sūtra is read. It brings out, in a remarkable way, the deep poetic quality that marks the Sūtrakāra's terse utterance.

VI. GOD OR BRAHMAN

75.* सर्वज्ञाखिलसच्छक्तिः स्वतन्त्रोऽशेषदर्शनः ।
नित्याताद‍ृशचिच्चेत्ययन्ता इष्टो नो रमापतिः ॥
(*Td.* p. 66).

"God is the Independent Being possessed of all adequate and unrestricted powers in regard to the Cit and Acit and who is all-knowing. He is the One who controls the Cit and Acit (sentient and insentient reals) which are of a different nature from Him."

This gives a neat and pithy definition of God. Cit and Acit are unlike God in that they are of limited powers, dependent and not all-knowing.

76.* स्वतन्त्रस्य पूर्णगुणत्वनियमात् (*N.V.* p. 4).

"The Independent Being must, necessarily, be infinite in Its attributes."

77.* न हि स्वतन्त्रोऽपूर्णतां कामयीत । (*N.V.* p. 4).

"For, an Independent Being cannot possibly wish to be finite and limited in any sense."

Is God accessible to Inference?

78.* तर्को ज्ञापयितुं शक्तो नेशितारं कथं च न ।
किंचिज्ज्ञत्वं हि पुंस्त्वेन शक्यं साधयितुं सुखम् ॥
वृक्षकृन्नाखिलं वृक्ष वेत्ति पुस्त्वाद्धि चैत्रवत् ।
इत्याद्यनुमया स्पर्धि नानुमानं परेशितुः ।
शक्तं विज्ञापने चातिप्रसंगोऽनुमयेदृशा ॥ (*A.V.* p. 5).

"Reason would not be able to prove the existence of God. It can always be countered by other reasons. If one should prove God to be all-knowing, another could as well reason that He must be of limited knowledge, like any other individual. A creator-God need not necessarily

be knowing each and every creature; just as a gardener does not know all about the trees and plants in his garden. All theistic proofs are thus inconclusive and vagarious."

Here, like a true Vedāntin, Madhva challenges the power of unaided human reason to prove the existence and nature of God, to the hilt. This does not mean that reason is futile. All Vedāntins have waxed eloquent on the futility of reason to establish God. Philosophers in the West too, have adduced various proofs like the ontological proof, the cosmological proof and so forth which have all been criticized threadbare by other philosophers like Kant. The limitations of reason and the claims of intuition have been loudly proclaimed. Since reason holds an important position even in the interpretation of Śrutis, what is meant by this criticism of the Theistic proofs seems to be this that it is beyond the power of reason to make the existence of the Deity anything more than a very reasonable presumption and hypothesis. It could suggest very strongly to all thinking men that there must be a God and adduce fairly sound reasons in its support, which cannot be easily dislodged. There it must stop. It cannot give us fullness of details about the nature of God, and His infinite attributes and powers and personality: *Yāvān yaścāsmi tattvataḥ* as the *Gītā* (18,55) so impressively puts it. That is left to the Śruti to give us complete and convincing knowledge *in detail* about the Supreme (*asamśayam samagram*, as the *Gīta* (vii, 1.) so aptly puts it). That reason can go thus far is conceded by Madhva when he describes how the idea of God is formed in our minds: *ita idam adhikam itopīdam iti sarvādhikatvena, tato adhikābhāvena, avaśeṣitatvena*... (*B.T.* x. p. 71).[1] See also Text 86.

1. The mind can conceive of an ascending order of power, goodness, knowledge, beauty etc. This implies the idea of perfection. Since perfection which does not really exist cannot be perfect, the being in which the idea of highest perfection is realized would be God.

Brahman cannot be altogether Attributeless

79.* इदमित्थमिति ज्ञानं जिज्ञासायाः प्रयोजनम् ।
इत्थंभावो हि धर्मोऽस्य न चेन्न प्रतियोगिता (*A.V.* p. 32).

"The aim of philosophical inquiry is to have some definite knowledge about the nature of the subject of inquiry (God or Brahman). Whatever that thing is shown to be as a result of such inquiry constitutes its attributes. Otherwise, it could not be distinguished."

Our philosophical inquiry, if it is to be fruitful and worth the trouble, must bring us face to face with some definite knowledge of the attributes of God. The very act of solemn philosophical inquiry, says Madhva, presupposes some fundamental attributes or characteristics with which the Brahman must be invested; tho' it is conceivable that the inquiry may show that it does not possess those or some of those attributes with which we had earlier invested it. But it would not do to hold that any inquiry about a real and truly existing entity would ever lead to the conclusion that it possesses *no attributes whatsoever*—that it is absolutely uncharacterizable. Even distinction from all empirical attributes *(neti neti)* is, after all, a characterization. Brahman would stand sufficiently marked off and characterized by such a negation of empirical attributes. In any event, it would not remain "*nir-viśeṣa*," in any truly philosophical sense. No inquiry can lie about anything that is essentially "*nirviśeṣa*. Thus, Madhva posits that as a necessary precondition of philosophical inquiry (*jijñāsa*), it must be agreed that God or Brahman is "Sa-viśeṣa" i.e., has a distinctive character of His own. Nothing can have a purely 'negative' character. It may be negative from the point of view of others; but, in itself, it must be something more than a Void. This is what is meant by saying it is "Sa-viśeṣa".

80.* इत्थंभावात्मकान् धर्मानाहुश्च श्रुतयोऽखिलाः ।
अदृश्यत्वादयोऽप्यस्य गुणा हि प्रभुणोदिताः ।
यदि स्युस्तादृशा धर्माः सर्वज्ञत्वादयो न किम् ?

(*A.V.* p. 33b).

"The Śrutis speak of many attributes which characterize Brahman. In the *Brahmasūtras*[1] too characteristics like 'other than being empirically knowable' are applied to It. If these could be present in Brahman, why not others like omniscience?"

The function of an attribute is to describe a thing as it is. This might be done positively or negatively. In the Śrutis we have texts which ascribe positive attributes like '*satyakāmatva*' (one whose will always prevails); they also ascribe to Brahman negative attributes like '*apahatapāpmatva*' (freedom from sin and limitation) etc. It makes no difference to the characterizability (Saviśeṣatva) of Brahman whether the attributes admitted are positive or negative in form. Hence, there is no bar to admitting other attributes like omniscience, *sarvakartṛtva* etc. for Brahman.

81.* अन्यापेक्षा यदि स्युस्ते सत्तैवं देशकालगा ।
देशकालानपेक्षा हि न सत्ता क्वापि दृश्यते । (*AV.* p. 33b).

"If the objection to attributes like omniscience is that they involve reference to something other than the subject, even the ascription of Sattā or reality to Brahman would be open to the same objection, as the conception of reality itself has reference to space and time".

The reluctance of monistic philosophers to recognize *sarvajñatva* (omniscience) and other attributes for Brahman on the ground that it would make the Brahman dependent on something outside itself is here commented upon. Madhva points out that Brahman's omniscience would not

1. I, 2, 21.

'depend' upon something outside its own nature, simply because it enters into a subject-object relation with the knowable world ; any more than the Sun's luminosity could be said to depend on the objects with which it comes into contact and so comes to be visualised.

82.* धर्मारोपोऽपि सामान्यधर्मादीनां हि दर्शने ।
इदं तदादिधर्मत्वे धर्मोऽन्य: कल्प्यतेऽत्रहि ।
सर्वधर्मविहीनस्य धर्मारोप: क्व दृश्यते ? (*AV*. p. 33b.)

"Even the superimposition of attributes is possible only when certain other conditions are satisfied—such as the existence of some general attribute, like 'thisness' or 'thatness' in the substratum, and a knowledge of the prototype of the object or property that is superimposed. How then can a thing (Brahman) that is *ex hypothesi* bereft of all attributes whatsoever be ever subjected to any superimposition of attributes ?"

This raises a penetrating objection against the theory of Saṅkara's Advaita which regards Brahman as "Nirguṇa" and "Nirviśeṣa" in essence and in reality ; but allows that the Śrutis recognize the existence of a "Saguṇa" Brahman from the Vyāvahārika or empirical point of view of Upāsanā, Jijñāsā etc. It is, however, recognized that there are not really two Brahmans ; but only one and that is verily "Nirguṇa", in the sense already defined. This same attributeless Brahman comes to be regarded as "Saguṇa" (all-knowing, all-creator, *satyakāma*, *antaryāmī* etc.) thro' superimposition of those attributes.

Madhva raises a pertinent objection to this theory. He shows the logical impossibility of superimposing any attribute upon a Brahman that is by hypothesis attributeless(*nirdharmaka*), absolutely. When the attribute of 'silverness' is superimposed on shell, something more than the mere percep tion of shell is needed. Besides the shell's perception, the

knowledge of a prototype really possessing the characteristic of silverness, the perception of the substratum as something that is in front of the perceiver and the appreciation of the common property of something white and shining answering to the true silver are required. *These conditions are not and cannot be fulfilled in the present case of the attributeless Brahman.* There is no real prototype Brahman (other than the Nirguṇa); which can be said to possess attributes like omniscience that are to be superimposed on the 'Nirguṇa'; nor any resemblance between the Nirguṇa and such a prototype. There is also no scope for 'general' attributes *as such*, in the '*attributeless.*' Hence, no theory of superimposition could be logically sustained. This objection is, indeed, hard to rebut.

83*. तदर्थं यदि धर्माणामारोपः स्यादनवस्थितिः (*AV.* p. 32b).

"If, in order to maintain such a theory of superimposition of attributes in Brahman, a prior superimposition in accepted, it would lead to an infinite regress of superimpositions".

It will not do, says Madhva, to explain the whole concept of Saguṇa-Brahma as the result of a series of super-impositions one acting on the other. Tho' on this view the ingredients for the subsequent superimposition might be furnished by the earlier, it would hardly suffice to prove that the earlier perception itself was a superimposition. That cannot be done unless the still earlier one is shown to be a superimposition. That would lead to an endless regress in argument.

84.* कथ मायाद्यवच्छिन्नः पूर्णो मुख्यतया भवेत् ? (*AV.* p. 5).

"How can the Supreme Brahman remain primarily Infinite (Pūrṇa) if It were to be limited by Māyā?"

Those who posit two aspects of Brahman—the "Nirguṇa" noumenally and the "Saguṇa" or Īśvara, pheno-

menally, to explain the creation of the world and other matters are virtually taking away the infinitude of Brahman by such compromises. The Śruti says that Brahman is always the Infinite and remains the infinite. Brahman limited by Māyā is Īśvara. Māyā is something that is in the nature of an *obscuring principle*. It would obscure Brahman to some extent and make it forget its pure being and engage in creation etc. If it remains a full consciousness of its identity, the principle of Māyā itself would become superfluous, as the Śuddha Brahman itself can act directly without recourse to Māyā. Īśvara, moreover, perceives differences in the world, which He would *not do*, if He were *aware of His identity with the Nirguṇa*. For these and other reasons, Madhva feels that any association of Māyā with the Brahman would make a serious inroad upon Brahman's Pūrṇatva, (fullness) implying, as it would, some sort of a diminution and a defect. The only way to avoid these defects is to give up the artificial distinction of Brahman into Śuddha and Māyāśabala and stick to a *Brahman that is always above Mayā*,—always Pūrṇa, and *therefore* endowed with all auspicious attributes such as omniscience *(sarvajñatva)* all-creationship (*sarvakartṛtva*) and acting by its own free will.

Saguṇa-Nirguṇa Vicāra

85.* अथैक आहुरगुणं ब्रह्मेति । न तत् युक्तम् । श्रुतियुक्ति-विरोधात् ।। तथाहि श्रुतिः—'सत्य ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म'; विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः । तस्मादेतद्ब्रह्म नाम रूपमन्नं च जायते'; एतावानस्य महिमा अतो ज्यायांश्च पूरुषः । दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषो स बाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः । अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः परः । यो नःपिता जनिता यो विधाता । पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं । सर्वकर्मा सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादरः । विष्णोर्नुकं वीर्याणि प्रवोचम् । परो मात्रया तन्वा वृधान * * न ते विष्णो जायमानो न जातो देव महिम्नः परमन्तमाप, इत्यादिका ।। (*K.N.*)

"Now, some philosophers say that Brahman is devoid of attributes. That is not fair ; for it is opposed to Śrutis and reason. Here are the Śruits : 'Brahman is the Independent Real whose all-comprehending knowledge is its essence and it is free from the limitations of space, time and qualities'. 'Its nature is bliss',; 'He who knows all, who is free from wants, whose effort is of the essence of wisdom. From Him this four-faced Brahmā, name, form and *anna* proceed'. 'The wonderful Puruṣa, who has no restricted dimensions, is inside and out.' He is free from prāna, mind and other kalās, the pure one who transcends the Cetana and Acetana Prakṛtis.' 'His greatness is not merely, this much ; but greater'. 'He is our Father, protector, nourisher etc.' 'He is Infinite and Full, He is the lord of all, free from untruth, false attachment'. 'Who can declare the heroic deeds of the all-pervading Lord? 'Thou hast transcended all, thy greatness is incomprehensible'. 'None among the living or those to be born has attained the truth about your majesty."

Some of the Śrutis cited above proclaim the Brahman to be endowed with all auspicious attributes ; while the rest establish that it is indeed Saguṇa.

86.* युक्तिश्च-बुद्धिपूर्वं सर्वकर्तृत्वात् सर्वज्ञत्वात् सर्वज्ञत्वादयो गुणा युक्ताः । (*K.N.* p. 10b).

"Reason also can be adduced to show that Brahman should be conceived as Saguṇa. It should possess attributes like omniscience insofar as it is the creator of everything in the universe. Creatorship presupposes full knowledge of the effect to be, its accessories, nature of effort, the expected result, and putting forth of necessary will and effort to accomplish the work. It follows that the all-creator must be all-knowing, all-powerful and capable of accomplishing whatever He wills. This is what "Saguṇa" stands for."

87.* न च—'एको देव: सर्वभूतेषु गूढ: सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा । कर्माध्यक्ष: सर्वभूताधिवास: साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च' । इत्यादिविरोध: । सत्वादिगुणाभावोक्तेस्तत्र । अन्यथा, एको देव: सर्वभूतेषु गूढ इत्यादीनामपि गुणत्वात् स्वोक्तिविरोध: ।।

(*KN.* p. 10 b)

"There is no contradiction of such reasoning by the Nirguṇa-Śruti which runs : He is the One Lord present in all creatures tho' invisible, all-pervading, controlling all, presiding over all our Karma, and witnessing everything, the knower, without physical body and without (material) qualities. For this Śruti merely expresses the idea that Brahman is without material attributes. Otherwise there would be a palpable contradiction with the earlier mention of a large number of attributes like oneness, in this very text."

88.* न च निर्विशेषं नाम किंचिदस्ति ।

(*KN.* p. 10 b)

"There cannot possibly be anything that is utterly attributeless".

89.* निर्विशेषत्वोक्तेरेव व्याहतत्वात् ।

(*KN.* p. 10 b)

"The Very proposition 'Brahman is without characteristics' would be inconsistent."

90.* निर्विशेषत्वेन विशिष्टं न वेत्युक्ते, यद्यविशिष्टं, तर्हि न विशेषनिराकारणम् । विशेषवत्त्वमेव भवति । यदि तेन विशिष्टं, स एव विशेष इति व्याहति: ।

(*KN.* p. 10 b)

"It is open to us to ask the Nirviśeṣatvavādin if Brahman actually possesses the characteristic of 'being *nirviśeṣa*' (devoid of *viśeṣas*) or not. If the answer is "not", then the *viśeṣas* (attributes) are not denied and would remain. If, on the other hand, Brahman *possesses the characteristic* of 'nirviśeṣatva (having no viśeṣas) that is itself a sufficient

characteristic of Brahman. Thus, in either case, the proposition "Brahman is Nirviśeṣa" is open to an inconsistency.

Brahman's Relation to Its Attributes

91.* गुणक्रियादयो विष्णोः स्वरूपं नान्यदिष्यते ।
अतो मिथोऽपि भेदो न, तेषां कश्चित्कदाचन ।
स्वरूपेऽपि विशेषोस्ति स्वरूपत्वदेव तु
भेदाभावेऽपि तेनैव व्यवहारश्च सर्वनः ।।

(*VTN.* p. 31.)

"The attributes and actions of Brahman are the same as itself. They are not different. There is no mutual difference either, among them. There is an intrinsic peculiarity in things (called Viśeṣas) by which, even in the absence of actual difference, a relation of 'substance and attributes' is rendered possible for purposes of reference".

92.* अभिन्नत्वमभेदश्च यथा भेदविवर्जितम् ।
व्यवहार्यं पृथक् च स्यादेवं सर्वे गुणा हरेः ।
अभेदाभिन्नयो र्भेदो यदि वा भेदभिन्नयोः ।
अनवस्थितिरेव स्यान्न विशेषणतामतिः ।
* * तस्मादकमनन्तधा ।
व्यवहार्यं विशेषेण * *
विशेषोपि स्वरूपं स स्वनिर्वाहकताऽस्य च ।।

(*VTN.* p. 31.)

"Just as 'identity' and 'being identical' are one and the same, but can still be treated as if they are different in our ways of speaking, so also in respect of Brahman and its attributes. There would be an endless regress if we are to postulate any difference between non-difference and the non-different. This applies equally to 'difference' and "the different". Therefore, it is best to admit that the same substance-essence lends itself to be spoken of, as if it were diflerent,—as substance and attribute, thro' the agency of "Viśeṣas" which is regulated by the power of God himself. This Viśeṣa itself is nothing other than the

essence of the substance itself. It is self-linking and self-supporting with regard to itself and with the substance and attributes."

The concept of "Viśeṣas", which is Madhva's unique contribution to the ontology of Vedānta, has already been touched upon, in the section on "Difference as Dharmisvarūpa". It plays a vital role in respect of the great problem of substance and attributes, in metaphysics. It is bound to have far-reaching effects in modern philosophy, if properly exploited by contemporary philosophers.

Brahman's Form is Purely Transcendental

93.* प्रकृत्यादिप्रवर्तकत्वेन तदुत्तमत्वात्, नैव रूपवत् ब्रह्म ।

(*B.S.B.* iii, 2, 14)

"Brahman is Formless because It transcends Prakṛti and others and controls them all".

All forms, so far as our minds can conceive, are either Prākṛtic or *bhautika* (constituted of the five elements). This is, however, impossible in Brahman, which is admittedly above the sway and influence of Prakṛti and the *bhūtas* (elements). Hence, it follows that It is formless.

94.* 'पश्यते रुक्मवर्णम्' 'सुवर्णज्योतिः' इत्यादिश्रुतीनां च न वैयर्थ्यम् । विलक्षणरूपत्वात् । यथा, चक्षुरादिप्रकाशे विद्यमानेऽपि, वैलक्षण्यादप्रकाशादिव्यवहारः ॥

(*B.S.B.* iii, 2, 15)

"At the same time, there is no inconsistency in holding that Brahman is of the form of 'gold', 'shining like gold', as described in the Upaniṣads. For the description of Brahman as 'formless' only signifies that its form is trans-empirical. In common parlance, we often say there is no

light (meaning the light of heavenly luminaries, like the Sun; even tho' there is the inner illumination of knowledge, thro' the eye, the mind etc".

95.* वैलक्षण्यं चोच्यते रूपस्य विज्ञानानन्दमात्रत्वम् ।

(*B.S.B.* iii, 2, 16).

"The Śrutis do speak of the trans-empirical form of Brahman as the very essence of bliss, reality, knowledge etc."

The distinction of Rūpa (form) and Rūpin (what is endowed with form) is only a distinction of reference and not of essence. This is explained by Madhva on the basis of the concept of Viśesa, or identity-in-difference':

96.* स्वरूपेणानन्दादिना कथमानन्दित्वादिरिति ? अत उच्यते— 'उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत्' । यथाहि: कुण्डली, कुण्डलं च । यथा, एक एव कालः पूर्वमित्यवच्छेदकोऽवच्छेद्यश्च भवति ।

(*B.S.B.* iii, 2, 28; 30).

"The reference to Brahman, as both Ānandi (possessing bliss) and as Ānanda itself, is (thro' Viśeṣa) just as a serpent is spoken of as the coiled one and as coil itself; or just as 'time' is qualified by epithets like 'earlier' and 'later'; even tho' the delimited and delimiting one are the same".

97.* न च, आनन्दादित्वात् लोकानन्दादिवत् ।
('यतो वाचो निवर्तन्त' इति) उन्मानत्वम् ॥

(*B.S.B.* iii, 2, 32)

"The attributes of ānanda, jñāna etc., of Brahman should not, by reason of their being referred to by the terms used in common parlance, be supposed to be nothing more than what these terms denote in empirical usage. They are indeed trans-empirical."

98.* अलौकिकोऽपि ज्ञानादिः तच्छब्दैरेव भण्यते ।
ज्ञापनार्थाय लोकस्य यथा राजेव देवराट् ॥

(*B.S.B.* iii, 2, 34).

"Even tho' the ānanda, jñāna etc., that constitute the nature of Brahman are trans-empirical, they are designated by words in ordinary empirical usage, just to give us an idea of their nature, however faint and inadequate it may be, even as one might say that Indra, the lord of heaven, is like a King."

Since there is no other way left for our limited understanding to know the Infinite, we have to use terms and concepts of empirical understanding in trying to form some idea of it. Otherwise, there would be no other way in which we could form any conception of the Infinite. Knowing what little one can thro' such descriptions, one can, later, form an idea of its trans-empirical nature, thro', the help of Śrutis etc.

Brahman is the Source of All

99.* अन्यत्र क्व ापि शक्तिर्न स्वातंत्र्येणेश एव हि ।
शक्तीस्ता: प्रेरयत्यंज: तदधीनाश्च सर्वदा ।
सत्ताप्रधानपुरुपशक्तीनां च प्रतीतय: ।।
प्रवृत्तयश्च ता: सर्वा नित्यं नित्यात्मना यत: ।
यथानित्यतयाऽनित्यं नित्यशक्त्या स्वयेश्वर: ।।
नियामयति नित्यं च न ऋते त्वदिनि श्रुते: ।
स्वभावजीवकर्माणि द्रव्यकालश्रुतिक्रिया. ।।
यत्प्रसादादिमे सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया
इति श्रुतेर्न सत्ताद्याऽपि नारायण विना ।
तत्पतञ्जलिविन्ध्यादिमतं न पुरुपार्थदन् ।। (*AV*. p. 13b).

"There is no independent potency anywhere in the Universe (in Prakṛti, Puruṣas etc.) It is Īśvara Himself that directs properly, the various potencies of Nature and of the souls for production, growth, development etc., which are always dependent on Him. The Prakṛti Puruṣas and their respective capacities, their very presence, cognizability and functioning,—all these are controlled by Īśvara, eternally, thro' His eternal power. Just as non-eternal things are ordained by the eternal will of Īśvara to be

non-eternal, similarly, eternal substances too are ordained by His will to be eternal. This is established by the Śruti:—Without reference to Your Will, nothing happens far or near *R.V.* x, 112, 9). The Śruti also says: Svabhāva, Jīvas, their Karma, categories, Kāla, Śruti, Kriyā, etc., all these exist, function and are cognized only by His will and pleasure. They have no existence in His despite. Hence, the very reality, existence etc., of Prakṛti and other entities depend on His control. Therefore, the position of Patañjali, Vindhyavāsin and other philosphers (who restrict, in various ways, the power Īśvara or do not recognize His existence, at all), is not conducive to spiritual advancement."

In the above passage, Madhva puts in a strong and eloquent plea for recognizing the potential energy of God's immanent control thro' and thro' the entire finite reality, sentient and non-sentient, in all stages of their existence and activity. The eternals no less than the non-eternals are subject to such control. Nothing exists anywhere far near without being subject to His jurisdiction and control, energization, actualization and so forth. This point has already been dealt with, earlier, in Text No. 5. The passage brings out the absolute sense in which Madhvā conceives of the metaphysical independence of God and the metaphysical dependence of all else upon Him. It also shows in what respect he differs from other Theists like Patañjali, who limit the controlling power of God to a serious extent. Prakṛti, according to Patañjali, has the *intrinsic potency* of change and development. It is not derived from the will of God. All that Īśvara does is to help Prakṛti to manifest her latent powers. Or, as Śaṁkara puts it in his *B.S.B.*, Īśvara, in the system of Patañjali, is like rain in the production of crops. He merely creates the favourable conditions for nature's development. The powers of Nature are her own. This is not acceptable to Madhva. He would

go farther still and attribute even these very potencies of things to God's will and constant control:

100* प्रकृतिमनुप्रविश्य, तां परिणाम्य, तत्परिणामनियामकत्वेन तत्र स्थित्वा, आत्मनो बहुधाकरणात् ॥

(*B.S.B.* i, 4, 27).

"He enters into Prakṛti and energizes it to transform in various ways and assumes many forms to control such modifications."

In his Bhāṣya on the above Sūtra, Madhva underlines the true nature of God's immanence in the Universe, which is something more than His bare passive presence in everything. The 'entry of God' into Matter is to render possible the modifications of Matter at each and every stage; since Matter, in itself, has no such power to change or transform from one stage to another without His energization. This idea is significantly expressed in our Upaniṣads, as when the *Taitt, Up.* (Valli 2) speaks of Brahman as 'creating all this and *entering into them*' and becoming known by all those names.

101.* तत्र तत्र स्थितो विष्णुस्तत्तच्छक्तिप्रबोधकः ।
एक एव महाशक्तिः कुरुते सर्वमंजसा ॥ (*B.S.B.* ii, 3, 11)

"The Supreme Being, possessed of infinite powers, enters into various stages of evolution of matter and brings about each and every such manifestation of things, Himself".

This idea gives point to the conception of God as the infinite One whose presence is felt everywhere and in everything that exists. This is how the Supreme chooses to reveal His Pūrṇatva: in a very real and active sense: 'तेनेदं पूर्णं पुरुषेण सर्वम्' ।

'By this Puruṣa all this is filled'.

102.* पुरुषः प्रकृतिः कालो महानित्यादिषु क्रमात् ।
विकार एव जननं; पुरुषे तद्विशेषणम् ॥
परतंत्रविशेषो हि विकार इति कीर्तितः । (*B.S.B.* ii, 3, 9).

"Creation in respect of the Puruṣas, (Jīvas) Prakṛti, Kāla, Mahat etc., is in the sense of liability to various kinds of change. But in the case of Jīvas, the association with the bodily or other psycho-physical changes of state is all that is intended by 'creation'. For, there is no birth of the Jīva *as* spirit. Passing *from one state of dependence to another* is itself a new birth (in respect of eternal entities like the Jīvas)."

This conception of "Parādhīna-viśeṣāpti" distinguishes the 'manifestations' of the Supreme Being from the various forms of embodiment to which the Jīvas are subject. The former are voluntary and independent manifestations by His own untrammelled free will; whereas it goes without saying that the individual's position is utterly different and every psycho-physical change of his state is a dependent origination.

Thus, the entire position of the Cit and Cetya (sentient and insentient reality) comprising Prakṛti, Puruṣas, Kāla, etc., is shown to be metaphysically dependent on One Independent Principle viz. God or Brahman, in Madhva's philosophy. The two main characteristics of God in respect of the Universe, viz., His transcendence and His immanence are given equal importance. Equal emphasis is laid upon them.

The idea that all powers of nature, in whatever form or shape they are manifested, are ultimately His and vest in Him is thrillingly brought out by Madhva in his comment on the following simple-looking passage of the *Gita* (vii, 8, ff):

103.* तथापि रसादिस्वभावानां साराणां च स्वभावत्वे सारत्वे च विशेषतोऽपि स एव नियामकः। न त्वबादिनियमानुबद्धो रसादिः तत्सारत्वादिश्च इति दर्शयति—'अप्सु रसा' इति विशेषशब्दैः ॥ *(G.B.)*

"By the use of the specific terms: '(I am) the 'taste' in the 'waters' etc., it is emphasized that God Himself is the

determining cause of the distinctive natures of the various tastes, their essences and their characteristics themselves, in a special sense. It is not to be understood that those special characteristics and essences are determined by the intrinsic natures of the substances themselves. Far from it. Not only the substances, but their respective essences and characteristics and the characteristics of those characteristics themselves are all derived from His immanent powers and presence in them".

This is indeed a very remarkable interpretation of Divine immanence in the world. Only a mystic-philosopher who has been able to go beyond the intellectual level of understanding the meaning of Divine immanence could give such a sublime explanation of it.

Brahman's Relation to the Universe as Its "Cause"

No conception of God, in any religious or philosophical theory, would be complete without a definite statement of the exact sense in which He is to be viewed as its 'cause'. Madhva's views of this point could be gathered from the following passages:

104.* (a) न युक्तमीशितुः किंचिदीशत्वस्य विरोधि यत् ।
यदीशत्वविरोधि स्यात्, तदेवायुक्तम् ।
ईशत्वस्याविरोधेन योजयित्वाखिलाः प्रमाः ।।

(*A.V.* p. 36b).

"Whatever would be incompatible with the sovereignty of God should be rejected. Inconsistency with Divine majesty would itself be the criterion of what is unworthy of acceptance. All proofs and authorities should be interpreted in the light of this criterion, that the supremacy of God should *not* be compromised."

105. (b) न चेतनविकारः स्याद्यत्र क्वापि ह्यचेतनम् ।
नाचेतनविकारोऽपि चेतनः स्यात्कदाचन ।।

(*AV*. p. 13b).

"Nowhere, in experience, has the insentient been known to be a product of the sentient; nor the sentient known to be a product of the insentient".

The sentient and insentient are essentially inconvertible categories in exprience. Madhva, therefore, finds it impossible to subscribe to rhe theory of Brahma-parināma in Vedānta, which makes Brahman the actual stuff of which the Universe is made. Since Brahman is essentially Caitanyarūpa, (and ānandarūpa) its transformation into what is obviously insentient would be unthinkable. Hence Madhva's inability to accept such a position. There are, no doubt, some texts which proclaim that, It (the Brahman) became the existent (Sat) and the '*tyat*'; 'All this is Brahman' etc. But, in the light of the criterion of Divine majesty, nothing that would in any way detract from it by making the Sentient Brahman lose its sentiency and become material could be accepted. Madhva has, therefore, suggested other explanations of such texts, without making the Brahman an actual transforming cause.

106. (c) भागेन परिणामश्चेत् भागयोर्भेद एव हि ।
यो भागो न विकारी स्यात् स एवास्माकमीश्वरः ।।

(*AV*. p. 13b).

"However, if it is suggested that there are two distinct aspects in Brahman—the conscious (sentient) and the existential (*sadamśa*) and that only the latter aspect transforms, it would not affect the Theistic position that God is that (aspect) which is non-transforming".

If the Brahma-Pariṇāmavādin should, however maintain that there are really two aspects of Brahman—the aspect of consciousness, bliss etc., and the aspect of bare existence; and that while, in the former aspect, it is not certainly transforming, in its latter aspect it transforms itself into the existent universe. Madhva asks some pertinent questions, which expose the weakness of such a contention. In the first place, are the two 'aspects' to be regarded as completely different from each other; or identical; or partly identical and partly different? In the first case, the Theist's position, that what *never* is the nontransforming cause of the Universe is to be designated as God, would be vindicated. He would then simply dismiss the claim that the other 'aspects' that are subject to change are entitled to the designation of "God."

If the two aspects are identical, both would be liable to transformation. If they are partly identical and partly different, then also, by virtue of the identity, the transformation of the aspect of consciousness, also, would be inevitable. If it is argued that the aspect of difference prevents the transformation of 'consciousness', it would be an admission that the identity between the two aspects is powerless by the side of 'difference', which is stronger. That would mean the supposed identity is impotent and as good as non-existent!

107. (d) भिन्नानां समुदायस्य नाम ब्रह्मेति चेद्भवेत् ।
ब्रह्मोपादानता न स्यात्तदा विश्वस्य हि क्वचित् ॥
(*AV* p. 13b).

"if, on the other hand, these various aspects are not severally Brahman; but what is constituted of them all, then, since that whole does not, as such, transform itself into the world, there is no question of Brahmopādānatva".

If the name 'Brahman' is to be given to something that is constituted of the diverse aspects of Sat, Cit, ānanda etc., then insofar as all the aspects constitutive of Brahman are *not* reproduced in the world of matter, it cannot be regarded as a transformation of Brahman *as such.*

108. (e) यच्चाविकृतमेवैकं ब्रह्म विश्वात्मता मृषा ।
दृश्यते मन्ददृष्ट्यैव स सर्गं इति गीयते ॥
स मन्ददृष्टिस्तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः किं ततोऽन्यगा ?
ब्रह्मणश्चेत्क्व सार्वज्ञमन्यगा चेत्स्वतोऽन्यता ?
नादेहयोगिनो दृष्टिरिति तत्कारणं स्वतः ।
देहिनः कारणयुता देहाश्च यदि न भ्रमात् ।
किं भ्रान्तिकल्पितं तत्र भेदोऽपि भ्रमजो यदि ।
भ्रान्तेरज्ञानमूलत्वादन्योन्याश्रयता यतः ॥

(*AV.* p. 13)

"As for the other view of Vivartavādins that the unchanging undifferentiated Brahman itself, by virtue of Māyā, comes to be falsely perceived as the world, one has to ask the question if this defective perception is of the Brahman itself; or of someone else. If the misapprehension belongs to Brahman itself, it would *not* be the all-intelligent being that it is represented to be, in the Śāstras. If the defective vision pertains to some-one other than Brahman, then the otherness of the Jīva and Brahman would in no sense be error-ridden. Moreover, since no subject can experience any external reality without a body, mind and so on, the mind, body and other things must be accepted as realities. What, then, is there left that is to be ascribed to 'illusory appearance'? If all external realities and the distinction between Jīva and Brahman are to be put down to beginningless ignorance, even then since the principle of Ajñāna (ignorance) would pre-

suppose some difference in order to come into play, there would be endless interdependence between the two."

Thus, Madhva finds that both the Brahma-Pariṇāma-vāda (which regards Brahman as actually transformed into the world) and Brahma-Vivartavāda (which explains the world as due to a mere illusory transformation of Brahman) are unsatisfactory explanations of Brahman's causality, in that they violate the criterion of the incorruptible and undiminishable excellence of God.

VII. SĀDHANA-VICĀRA

Jīva-Kartṛtva Vicāra

The subject of Sādhanas is bound to raise, at the very outset, a fundamental question in Vedānta, viz., 'Is the soul a real agent (kartā)? In the Advaita school of Śaṁkara, which regards the ātman as essentially *'nirviśeṣa-cinmātram'*, the self is not really an agent. All activity is due to the play of Avidyā or ignorance and is essentially the result of a superimposition on the ātman. Since Mokṣa, understood in terms of identity with Brahman, is not something to be achieved afresh; but is of the essence of the ātman himself, tho' (seemingly) obscured and hidden, even the spiritual programme cannot be regarded as a true purposive activity, in all seriousness. Madhva is unable to accept such an extreme position, which would reduce all activity on the part of the self—whether hedonistic, or ethical, secular or spiritual, to a mere make-believe. It is, therefore, necessary to ascribe real activity to the self:

109.* जीवस्य कर्तृत्वाभावे शास्त्रस्याप्रयोजकत्वापत्तेः ।

(*B.S.B.* ii, 3, 33).

"The Jīva must indeed be a real doer; otherwise, the Śāstra, which is addressed to those who want to achieve certain objectives by certain specified means and to avoid certain undesirable contingencies by not doing certain things, would have no scope."

110.* विहारोपदेशात् मोक्षेऽपि । (*B.S.B.* ii, 3, 34.)

"Also because, in the Śrutis describing him in the state of release from Saṃsāra, various kinds of free activity are attributed to him".

This is intended to show that the *kartṛtva* (activity) of the Jīva is not necessārily restricted to the sphere of Samsāra alone, in the Srutis; but that some kind of spontaneous activity is recognized in the case of the souls even after they attain Mokṣa. This is clear from the *Chān, Up.* (viii, 12, 3) :

परंज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते । स तत्र पर्येति
जक्षन्क्रीडन् रममाण: ।।

'Having reached the Supreme Effulgence (Brahman), the individual self attains to his true stature of selfhood: he moves about there, enjoying, playing, riding and so on.' The context here is definitely trans-empirical. Hence, the explanation, that the Jīva's activity is not real but due to a superimposition and is applicable only to the Avidyāvastha, cannot be accepted as a convincing one.

111.* साधनाद्युपादानप्रतीतेश्च ।

(*B.S.B*, ii, 3, 35).

"Also because Scripture tells us about the various means which have to be resorted to by aspirants to achieve various ends like Mokṣa and other objectives".

The means of realization of Brahman such as *Śravaṇa*, *manana*, *nididhyāsana*, Samādhi etc., recommended in the Śāstras, clearly imply that they are to be carried out by a real agent. If the activity in respect of these is only a matter of superimposed assumption, there is no certainty of the fruit (result) of such Sādhanas practised being realized by the aspirant in question. Whatever may be the aim of spiritual effort (whether to achieve something *new*; or to recover a *lost forgotten one*), the effort in that direction must be a very real effort on the part of a true agent. This is all that Madhva wants to maintain when he says that the Jīva must be deemed to be a true and a real agent.

112.* परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः । सा च कर्तृत्वशक्तिः परात् एव ।
(*B.S.B.* i, 3, 41).

"The creative energy of the Jīva is, however, ultimately derived from God. Such is the position of the Śrutis."

Since all finite reality is metaphysically dependent on God, even the *kartṛtvaśakti* of the Jīva is to be admitted to be subjected to the divine will, for its existence and functioning. This would not, however, nullify the scope of the Śāstras in regard to the moral law and its sanctions; for, without prejudice to his position as the ultimate controller of all, the Supreme Being is to be understood to take the moral law, which is an expression of His own will, and the previous Karma, intrinsic nature and fitness of the Jīvas, into account, in regulating their actions.

Necessity for Sādhanas

113.* अनादितः संसारस्यानिवृत्तत्वेन भावात्
*N.V.*p. 8b).

"The need for Sādhanas follows from the very fact that the bondage of souls in Samsāra has been continuing from time immemorial".

There is not much need to emphasize that there *is* a bondage of souls in Samsāra. So far as we could make out, it is a very real bondage. It cannot be simply laughed out of existence or disproved by mere argument. It has to be reckoned with. It is, therefore, a reasonable hypothesis, from the immemorial continuity of bondage, that it would not cease of its own accord. Since the desire to get rid of it and be free is fairly widespread in the thinking section of humanity, it may be assumed that there must be some means of achieving this objective. "Sādhana" is the

generic name given to the various means which our Sāstras have laid down, in this connecton.

114.* स्वाभाविकमरणमेव मुक्तिरिति न मन्तव्यम् ।
मरणे भूतवियोगस्यैवाभावात् ।

(*N.V. p.* 6).

"It should not be thought that 'natural' death is itself the termination of bondage. For, in (ordinary) death, there is no complete severance of the self from the elements".

Madhva raises a pertinent point here, which leads us right into the heart of the problem of the Hindu (and Vedānta) theory of the souls' bondage in terms of the famous theory of Transmigration. This is indeed very vital point. Death being the great leveller of all distinctions (as it is believed to be), the souls should automatically become free from all bondage and Samsāra, once they shuffle off the body. Where, then is the need for any practice of elaborate Sādhanas, for this purpose? It is at this point that the real clue to the Hindu theory of transmigration of souls lies hidden. Śrī Madhva brings out this point by his thoughtful interpretation of B.S. iii, 1, 1, 6, as above.

115.* मृतिकाले जहत्येनं प्राणा भूतानि पञ्च च ।
भागतो; भागतस्त्वेनमनुगच्छन्ति सर्वशः ।

(*B.S.B.* iii, 1, 4) ;

"At the time of death, the vital powers (prāṇāḥ) and the elements leave the individual only in part and follow him with other parts (of themselves)."

It should be noted that this view is based on the teaching of the Upaniṣads (*Chān. Up.* v, 9, 1), and other texts. But a purely authoritarian approach may satisfy or convince modern minds, which would require verifiable evidence and scientific reasons in support of the above contentions. Hindu

philosophers have generally tried to establish the existence of 'a past life' on the basis of the 'inequalities' of the present. It is a matter of opinion and sociological theories, to what extent they are the consequences of our past lives !

Vairāgya

Among such Sādhanas, Vairagya or non-attachment to the body and bodily pleasures and cravings has always been recognized as the first step in Sādhana. The Hindu Scriptures are full of strongly-worded condemnation of all kinds of worldly attachments in respect of the aspirant: नैषां ममाहमिति धीः श्वशृगालभक्ष्ये "Those who are free from the attachment to the body which after one's death, becomes the food of dogs and jackals' (*V.P.*). The aversion to the body from the spiritual point of view is the logical corollary of the distinction of soul from the body (*dehātma-viveka*), which is almost the first lesson in Upaniṣadic philosophy. Madhva points out that true Vairāgya cannot be attained until man realizes the utter dependence of everything that he imagines to be his own—be it the body, cattle, wealth, relations, or his own self,—on God. Not merely *dehātmaviveka*, then ; but *Jīveśvara-viveka* too, is absolutely essential for the cultivation of true Vairāgya:

116.* प्राणबुद्धिमनःस्वात्मदेहापत्यधनादयः ।
यत्सम्पर्कात्प्रिया आसंस्ततः कोन्वपरःप्रियः ? (*A.V.*, p. 2).

"The Supreme Being thro' whose contact the vital powers, *buddhi*, mind, senses, body and self and possessions have become dear (to us)—could there be anyone dearer to us than such a Being ?"

The highest ambition of the human soul should therefore be to realize its nearness to the Supreme Being

and discard everything else. So long as the attachment to the body and other external attractions to exist and exercise its influence on the self, it is futile to expect any lasting results. Hence, the Śāstras emphasize the supreme need for Vairāgya, by drawing attention to the untold sufferings and endless distraction and miseries of bondage, transmigration to and from various worlds and phases of embodiment :

117.* वैराग्यार्थे गत्यादिनिरूपणा ॥

(*B.S.B.* iii, 1. 1).

"The description of exits and entries (thro' various phases of transmigration) is to instil non-attachment".

For instance, in B.S. we have a number of adhikaraṇas dealing with the nature of the soul's journeys up and down the various worlds and its sojourn in Svarga, Naraka and its experiences therein and its passage thro' the father's seminal fluid into the mother's womb and its exit therefrom to take birth, on earth. The object of all these detailed descriptions is, naturally, to create in the mind of the aspirant a sense of aversion and distaste for the pleasures of earthly life which is attended with so much dire consequences and are so short-lived in their pleasures also and turn his mind God-ward.

Karma

118.* न च कर्मैव मोक्षसाधनमिति मन्तव्यम् ।
'नान्यः पन्था' इति श्रुतिबलात् ॥ (*N.V.* iii, 1. adh. 7).

"It should not be supposed that Karma alone is a sufficient means of Mokṣa. For the Śrutis clearly say that there is no other (final) way to attain Mokṣa than by Jñāna".

Here, Madhva refers to the frequent reference, in the Hindu Scriptures, to the benefits of rites, rituals, sacrifices and other obligations laid down for those in various stations

in life. These are generally regarded as falling within the purview of the 'Karma-Kāṇḍa' of the Vedas and the Kāmya, Nitya and Naimittika' Karmas dealt with in the Smṛtis also. There are also certain statements in the Vedic and other texts which give an altogether exaggerated importance to Karma. The school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, in Indian philosophy, accepted these statements literally and claimed that the scrupulous performance of Vedic and other sacrifices was sufficient to confer immortality. This theory lost ground completely in the Upaniṣads, the Gītā and the Sūtras and has now nothing more than an antiquarian and academic interest. The Gītā has, as is well-known, given a new orientation to the old theory of Karma and sacrifices in the Vedas and effected a synthesis between Karma and Jñana by taking away the element of egoism (kartṛtvābhimāna) and hankering after the fruit (*phaleccha*) from Karma; and by enriching the content of Jñāna with the new element of passionate devotion (Bhakti) towards God who is represented as the goal of Jñāna. This lead is followed by Madhva:

119.* न च, कर्ममात्रे पर्यवसितिर्वेदस्य । सुखज्ञानस्यैव
प्रयोजनत्वात् । अतः सिद्धस्यैव प्रयोजनत्वं वाच्यम् ।

(*K.N.* p. 16b)

"It cannot be held that the Vedas find their fulfilment in Karma; for only the realization of true happiness can be the true goal of human endeavour. Hence, only an existent reality (as different from something to be produced or brought about by Karma) could be the purport of Scripture."

120.* "यदेव विद्यया करोति श्रद्धयोपनिषदा तदेव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति"

(*K.N.*)

"The Śrutis also accordingly lay down that only Karma that is carried out with faith and knowledge of the supreme reality is efficacious".

121.* आ चतुर्दशमात् वर्षात् कर्माणि नियमेन तु ।
दशावराणां देहानां कारणानि करोत्ययम् ।
अतः कर्मक्षयान्मुक्तिः कुत एव भविष्यति ?

(*B.S.B.* iii, 1, 8).

"Beginning from the fourteenth year of his life an individual goes on doing such Karmas as, at the lowest estimate, are sufficient to lead to ten future births. How, then, is it possible to expect Mokṣa to be achieved by the complete cessation of Karma and its effects alone?"

It is, therefore, foolish to expect to attain Mokṣa thro' a mechanical adherence to the way of works alone, without harnessing it to the other and more important Sādhanas of Bhakti and Jñāna :

122.* भगवद्भक्तिज्ञानवैराग्यपूर्वकं कर्म कर्तव्यम् ।

(*K.N.* p. 16).

"Karma should therefore be performed with bhakti, jñāna and vairāgya (freedom from attachment)."

Bhakti

The importance of Bhakti among Sādhanas and the peculiar place that Bhakti is assigned in Madhva's system, in relation to Jñāna and all other Sādhanas, have already been explained at length in earlier sections. His conception of Bhakti as a means (before Moksa) and as an end in itself (thereafter), has also been dealt with. [See Texts 68-70].

We may therefore turn to his views on the subject of "Upāsanā".

Upasana

Upāsanā is a mental process of absorbed thought in unbroken continuity and with deep attachment to the subject

When turned Godward it becomes a potent Sādhana for Aparokṣa or direct vision (Sākṣātkāra).

123.* सोपासना च द्विविधा शास्त्राभ्यासस्वरूपिणी ।
ध्यानरूपा परा चैव, तदङ्गं धारणादिकम् ॥ (*A.V.* p. 40).

"Such upāsanā is twofold: one consisting of deep study, reflection and exposition of Scriptures and the other of pure meditation. The control of breath and other aspects of Yogic meditation are all the accessories to Dhyāna."

Madhva gives a very high place indeed to "Śāstrābhyāsa", when he recognizes it is constituting an independent form of Upāsanā, leading to God-realization. In this, he has clearly gone far beyond what the exponents of other Vedāntic schools of thought have conceded. Anyway, it shows his supreme confidence in the Śāstra, as interpreted by him, to lead to the highest, realization. He takes care to lay down that the study of Śāstras should consist of those 'whose purport has been definitely settled (*nirṇīta*) by authoritative canons of interpretation. This is because the aim of such study, as an Upāsanā, is God-realization and not merely a literary pursuit. It may be mentioned that the special place of honour assigned to Śāstrābhyāsa as an Upāsanā, in itself, by Madhva is in line with the ancient tradition of seers like Maudgalya (*Taitt. Up.* i, 6) who refers to "Svādhyāya and Pravacana" as the highest type of penance; and of Sañjaya who declares in the *Mahābhārata* that 'having become purified in mind by Bhakti, I have realized Janārdana thro' Śāstras'. Madhva has also suggested another interpretation of his own statement according to which the study and exposition of Śāstra would constitute the preparatory stage for Dhyāna. The term Dhyāna here, stands for and includes all the other stages of self-discipline leading to Samādhi.

124.* कुर्वतः स्याद्धि दर्शनम् । (*A.V.* p. 40).

"One who practises this form of Upāsanā will surely have the vision of God".

Here, Madhva points out that Upāsanā, understood and practised on right lines and under proper guidance of Gurus, would eventually lead to God-realization. The clause तदङ्गं धारणादिकम् in Text 123 above, has been taken to refer to both forms of Upāsanā, in some commentaries on the AV.

Orders of Upāsakas

It is Madhva's firm conviction that throughout the Vedas and Upaniṣads it is the Supreme Being *alone* that constitutes the subject-matter of Upāsanā. The differences arise on account of the particular aspect of Brahman that is placed before the Upāsaka—such as the *adhidaiva, adhiyajña, adhibhautika or adhyātma* aspect. Since the Brahman is immanent in the Universe in all these planes and many others besides, whatever Upāsanā is prescribed or recommended in the various parts of the Vedas is, in point of fact, a direct Upāsanā of Brahman, in its diverse aspects. It will be seen that this places the whole subject of Upāsanās in an altogether new light. It also gives us a new insight into the ideology of the ancient seers and mystics, who by various forms of Upāsanā recorded in the sacred literature realized the Brahman as the all-immanent principle in and thro' diverse aspects in which such immanence is manifested. Such an elevated conception of the subject of Vedic and Upaniṣadic Upāsanās, of different "Vidyās", would correct many unfortunate misconceptions which have crept into present-day beliefs and practices of Hindus about the true aim, function and ideology of "Upāsanās".

125.* अन्तर्बहिः सर्वगतत्वेन इत्युपासात्रैविध्यात् । तत्तदुपासना-
योग्यतया च पुरुषाणाम् ।

(*B.S.B.* i, 1, 31.)

"There are three orders of Upāsanā: internal, outward and all-pervasive, These different Upāsanās are in accordance with the different (intrinsic) capacities of individuals".

126.* केषांचित्सर्वगत्वेन केषांचित् हृदये हरिः ।
केषांचित् बहिरेवासौ उपास्यः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥ (*ibid.*)

"God is to be meditated upon as all-pervasive by some; as in their heart by others; and externally (in Pratīkas, images etc.) by some others".

127.* अग्नौ क्रियावतां विष्णुर्योगिनां हृदये हरिः ।
प्रतिमास्वप्रबुद्धानां सर्वत्र विदितात्मनाम् ॥ (*ibid.*)

"Those who worship thro' rituals and images worship God outwardly! the Ṛṣis meditate upon Him as the Antaryāmī in the heart; and the still higher Adhikāris as the all-pervasive One".

128*. उपासनाभेदवद्दर्शनभेदः । तच्चोक्तम्—'अन्तर्दृष्टयो बहिर्दृष्टयोऽवतारदृष्टयः सर्वदृष्टय इति । देवा वाव सर्वदृष्टयोऽन्येषु यथायोगं यथा ह्याचार्या आचक्षत' इति ॥
(*B.S.B.* iii, 3, 52).

"The vision of God also depends upon the different types or orders of Upāsanās. So it is said: 'There are (Upāsakas) who realize God thro' meditation inside; some others realize Him outside; others in Avatāras and yet others everywhere'. The gods are able to realize Him as all-pervading. Among others the fitness is to be understood as taught by the Gurus".

Technical Aspects of Upāsanā.

It would be obvious from what has been said in Text No. 79, that Upāsanā, which is the last stage of Jijñāsā of Brahman, presupposes some definite attributes in the subject of such inquiry and meditation.

This means that all Upāsanā must necessarily be of a Being that possesses to empirical attributes whatever, for the simple reason that It transcends the world (of Prakṛti —See Text 93); but which must, nevertheless, have a distinctive character of its own, in virtue of which it is taken to be 'transcendental' (*neti, neti*). It is these essential attributes of Brahman that have to be meditated upon in order to 'realize' It. In a fundamental sense, then, the subject of Upāsanā must necessarily be "Saguṇa". The distinction is often made in popular fancy between the so-called Nirguṇopāsanā and Saguṇopāsanā, on loose grounds, which can hardly bear scrutiny. Unfortunately, such loose ideas have sometimes a tendency to rear their heads even in accredited works of experts in philosophy. "When the absolute becomes *embodied* as a *personal* God" is not a proper definition of the concept of "Saguṇa", as debated in the original texts of the Vedāntic schools. Nor is the definition of Saguṇa as "when man posits an external God, he assigns a form to it given by tradition, that forms the prop for his mind; and meditation on God with the aid of this prop, say idol, etc., constitutes Saguṇopāsanā"[1] any the better. Whatever the popular value of such definitions, they have no claim to acceptance in the authentic traditions of Vedāntic thought. A reference to Texts 93-101, would make it clear in what sense Madhva uses the term "Saguṇa" to describe the Brahman. We have seen that there is nothing 'empirical', 'personal' or material in that conception. It is expressly trans-empirical and purely metaphysical, and in strict conformity with the high altitude of Upaniṣadic thought.

Since Brahma's nature is obviously infinite and its metaphysical attributes are such as could not be grasped by human intelligence in full, the Upāsaka has naturally to be satisfied with the few that he can conceive of and concentrate

1. *Śaṁkara's Teaching in His Own Words*, P. 129.

upon, as far as it lies in his power. The idea is not peculiar to Madhva. It finds impassioned iteration in the great Christian theologian of the 17th century: Ralph Cudworth who writes: "tho' we cannot fully comprehend the Deity nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfections, yet we may have an idea of a Being absolutely perfect, such a one as is agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling *nostro modulo conformis*, as we may approach near to a mountain and touch it with our hands; tho' we cannot encompass it within our arms".[1]

On the authority of Śāstras, Madhva lays down the limits to which different orders of Adhikārins could go in the matter of "Upāsanā" of the nature and attributes of Brahman:

129.* सच्चिदानन्द आत्मेति मानुषैस्तु; सुरेश्वरैः ।
यथाक्रमं बहुगुणैः ; ब्रह्मणा त्वखिलैर्गुणैः ।
उपास्यः सर्ववेदैश्च सर्वैरपि यथाक्रमम् ॥ (*Aṇu-Bhāṣya*)

"The supreme should be meditated upon by human beings with the aid of the four attributes of freedom from flaws, knowledge, bliss and lordliness. Celestial beings could meditate on Him as endowed with many more attributes according to their capacities and the four-faced Brahmā with all the attributes".

The object of meditation being the ultimate manifestation and realization of these in their own being, in Mokṣa, by the Sādhakas, (proportionate to their capacity), and freedom from defects,—knowledge and bliss being naturally desired by everyone, they are to be meditated upon by *all aspirants*. The quality of lordliness of Brahman denoted by the term "ātmā" is to be meditated upon insofar as it expresses the true relation in which God stands to the

1. '*True Intellectual System of the Universe*, quoted from 'Chamber's Encyclopaedia of English Literature' Vol. I, in my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature*, Vol. I, p. 212.

individual and meditation upon it by the latter would be the surest way of earning His loving grace.

It will be noticed from the above that in Madhva's view Upāsanā is not merely a 'prop' to the mind. It is the only way in which the individual can recover his own spiritual depth and realize what is in himself and what he is in relation to the Supreme; his *Bimbarūpa*. The Śruti 'तं यथा यथोपासते तथा तथा भवति' 'In whatever manner he meditates on God, in accordance with that he is rewarded by realization', according to Madhva, regulates the proper way in which Upāsanā should be conducted.

"Vidyās"

The subject of Upāsanā has another important aspect known as "Vidyās." This term occurs prominently in the Upaniṣads, notably in the *Chāndogya*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Kaṭha*. Such are for example the 'Prāṇa-Vidyā'. Vaiśvānara-Vidyā', 'Dahara-Vidyā, 'Puruṣa-Vidyā', 'Pañcāgmi-Vidyā', 'Agni-Vidyā', 'Bhārgavī-Vāruṇi-Vidya', 'Madhu-Vidyā, etc. There is a good deal of esoteric element and symbolism in the description of these Vidyās. A literal interpretation of many of those texts is often misleading and sounds grotesque. According to Śaṁkara, these Vidyās are not organically connected with Brahman; but are concerned with the lesser principles like the physical elements or their presiding deities only and have only a low status of Karma and intended for the sake of worldly prosperity, gradual release, and so on. But the studied attempts of the author of the *Brahmasūtras* in the Samanvayādhyāya to correlate the *adhibhūta*, *adhyātma* and other aspects of nature to the sway of Brahman as their Antaryāmī make it very probable that he was, in some deeper way, thinking of their more direct, organic connection with Brahman. By extending his principle of *samanvaya* in and through the

Antaryāmi-aspect to the interpretation of most of the Vidyās in the Upaniṣads, it is possible to see in all of them a particular form of Brahma-Vidyā itself, for purposes of Upāsanā. This is how Madhva has approached the problem of the interpretation of these Vidyās in his Bhāṣyas on the Upaniṣads. The Bhṛgu-Vidyā in the *Taitt. Up.* dealing with the Annamaya, Prāṇamaya, Manomaya, Vijñānamaya and Ānandamaya, of whom *all but the last* are regarded as Kośas by Rāmānuja and all are treated as Kośas by Śaṁkara, affords a telling instance of Madhva's new approach to such Vidyās. He has shown, in his commentary on the *Taitt. Up.* and the *Brahmasūtras* (i, 1, 12-19), that this particular Vidyā is intended to establish the Upāsanā of Brahman as the sustaining force behind the workings of each and every one of the respective principles of *anna, prāṇa, manas, vijñāna* and *ānanda* that constitute the sum-total of man's life and which, for that fundamental reason, is designated by those names *annamaya* and so on (Cf. को ह्येवान्यात् कः प्राण्याद्यदेष आकाश आनन्दो न स्यात् ? 'Who can breathe and who can live, were it not that the Ākāśā, which is ānanda, renders it possible). Going into similar details with reference to the other Vidyās also, Madhva has shown that they are to be interpreted in terms of the direct working of the Brahman as the immanent principle in all reality. In this way, Brahman becomes connected with every one of these Vidyās, in the deepest sense of Antaryāmī which is accordingfy placed before the aspirant for purposes of meditation (upāsanā). The understanding of Brahman's direct relation with these Vidyās, would thus constitute what is called "Guṇopasaṁhāra" or the offering of attributes to Brahman as the infinite source of all, by way of systematic Upāsanā.

This process of "Guṇopasaṁhāra", again, has its own technique and details, according to Madhva, whice he has explained at some length in his Bhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtras.*

The interested reader is referred to his *Sūtrabhāṣya* for further details, which are not likely to be of interest to the general reader.

Pratīkopāsanā

There are numerous texts in the Upaniṣads which prescribe, almost at random, the meditation of any physical, psychical, adhidaiva or other principles as Brahman. 'Meditate on name as Brahman' (नाम ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत) 'Let him meditate on mind as Brahman (मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत) 'The Sun is Brahman, such is the teaching'. (आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः) 'Then the adhidaiva—Ākāśa is Brahman, (अथाधिदैवतं आकाशो ब्रह्मेति) 'Let him meditate on the syllable Om as the Udgītha' ओमित्येदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत. 'Om is Brahman, (ओमिति ब्रह्म) These various identifications of the *adhibhautika*, *adhyātma* and other principles with Brahman (thro' *vibhakti-sāmānādhikaraṇya* or the use of identical case termination) very naturally raises the question: Is this meant as a meditation of their identity *(abhedopāsanā)*? The usual answer given to this question is that these are meant to be "Pratīkopāsanās" or symbolic meditations. For the sake of efficacy of meditation these various objects of meditation are to be *treated* as 'Brahman'. Mentally, the idea of Brahman should be 'superimposed' upon them, so that they could be viewed in an enhanced status. This is Śaṁkara's explanation of what constitutes Pratīkopāsanā: ईदृशं चात्र ब्रह्मण उपास्यत्वं, यत्प्रतीकेषु तद्दृष्टयध्यारोपणंप्रतिमादिष्विव विष्ण्वादीनाम् ।। This is how Brahman becomes the object of meditation here in that there is the superimposition of the idea of Brahman on the symbols just as there is the superimposition of the idea of Viṣṇu upon an image or a Śālagrāma. (*B.S.B.* iv, 1, 5).

Madhva's views are quite different here. He does not countenance the idea of any superimposition of Brahman-dṛṣṭi on any Pratīka, however sacred or exalted it might be:

130.* न प्रतीके न हि सः। 'नाम ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत', इत्यादिना शब्दभ्रान्त्या न प्रतीके ब्रह्मदृष्टिः कार्या। किन्तु, तत्स्थत्वेनैवोपासनं कार्यम् (*B.S.B.* iv, 1, 4).

"On the strength of statements like 'He meditates on name as Brahman' one should not look (meditate) upon any Pratika (medium or symbol) as Brahman, misled by the way of expression. The proper way of Upāsanā is to meditate on Brahman as being *present in* them".

131.* सर्वार्था प्रथमा यस्मात् सप्तम्यर्था ततो मता (*ibid.*)

"Since the nominative case is permitted in place of all others, it can appropriately be explained in the sense of the locative here".

It is natural to expect the mystic way of speaking in regard to so profound a subject-matter as God-realization and the means thereof, especially in the works of ancients. Even in the writings of modern mystics the tendency to resort to mystic modes of expression are not rare. We have only to recall the famous statement of the (*A.Ā.* ii. 4, 3) परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवाः प्रत्यक्षद्विष-। 'the gods prefer esoteric way of speaking to the plain one,—to understand the psychology of the mystic mind. That the new interpretation given by Madhva to such statements as नाम ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत bearing on the context of Upāsanās could also be seen to have the full support of well-known passages in the Āraṇyakas such as: एतं ह्येव बह्वृचा महत्युक्थे मीमांसन्ते। एतमग्नौ अध्वर्यवः, एतं महाव्रते छन्दोगाः, एतमस्यामेतं दिवि, एतमाकाशे, एतमप्सु, एतमोषधीषु * * * सर्वेषु भूतेष्वेतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते ॥
(*A.Ā.* iii, 2, 3) 'It is this Paramātman indeed that the votaries of the Ṛg Veda meditate upon *in* the great Uktha, the Adhvaryus *in* the fire; the Chandogas *in* the Mahāvrata; Him *in* the heaven; Him *in* the Ākāśa: Him *in* the waters: *in* the Oṣadhīs; *in* all the beings. That one they call

Brahman" Here the expression मीमांसन्ते has been explained by Śaṁkara himself in his Bhāṣya on B.S. i. 1, 25, as 'Upāsanā' This shows that Madhva represents correctly and faithfully the genuine tradition of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic seers in regard to the principles and technique of Brahmopāsanā.

132.* तर्हि, प्रतीकमपीश्वर इत्युपास्यमिति चेन्न ।
अन्यस्येशत्वग्रहणस्य मिथ्याज्ञानत्वादेवानुपपत्तेः
(*NV.* p. 12).

"That the Pratīka should be meditated upon as Īśvara or Brahman is not a right view. It is equally a misapprehension and false knowledge to mistake or deliberately identify the Supreme Being for or with any other thing (that is not Īśvara or Brahman)".

133.* ब्रह्मदृष्टिश्च सर्वथा कार्यैव परमेश्वरे । उत्कृष्टत्वात् ।
महत्त्ववाची शब्दोऽयम् ॥ (*B.S.B.* iv, 1, 5).

"The Supreme Being should always be meditated upon as "BRAHMAN" i.e. as the Highest Being endowed with infinite attributes and which transcends all".

By this new interpretation of the well-known Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa ब्रह्मदृष्टिरुत्कर्षात्', Madhva has given a totally new turn to the whole standpoint from which the subject of Upāsana is to be viewed, according to the true intentions of the Sūtrakāra. This is indeed a crucial Sūtra whose generally accepted interpretation, not excluding Śaṁkara's, would seem not only to condone but *approve of* a conscious superimposition of the idea of the *upāsya* (object of meditation) on the object chosen as Pratīka, which would be an open sanction of idolatry. As a true Theist, Madhva sharply criticizes such an interpretation of this Sūtra.[1]

1. तस्मादतत्वं नोपास्यमिति वेदविदां मतम् (*A.V.* p. 55b)
So one should never meditate on a false basis. Such is the view of knowers of Vedas.

No Christian missionary could be more critical of the profanity of idol-worship than Madhva has been, on this Sūtra. He feels strongly that we cannot get away from the difficulty posed by this Sūtra by explaining that the Pratīka is, after all, recognised as a 'symbol' or a medium. But the point, says Madhva, lies in this that the symbol would cease to be such the moment you approve of mentally and deliberately looking *upon it* as the God or Supreme Being who is the true object of the worship in question. It would become enhanced in status beyond its legitimate limit. Madhva evidently found this tendency had deeply penetrated into the Hindu society of his times to an extent that was giving needless encouragement to feelings of iconoclasm among the crusaders of a new militant monotheism that was becoming a power in the country. To-day of course, the whole of popular Hindu worship is strongly coloured by the very tendency which Madhva has so vehemently condemned in his works. That only shows how irresistible is the force of Adhyāsa in life, as Śaṁkara has so impressively pointed out!

134.* ध्याते त्वेकस्य तद्भावे तद्भावोऽन्यस्य किं न तत् ?
तस्मादपेशलं सर्वमन्यस्य ब्रह्मतावचः ॥ (*A.V.* p. 55b).

"When one meditates upon one thing as another, the identity would apply both ways. Therefore, it is flimsy to talk of meditating upon any Pratīka whatsoever *as* Brahman".

The temporary identification, by superimposition, of the Pratīka with the true object of meditation (Brahman or Īśvara) is generally justified on the ground that the Pratīka by becoming so identified, mentally, with the highest object of our attention enables us to keep our mind strongly rooted to the Brahman. But Madhva points out this advantage is not unlikely to be eclipsed by the spiritual fall in allowing ourselves to think of God in turn as a limited object. If someone should say that in

such meditation we get to annihilate the Pratīka as such, we have only to say it is hardly a fact. If we do so, there would be no talk of Pratīkopāsanā as such; since the Pratīka itself would no longer be there, mentally. Cf.— स्वरूपोपमर्दे च नामादीनां, कुतः प्रतीकत्वम् ? (Śaṁkara *B.S.B.* iv, 1, 4).

For these reasons, then, Madhva discards the older interpretations of B.S. iv, 1, 4-5 given by other commentators and treats the two Sūtras there, as constituting different adhikaraṇas (topics), which is the only way in which the incorrect interpretation of the Sūtra 'आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च' could be averted.

How to Meditate on Brahman ?

135.* आत्मशब्दः पतिं वदेत् (*AV.*)
आत्मेत्युपदेश उपासनं च मोक्षार्थिभिः सर्वथा कार्यमेव ॥
(*B.S.B.* iv, 1, 3).

"The Supreme Being should always be taught and meditated upon as 'He is my Ātmā (Lord)' by all seekers."

Madhva understands the word Ātman in the above Sūtra, in the highest sense in which it is used in the Vedas and Upaniṣads (as distinguished from the iudividual self who is more commonly understood by the term, in ordinary usage. For the use of the term in the sense of the Sarvāntāryāmī (which is Brahman) see the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa in the Bṛh. Up.

136.* सर्वगुणेषु भूमगुणस्य ज्यायस्त्वं । सर्वत्र सहभावात् ।
(*B.S.B.* iii, 3, 59).

"Among all the attributes of Brahman, to be meditated upon, the attribute of "Bhūmatva" or infinitude is the chief one which is to be meditated upon in unison with the other attributes like *ānanda*".

Each one of the attributes of Brahman chosen for meditation is to be viewed as infinite in its range. The *Bhāgavata* expresses this idea in this way :

'मय्यनन्तगुणोऽनन्ते गुणतोऽनन्तविग्रहे' (*VI*, 4, 48)

'In me whose attributes are infinite both individually and collectively and constitute my essence'. It is well-known that the Upaniṣads represent the Brahman as 'infinite' (bhūmā) and Pūrṇa in every respect and emphasize the contemplation of this distinctive aspect as the source of highest spiritual realization: यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं । नाल्पे सुखमस्ति भूमैव सुखम् (Chān. Up. vii, 23). 'What is infinite is blissful. There is no lasting bliss in what is limited'. Human intelligence may be unable to form any precise idea of the infiniteness of any attribute of God. The conception of such infinitude may also differ according to different levels of comprehension. There is, however, nothing to feel absolutely sceptic about forming some idea of what it would be like, within the limits of our own faculties. To give an example, tho' infinite is the number of years and the number of months that have gone by, since the beginning of time, we are still able to conceive of some difference in the infinitude of these two ideas of infinitude. The same should be understood to be the case with the different conceptions of the infinite attributes which different Adhikārins in the spiritual sphere are able to form, in their own minds, for purposes of meditation.

Bimbopāsanā

The eternal and intimate relation in which each individual self stands to the Paramātman is conceived by Madhva as a peculiar metaphysical relation of constant dependence of the Jīva on Brahman, not merely in respect of its external outfit of body and belongings, but even in

regard to his being and becoming. (Vide Text No. 74 P. 93). This relation is something intrinsic to the very nature of the soul and has nothing physical about it. It is difficult to express it in terms of any other relation within our empirical grasp. The term "Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva", or the relation of 'Original and Reflection' suggested for it, is only to be taken as the nearest parallel in our experience. It is not, however, to be taken *literally* as depending on any external factor or medium (upādhi), which would render it a *conditioned relation and therefore terminable.* It is a relation of intrinsic dependence of the Jīva on Brahman rooted in the very essence of the Jīva and his essential characteristics of reality, consciousness and bliss. It is coeval with the Jīva (*yāvadātmabhāvī*) and becomes fully manifested in Mokṣa. The bondage of Samsāra is itself due to its being missed and obscured by a false sense of independence. No wonder that among the various forms and aspects of Upāsanā, the meditation on the Bimba-aspect of the Lord has been considered by Madhva to be the *sine qua non* for Aparokṣa :

137.* समोऽपि भगवान्, स्वबिम्बदर्शन एव एनं मोचयति

(*N.V.* iii, 3).

"Tho' God's powers are uniform in all His manifestations, final release is possible only thro' the visualization of Him in his Bimba-aspect by each individual".

To give an illustration, Mokṣa is attainable only after death. But it does not mean that one gets Mokṣa at the time of any death at random from among the innumerable ones thro' which he has to pass, in the course of the transmigratory career; but only at the end of a *particular one* in the chain. The same is the case with Bimbāparokṣa, as the requisite of release. The concept of Bimbāparokṣa may well be considered to fall under the domain of mystic communion in Madhva's religious philosophy. By its very nature, it is beyond discursive elucidation.

Aparokṣa-Jñāna.

Dhyāna or meditation, otherwise known as Upāsanā, merely leads on to direct realization. There is, however, a vital distinction between the mental configuration of Brahman that the Upāsaka keeps before his mind's eye, even in the most absorbed state of meditation and Samādhi and the actual form of Brahman of which his configuration is just a copy. Some schools of thought identify the particular form of Brahman in which the Upāsaka is absorbed in meditation with the true form of Brahman itself. Madhva, however, distinguishes between the two:

138.* यथा जीवानन्दादेरन्यत् ब्रह्म, तथोपासाकृतादपि—
पश्यन्ति परमं ब्रह्म चित्ते यत्प्रतिबिम्बितम् ।
ब्रह्मैव प्रतिबिम्बे यत् अतस्तेषां फलप्रदम् ॥
तदुपासनं च भवति प्रतिमोपासनं यथा
उपासना त्वापरोक्ष्यं गमयेत् तत्प्रसादतः ॥

(*B.S.B.* iii, 2, 37).

"Just as it has been pointed out earlier that even tho' the same terms might be used to refer to the essential characteristics of *ānanda* etc,, of the Jīva and Brahman, still the ānanda of Brahman is altogether different in its content and nature from those of the Jīva, similarly, the form of Brahman that is built up in Dhyāna, by the mind of the Sādhaka, is *not* the same as Brahman. In Dhyāna one sees only the reflection of Brahman in the Citta. By its presence *in the reflection* the Supreme Brahman confers the fruit of meditation on the aspirant. The meditation of this reflecten form of Brahman, is like the worship of an image. It leads (gradually) to the actual vision of the Lord, by His own grace".

In the above, Madhva maintains rigorously that the form of Brahman as it reveals itself to the Sādhaka, at the stage of Aparokṣa, is quite different from the mental *construct* of

Upāsanā or Dhyāna. He takes his stand also on *Kena Up.* i, 6. (नेदं यदिदमुपासते) ('known that to be the Brahman which stands near as you meditate upon'), in this connection.

139,* अव्यक्तमेव तत् ब्रह्म स्वतः । अग्न्यादिवत् स्थूलसूक्ष्मत्व-
शेषाभावात् । सर्वत्रैकरूपोसौ ॥
(*B.S.B.* iii, 2, 23 ; 25).

"Brahman is essentially unmanifest and formless. Unlike the elements of fire etc., which are insensible in their subtle (*tanmātra*) form but yet visible and manifest in their gross form, Brahman has no such diversity of aspects as gross and subtle. It is always and essentially *avyakta* (unmanifested)".

140.* नित्याव्यक्तस्य कथं प्रकाशः ?
नित्याव्यक्तोऽपि भगवानीक्ष्यते निजशक्तितः ।
तमृते परमात्मानं कः पश्येतामितं प्रभुम् ?
(B.S.B. iii, 2, 27).

"Tho, He remains unmanifest always, by His own grace He reveals Himself to the Upāsaka, by His own inscrutable power. Without His choosing to reveal Himself in this way, who can ever see Him, the limitless one ?"

Aparokṣa-jñāna, then is something which by its nature, defies any more explicit description. It is a flash-like revelation of the Supreme at the fruition of a long and arduous process of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, in the fulness of absolute self-surrendering devotion to the Lord, as our Bimba. Ultimately, it is *He* that must choose to reveal Himself, pleased by the hungering love of the soul. The Pratibimba (soul) must turn in and *see his Bimba in himself*. That is Aparokṣa.

After—Aparokṣa State

Aparokṣa marks the preliminary stage of release. The journey's end is now fairly in sight; but not yet fully attained. The Aparokṣajñānī, in Madhva's system, corresponds to

the "Jīvan-mukta" of other schools. But the analogy should not be pressed too far. There is here no destruction of Avidyā or Prākṛtic bondage yet. It is not merely waiting unconcerned for a while for death to rid oneself of all further bondage. To the Aparokṣa-jñānin, the prospect of Mokṣa is now *assured.* But, until the subtle body of sixteen *kalās*, known as "Linga-Śarīra", is disintegrated, the Jīva is not freed from Prākṛtic bondage. This comes at the end of the working out of a portion of his "Prārabdha-Karma" (that portion of the accumulated load of all past Karma, which he has begun already to go through) by '*bhoga*' (not necessarily pleasant). Madhva holds out also a very assuring prospect of the possible "Upamarda" (putting the lid upon) or writing off of some portion of *even* the Prārabdha Karma by the grace of God and release in its full sense speeded up. The term Prārabdha-Karma includes obviously the good and the bad (*puṇya* and *pāpa*). Madhva introduces (on the authority of the Śāstras) a subtler distinction in the *former*, from the point of view of the Aparokṣa-jñānin, as *iṣṭa* (desirable) and *aniṣṭa* (undesirable). The former is what conduces to deeper and deeper manifestations of innate bliss in Mokṣa. The latter is whatever is likely to prolong the onset of complete release :

141.* एवमेव प्रारब्धकर्माभावे, शरीरपातानन्तरमेव मोक्षः ।
तद्भावे, जन्मान्तराणि; इत्यनियमः ॥ (B.S.B. iii, 4, 51).

'Thus, there is no hard and fast rule that final release should take place at the destruction (by death) of that particular body in and thro' which the Aparokṣa-jñāna was attained. It depends on Prārabdha-Karma. If its effects have been worked out (in that body) there is no more delay ; but if they have not been, then he must pass thro' some more 'lives' to work them out. This is the position of the Śāstras on the point".

It will be seen that this is designed to meet the requirements of the inexorable law of Karma, in Vedānta philosophy. But since even the law of Karma is not independent of the Lord's will, Madhva interposes a saving clause in respect of God's will, which nothing can limit. This may be called the 'vetoing power' of the Lord exercised in His own grace :

142.* उपमर्दं च B.S. iii, 4, 16).

उपमृद्य पुण्यं च पापं च ब्रह्मानुव्रजन्ति ।

"Freezing both (undesirable) good and all demerit, they attain Brahman".

Here, the "*Upamarda*" or devitalizing of the effects of Prārabdha Karma refers to all evil Karma and such of the Puṇyakarma (or Puṇya-Prārabdha, as it is called) as will delay or retard Mokṣa, by producing agreeable effects for enjoyment in future lives. But such Puṇya, as will enhance the *ānandānubhava* in Mokṣa, is "credited to the account" of the Āparokṣa-Jṇānin, so to say. This emphasizes that nothing can possibly stand against God's will. Tho. normally not interfering with the law of Karma, there are occasions in the careers of souls when he benevolently intervenes to scotch individual Karma as such, when He feels that it has had its day. This again brings out vividly the place and importance of the concept of Grace in the Theism of Madhva. This is how Madhva understands the statement that God grants His grace to man and it is thro' grace alone that we can deserve to be saved from Samsāra. To get God's grace upon oneself is greater than to know God intellectually. Bhakti is emotional sublimation in God. When intellectual perception melts into devotion we have Bhakti. When such final stage of Bhakti is reached, after Aparokṣa-vision, God intervenes to neutralize a portion of Prārabdha even, and ushers in final Mokṣa. See Text No. 72.

VIII. MOKṢA SVARŪPA

Madhva develops his conception of Mokṣa very methodically. Progress is essentially by stages. The climax of spiritual realization is gradual. In keeping with the Vedantin's acceptance of the role of Karma in human destiny, he reconciles it with the power of Jñāna to destroy Karma with the help of his special interpretation of "Upamarda" as already explained. Hence, the first stage of Mokṣa after Aparokṣa-jnāna is what is technically called by Madhva "*Karmanāśa*". The next is "*Utkrānti*" or rise from the gross body so as to be qualified for the disintegration of "Liṅga-deha". Following the Hindu (Upaniṣadic and Purāṇic) tradition, Madhva refers to the tarrying of the enlightened selves in the Brahmaloka, along with Hiraṇyagarbha (the world-soul) and entering into final beatitute along with him. The conception of Hiraṇyagarbha leading the souls to their final goal, as their leader, has clear support in the *Muṇḍaka Up.* iii, 2, 6, where the terms "वेदान्तविज्ञान-सुनिश्चितार्थाः" and "संन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्वाः" obviously refer to the souls who have realized Brahman thro' Jijñāsā and thro' Niṣkāma Karma and Dhyāna. The term "ब्रह्मलोके" used in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* would also appear to presuppose a temporary sojourn in Brahmaloka before entering final release. It is difficult to grasp the full significance of these statements which have evidently a mystic significance. The same is the case with Madhva's conception of "Ānandatāratamya" among the released souls. This is also an essentially mystic conception. The bliss of Mokṣa is ineffable; but all the same *sui generis* to each Mukta. These and other ideas are set forth by Madhva as follows:

Survival of Ātmic Consciousness of Mokṣa

143.* आत्माभावे पुमर्थः क इष्टस्यात्मा अवधिर्यतः । (*AV.* 57b)

"Mokṣa would not be worth having, if the ātman does not survive as a self-luminous entity therein. For, the ātman is the ultimate goal and target of all desires."

Madhva lays great stress on the survival of every individual personality, as such, in Mokṣa. It is the corollary of his belief in the distinctiveness of Svarūpa of each Jīva. (See Texts Nos. 51-53). Since release is for the sake of realizing the intrinsic bliss of selfhood by each one, it must be a positive experience, to be felt and realized by each and necessarily incommunicable to others. We cannot obviously press the point further and ask *how* the blissful experience of its own self-essence by one self differs from that of another. It is purely a matter of intuitive experience of each individual and we have to leave it at that:

144.* "मुक्तिर्हित्वाऽन्यथारूपं स्वरूपेण व्यवस्थितिः ।"

(B.S.B. i. 1.17).

"Release consists in shaking off all extraneous associations and regaining one's own selfhood."

It would be presumptuous on the part of any one to attempt to define in clear and precise terms what exactly the released state would be like, *from this side of release.* Nevertheless, man is irrepressibly curious about what lies in store for him, in the great beyond! Madhva bases his account of the released state on a coordinated interpretation of the Scriptural facts and evidences. He also adduces his reasons in support of these interpretations. Without entering into controversial details, we may broadly set down his ideas on this subject.

Mokṣa is essentially a State of Positive Blissfulness

The first and foremost fact about Mokṣa is that it is accepted, by common consent, as the highest "Puruṣārtha"

(desirable objective) of man. For this reason, it must be a state of unalloyed bliss; and this bliss must be *manifested* i.e. capable of being actually felt and enjoyed with a full consciousness of its being *so enjoyed*. This would naturally presuppose the survival of the one who experiences this state :

145.* साङ्ख्यनैय्यायिकाद्याश्च प्राहुर्मोक्षं च निःसुखम् ।
* * * नैतदप्यत्र शोभनं श्रुतयो यतः ।
महान्दं च भोगं च नियमेन वदन्ति हि (*AV.* p. 57).

"The Sāṅkhyas, Naiyāyikas and others maintain that Mokṣa is devoid of any blissful experience as such and that it is only a purely negative state of cessation of all misery. This is not a proper view; for the Śrutis speak of the great spiritual joy and enjoyment in that state."

The Śrutis referred to in this connection are:— सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता (*Taitt. Up.*) 'He enjoys the fulfilment of all desires in company with the released Brahmā.' परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते, स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाणः (*Chān. Up.* viii, 2, 4). Reaching the Supreme Being, he emerges into his true selfhood; there he moves about, enjoying, playing' and :

यत्रानन्दाश्च मोदाश्च मुदः प्रमुद आसते ।
स्वधा च यत्र तृप्तिश्च तत्र माममृतं कृधि ।
RV. ix, 113, 1).

'Where there is joy, bliss, delight and pleasure of inexpressible variety, where all wishes are fulfilled, there make me immortal.'

146.* ज्ञानरूपस्य विज्ञाननाशस्तन्नाश एव तत् (*AV.* p. 58b).

"Since the ātman is of the essence of consciousness, any cessation of that self-consciousness in Mokṣa would be equivalent to the loss of selfhood."

147.* प्रत्यक्षात्मविज्ञानविरोधानुभवादपि ।
न स्वविज्ञानितायां च विरोधः कश्चनेष्यते
कर्तृकर्मविरोधश्च नित्यानुभवरोधतः
कथमेव पदं गच्छेत्, विरोधो दृष्टबाधनम् ।। (*AV*.p. 58b).

"There is no difficulty in accepting the existence of self-consciousness in mokṣa. As for the supposed incompatibility of the subject knowing itself as object, there is no difficulty in it, as it is a matter of our own direct experience. Experience is indeed the test of what is compatible or not."

148.* सुखादिधर्महानौ तु मुक्तेः किं च प्रयोजनम् ?
यद्यर्थो दुःखहानिः स्यादनर्थः सुखनाशनम् ।
तयोश्च दुःखहानाद्धि सुखनाशोऽधिको भवेत् ।
प्राप्यापि दुःखं सुमहत् सुखलेशाप्तये जनः ।
यतते सुखहानौ हि को मोक्षाय यतेत् पुमान् ?
अल्पाच्च सुखनाशाद्धि विभेत्यतितरां जनः ।
महच्च दुःखमाप्नोति सुखनाशनिवृत्तये । (*AV*. p. 58).

"If Mokṣa were devoid of bliss, there would be no motive for seeking it with so much trouble. If the destruction of misery by the attainment of release is an adequate motive for undertaking so much trouble, it would be actually possible to contend that the loss of all happiness, as such, wonld deter one from taking the trouble. Moreover, the abandonment of misery would be outweighed by the prospect of loss of all happiness, and could definitely deter one from taking the trouble to achieve Mokṣa, at so much risk. The very fact that people; willingly submit themselves to undergo great privation and trouble for the sake of even a little joy shows that if Mokṣa were a state of absolute absence of bliss, none would turn to it. The fact also that people face great dangers to prevent any loss of their happiness confirms the above. *Therefore, the theory that Mokṣa is a condition in which there is no bliss or joy, as such, is not a sound one.*"

It Cannot be a Purely Negative State

149.* न समस्तप्रियाभावो मोक्षे प्रोक्ते तु युज्यते ।
प्राकृतः प्रियहानिस्तु प्रियास्पृष्टिरितीर्यते ।
अप्रियं प्रतिकूलं तदविशेषेण शब्दितम् ।
प्रियं स्वरूपमेवास्य बलानन्दादिवाक्यतः ।
हेयत्वादप्रियस्यैव प्रियहानेरनिष्टतः ।। (*AV.* p. 57-58b).

"The Śruti which runs: अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः । (*Chān. Up.* viii, 12, 1) (pleasure and pain do not affect him who is disembodied) does not rule out the complete absence of all sense of joy or happiness in Mokṣa. 'Non-contact with what is agreeable' (spoken of there) is to be understood with reference to whatever is agreeable, in a material sense. It should be understood from this Śruti that whatever is material and disagreeable is ruled out in Mokṣa. Joy, which is agreeable, is however the very essence of the Jīva; Since it is so stated in the Śrutis. The Śrutis "प्रियाप्रिये न स्पृशतः" should, therefore, be properly understood as meaning that all material pleasure and miseries are alike disagreeable and therefore to be ruled out in Mokṣa; while the loss of inner joy of self being absolutely calamitous, cannot possibly be ruled out in Mokṣa."

150.* चितिमात्रो देहो मुक्तानां पृथग्विद्यते; तेन भुञ्जते
(B.S.B. iv, 4, 6).

"The enjoyments in release are carried on with the help of external bodies (made of Śuddhasattva) or bodies constituted by the essence of the self itself."

Many Śrutis and B.S. iv, 4, 22, expressly refer to special kinds of joys and sports which the released souls experience. To a question as to how the released spirits can enjoy themselves in the state of Mokṣa insofar as they have transcended the material plane and have no 'bodies' or senses, the answer is given in B.S. (iv, 4, 10-16) from different standpoints, consistent with the trans-empirical

character of the released state. The released can fashion, at will, suitable bodies out of Śuddhasattva; or enjoy themselves with their own spiritual body composed of cit, ānanda etc. These answers are merely intended to show that we cannot judge the state of Mokṣa from our own limited range and conclude that no kind of enjoyment of bliss is possible to the Muktas, because they have no material bodies like ourselves and that, therefore, the state of Mukti should be one of utter inactivity and inertia for the souls. There is nothing to prevent the Muktas from enjoying their blessed state in ways which human imagination can hardly comprehend.

The Released Souls are not Independent of God

151.* जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् (B.S. iv, 4, 17) "सर्वान्कामानाप्त्वा अमृतः समभवत्" इत्युच्यते। तत्र सृष्ट्यादिभ्योऽन्यान् व्यापारानाप्नोति। जीवानां तादृक्सामर्थ्यविदूरत्वात् ॥

(B.S.B. iv, 4, 17-18).

"The released tho' capable of realizing all their wishes have their sovereignty limited. They have no power to carry on the cosmic functions of the Supreme Being, such as the creation, preservation etc., of the worlds."

This limitation imposed on the released in B.S. iv, 4, 17, is a conclusive proof of the absence of any identity of essence (*svarūpaikya*) between the Jīvas and Brahman or their merger, in release.

Ānanda-Tāratamya

"Ānandatāratmya", or a hierarchic gradation in the nature, range, quality, intensity etc., of *svarūpānanda* or innate bliss enjoyed by the released souls, is a logical deduction from the theory of Svarūpa-bheda of souls accepted by Madhva (explained before—See Text No. 54). Since Mokṣa is only the discovery of one's own selfhood and experiencing what is there in it :—

मुक्तिर्हित्वान्यथारूपं स्वरूपेण व्यवस्थितिः (*Bhāg*. ii, 10, 6)

There is no possibility of exchanging one's experience with another's or its transference to another, whether wholly or in part. Each released soul rests fully satisfied (*pūrṇa-tṛpta*) in the enjoyment of *his own Svarūpānanda*. Madhva uses the argument based on the obvious disparity in the Sādhanas of different orders of beings to reinforce the doctrine of Ānandatāratamya in Mokṣa. He has also cited passages from the *Ṛg Veda*, the *Upaniṣads* and other works, in the *AV*., and discussed their implications. The interested reader may refer to his *AV* (iii. 3) for further details.

152.* तारतम्यं च मुक्तानां, साधनानां च दृश्यते ।
साध्यसाधनवैरूप्यमदृष्टं केत कल्प्यते ?
श्रुतियुक्तिवलादेव तारतम्यं विभाव्यते ।
मुक्तावपि, ततः केऽत्र विरोधं कर्तुमीशते ? (*AV*. p. 48b).

"There is natural gradation among the released souls as also disparity in their Sādhanas. The difference in the nature and quality of Sādhanas must necessarily have a relation to the result. The existence of such a gradation in Mokṣa is established by reason and revelation. How can any one oppose it?"

153.* यथोदञ्चनकुम्भादेः सरित्सागरयोरपि ।
अल्पेन महता वापि पूर्तिर्योग्यतया भवेत् ।
एवं नरादिब्रह्मान्तजीवानां साधनैरपि ।
अनादिसिद्धैर्भक्त्याद्यैः पूर्तिर्योग्यतया भवेत् ।
अल्पैःपूर्तिस्तथाल्पानां महद्भिर्महतामपि ॥
(*Bṛh. Up. Bhāṣya*. p. 14b)

"Just as vessels of different sizes, the rivers and the Ocean are all "full" of water according to their respective capacities, even so, in respect of the Jīvas, from ordinary human beings to Brahmadeva, their fulness of bliss attained thro' Sādhanas is to be understood with reference to their varying (intrinsic) capacities. The Sādhanas practised by them such as Bhakti, Jñāna etc. are nothing more than an

expression of their intrinsic potentialities, which are the very core of their being—going back to beginningless eternity. Those with limited capacities are satisfied with limited bliss and those with comparatively greater capacities reach fulfilment with still more."

But each one's satisfaction would be "full" and "complete" in itself—having reached its 'saturation point', so to say.

154.* भवेयुर्यदि चेर्ष्याद्याः समेष्वपि कुतो न ते ?
तप्यमानाः समान् दृष्ट्वा द्वेषेर्ष्यादियुता अपि ।
दृश्यन्ते बहवो लोके; दोषा एवात्र कारणम् ।
यदि निर्दोषिता तत्र, किमाधिक्येन दूष्यते ? (*AV*. p. 47).

"If it is argued that there is every likelihood of hate, jealousy and discord arising among the released souls, in the event of a persistence of any gradation and disparity of bliss among them, it may be rejoined that there is no assurance that such discords would be ruled out, if complete 'equality' is accepted! Instances are not wanting in our own experience (in various spheres of life—at the domestic, national and international levels), of persons harbouring jealousy, hatred and evil designs against their own equals. These tendencies are traceable to defects in character. But inasmuch as Mokṣa is, by definition, a state of blessedness, free from all imperfections and bad passions of embodied existence, there is absolutely no fear of any strife or discord arising among the released, on account of their intrinsic capacities to enjoy their own distinctive bliss."

155.* अक्षरधियां त्वविरोधः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यामौपसदवत्तदुक्तम् ।
न चासमत्वेन विरोधो भवति । ब्रह्मधीत्वात्, दोषाभावसाम्यात्,
उत्तमेभ्योऽयेषां भावाच्च । औपसदवत् शिष्यवत् ।।
(*B.S.B.* iii, 3, 34).

"The objection, that it would lead to bitterness, jealousy, discord and other bad passions among the released souls, if there should be any sort of disparity and gradation (tāratamya) among them in the nature, content and quality

of the bliss etc., enjoyed by them, as part of their essence, is a misplaced one. For, it should be borne in mind that these released souls being spiritually attuned to Brahman (*akṣara-dhī*) would be absolutely free from all evil and disturbing passions and mutually well-disposed towards one another, always. Those in a higher status would extend their help and friendship to others below them; and the humbler would look upon those above them, with love, and reverence as a true disciple (*aupasada*) would look upon his Guru".

This picture of complete mutual fellowship, harmony and goodwill that prevails among the released souls, presented by Madhva, shows how absurd and ridiculous it would be to judge the trans-empirical state from the standpoint of the passions and prejudices of earthly life. The state of Mokṣa, as a state of blessedness, precludes, by its very nature, all disturbing passions and psychological complexes. The freed souls lead there a life of unalloyed blessedness in blissful mutual fellowship and communion with the Lord. It is a state above all strife and disharmony which are left behind, once for all.

Thus does Madhva conclude his exposition of the subject of Mokṣa with an interesting and spirited defence of the concept of Ānanda-tāratamya. The significance of this unique doctrine lies as much in its logical trenchancy as in its mystic inwardness. Anyway, here is a conception which applies the principle of peaceful co-existence and fellowship to the whole community of the released souls and guarantees to each one of them the fundamental right to the complete and distinctive enjoyment of its own selfhood and Svarūpānanda.

आनन्दतीर्थस्य वचांस्यनूद्य वाण्याङ्ग्लयायं विवृतः प्रबन्धः ।
"नहीन्दिराराध्यपदो मुकुन्दो दूर्वाङ्कुरैर्मन्दधनैरपूज्यः" ॥
श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ।

APPENDIX I

A Brief Outline of the Contents of Madhva's Works

GĪTĀ-PRASTHĀNA

Madhva has left us two works on the *Gītā*, a Bhāṣya and a Tātparya. In the first six chapters of the *Gītā-Bhāṣya*, he shows that the performance of Karma in the widest sense of the term, in the true spirit of "Karma-yoga", is the unfailing means of acquiring God-vision. The next Ṣaṭka (six chapters) is taken up with the subject of the majesty of God, His manifestations, Vibhūtis, Viśvarūpa etc. In the last are explained the nature of beliefs and practices not conducive to spiritual uplift, warning the aspirant against them. The work concludes with an insistence on Bhakti as the innermost means of achieving Mokṣa. An outstanding contribution of Madhva to the understanding of Gītā-thought is the reorientation given by him to the interpretation of its theory of Karma-Yoga in terms of "Niṣkāma-Karma" defined as 'enlightened action' (*jñāna-pūrvam karma*), devoid of selfish attachment to or hankering for fruit and performed without the egotistic assumption of independence in the initative and conduct of such Karma. Such Karma is to be dedicated to God for this reason that He is the Bimba or Controlling Power behind all sentient beings, who are but His "Prati-bimbas". The significance of this idea of "Bimba-pratibimbabhāva" relation between God and souls, which Madhva introduces, in his interpretation of many of the crucial stanzas in Chapter II of the *Gītā* and other contexts, is the emphasis it lays upon the dependent and derivative character of the powers of the individual. It is in the light of this basic conception of the philosophical relation between the individual and

the Supreme Being that Madhva understands the Lord's exhortation to Arjuna to fight the battle as His *instrument* (निमित्तमात्रम् xi, 33). The *Gītā-Tātparya* is a companion volume to the *Gītā-Bhāṣya*. Here, the interpretations of the Bhāṣya are supported with fresh arguments and additional authorities.

SŪTRA-PRASTHĀNA

Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya. This is written in a very terse style and is full of quotations from a large body of interpretative literature. The work aims at bringing out, in a prominent manner, the Theism of Bādarāyaṇa by emphasizing the twin aspects of Brahman's nature taught in the Upaniṣads and referred in the Sūtras, in terms of (i) transcendence *(adhyupadeśa)* and immenence *(antaryāmitva)*, in respect of the Adhyātma, Adhidaiva, Adhibhautika and other aspects of finite existence. Madhva shows that it is the object of the first or Samanvaya Adhyāya of the *Brahma Sūtras* to elucidate the nature of Brahman as the One Supreme Reality behind the Cosmos which both transcends all finite reality and is at the same time, immanent in it and in virtue of such immanence creates, maintains, dissolves, controls, enlightens, obscures and redeems the world. Such an interpretation naturally brings out the Theistic conception of God or Brahman, by whose grace the individual souls in bondage are to realize their innate bliss of selfhood (स्वरूपानन्द). Modhva's Bhāṣya shows how the Samanvaya—Sūtras, by their very terms and arguments, emphasize the nature of Brahman as the most perfect Being (Bhūma) of infinite bliss(Saṁprasāda) which transcends all finite reality by the greatness of its sovereign attributes (adhyupadeśāt). He thus shows how the aim of the Samanvaya or systematization of the teachings of the Śāstras is no more than a convincing demonstration of the immeasurable greatness of Brahman,

as the abode of all such auspicious attributes and the source of all existence and powers of finite reals.

In Chapter II, designed as "Avirodhādhyāya", Madhva shows the various defects and limitations of other philosophical systems, as compared with the Vedānta. In the next Adhyāya termed "Sādhanādhyāya", he throws light upon the true Theistic bearings and significance of many of the topics discussed by the Sūtrakāra, such as the one discussing the status of dream-experience. One very striking contribution of Madhva, in connection with this Chapter, which deserves mention, is the apt and highly suggestive way in which he has found an appropriate place for the formulation of the doctrine of Bhakti *within the body of the Sūtras* (iii, 2, 19). As the doctrine of Bhakti is pivotal to Theism, *the significance of this contribution is unquestionably great.*

In Chapter IV, attention is drawn to the natural drift of the Sūtras towards the acceptance of the survival of a basic difference between the individual and the Brahman, even in release. (iv, 4, 9; 17).

Nyāya-Vivaraṇa is a small prose work of Madhva, on the Brahmasūtras, giving the gist of the leading *adhikaraṇas* (topics) thereof, as interpreted in the Bhāṣya. It indicates briefly the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta positions and the reasons therefor.

Anu-Vyākhyāna. This is both a dissertation on the philosophy of the Sūtras and a discontinous commentary and a critical supplement to the Bhāṣya. It is a work in which Madhva has put forth *his best efforts at interpretation and criticism.* Each line and phrase of it is a veritable seed of ideas. Here, Madhva not only amplifies his interpretation of the Sūtras, as given in his Bhāṣya; but examines the interpretations of Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja and others. His criticisms extend to such other works of

the Advaita school as the *Bhāmati*, the *Vivaraṇa*, *Saṃkṣepaśārīraka*, *Iṣṭasiddhi*, *Brahmasiddhi* and *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*. The *Nyāyasudhā* of Jayatīrtha (1365-88) brings out the full significance and depth of this great masterpiece of Madhva. The *Anuvyākhyāna* contains also a dialectical criticism of many of the leading concepts of the Advaita school such as, 'Anirvacanīyatā', the identity of Jīva and Brahman, and the falsity of the world.

Aṇu-Bhaṣya. This is a metrical summary of the adhikaraṇas of the *Brahmasūtras*, in only 34 *anuṣṭubh* verses, divided into four short adhyāyas, each summing up one chapter of the *Brahmasūtras*. The *Ānandamālā* of Traivikramāryadāsa and the *Tattvamañjarī* of Rāghavendra Tīrtha are the most learned commentaries on this short work.

BHĀGAVATA-TĀTPARYA

The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* is held in very high esteem by all vaiṣṇava thinkers of India. Madhva, naturally, attached great importance to this Purāṇa, which had inspired the great Bhakti literature of the Ālvārs in the South. He wrote a condensed commentary on some 1600 important verses of it. His comments are concerned with bringing out the underlying purport of the verses and are supported by numerous quotations from the Purāṇic and Pañcarātra literature. His object in writing the *Tātparya* was to reconcile the seeming contradictions of the text and bring out prominently the Theistic Realism of the Purāṇa, which appears, here and there, to have been pushed into the background by a quasi-monistic note struck in certain contexts notably in the chapters dealing with the Kṛṣṇa-Uddhava Saṃvāda in the XI Skanda (chaps., 6-29). Madhva deals cursorily with the first three Skandhas and directs his attentain mainly to Skandhas X and XI. The following verse, which is

often cited by him, represents the pivotal doctrine of the Theism of the *Bhāgavata*:

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।
यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥ (ii, 10, 12.)

[Matter, Karma, Time, Individual nature, and Jīvas—all these exist always, because of the grace of the Supreme; never despite Him.]

MAHĀBHĀRATA-TĀTPARYA-NIRṆAYA

This is a metrical epitome of the Epic in 32 adhyāyas. The Epic has always been regarded by orthodox Hindu thinkers as an encyclopaedia of religion, philosophy and ethics. Vaiśampāyana calls it "Nārāyaṇa-kathā" (the great story of Nārāyaṇa). The essentially Theistic background of the Epic was considered a point of great strength by Madhva. *He therefore claims it as an important source-book of his system.* He reads an esoteric and allegorical meaning into the Epic kernel, which he develops with great skill and philosophical suggestiveness, in the second chapter of his work. The historical narrative is thus considered by him to allegorize the conflict between the forces of good and evil in life with God on the side of right and right triumphing in the end. He accepts three different ways of approach to the interpretation of the Epic: the historical (*āstika*), the moral *(manu)* and the metaphysical *(uparicara)*. He should thus be considered the *pioneer of the allegorical interpretation of the Epic.* In modern times, Prof. Tadani has written a thought-provoking work on the *Mystery of the Mahābhārata* and the late Dr. V. S. Sukthankar has also recognized the presence of an allegorical and metaphysical meaning in the Epic, to which he refers, in his work '*the Meaning of the Mahābhārata*' (posthumously published by the Asiatic Society o fBombay, 1958).

Madhva idealizes the character of Bhīma and shows him to advantage as the greatest Epic character next to Kṛṣṇa. He calls him the chief instrument of Divine will, in the Epic :

भूभारहरणे विष्णोः प्रधानाङ्गं हि मारुतिः ।

The historical value of Madhva's epitome lies in its being the earliest datable comment on the Epic in Sanskrit and its value for text-criticism of the Epic, even as a Testimonial is undeniable. It is unfortunate that this point has not been realized by modern scholars interested in Epic studies and criticism.

DAŚA-PRAKARANAS

Daśa-Prakaraṇas is the name collectively given to the ten minor philosophical tracts of Madhva. They are (1) (1) *Pramāṇa-Lakṣaṇa* (2) *Kathā-Lakṣaṇa* (3) *Upādhi-Khaṇḍana* (4) *Māyāvāda-Khaṇḍana* (5) *Prapañca-mithyātvānumāna-Khaṇḍana* (6) *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* (7) *Tattvaviveka* (8) *Tattvodyota* (9) *Viṣṇutattva-nirṇaya* and (10) *Karma-Nirṇaya*. These deal with various aspects of his logic, ontology, theory of knowledge etc. Five of these (nos. 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9) are refutations of the monistic idealism of Śaṁkara, from various points of view. Nos. 6-9 are constructive works devoted to an exposition of his ontological conception and classification of reality and his general metaphysics. The language of the Prakaraṇas is very terse and the thought is very much condensed. The full significance and depth of thought of these important works could only be grasped with the help of the masterly commentaries of Madhva's illustrious commentator: Jayatīrtha.

DAŚA-UPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYAS

The Upaniṣads had all been interpreted by Śaṁkara and his commentators in a monistic sense. Their writings

had left the impression on the minds of people that whatever might be the teaching of the Epics and the Sūtras, the Upaniṣads themselves were unquestionably in favour of an absolute monism, which had come to be regarded as the only "Aupaniṣdam Darśanam" (*the* philosophy of the Upaniṣads). In the interest of the success and acceptance of the revolt Theism led by him, Madhva had to show to the people convincingly that the monistic interpretation of the Upaniṣads was hardly fair or just to their basic philosophy of Theism, which, despite the language and imagery of monism occasionally to be met with in the Upaniṣads in moments of their great mystic fervour, stands out at the background of Upaniśadic thought, at its core. Madhva's commentaries on the Ten Upaniṣads thus seek to draw attention to the full measure of support which the Upaniṣads give to Theistic Realism and the impossibility of interpreting these contexts and texts, in any but their natural sense and drift. They also show the ways in which certain other texts, more or less ambiguously worded like "*Sarvam khalv idam bṛama*" (All this is verily Brahman) "Tat tvam asi" (That thou art) "*Yo'ham so'sau Yo'sau so'ham*" (What is "I" is He: what is "He" is "I"), which, on very superficial grounds, had been taken to be indubitably 'monistic' should be re-interpreted, consistent with the underlying Theism of the Upaniṣads. They also suggest a number of significant standpoints, mystic, philosopical and other from which these monistic-looking texts could be very properly explained, in conformity with the bulk of the texts that teach a radical Theism, even as conceded by monistic commentators.

ṚG BHĀṢYA

Among the great system-builders of the Vedānta Madhva was the first and the only one who thought it fit to write a commentary on the oldest representative of Vedic literature: the *Ṛg Veda*. For, he believed firmly that

there is as much philosophy in the Vedas, as there is in the Upaniṣads, if only we could see it from the proper point of view. The popular view that the Vedas only sing the praises of a plurality of gods (Devas) and are merely made up of hymns to be addressed to them at numerous sacrifices, is opposed by him. While admitting that the Vedas *do* serve this purpose, he contends that they have a *higher aim* also, viz., to convey the knowledge of the One Supreme Being. This latter is, in his view, the highest and most fundamental object of the Vedas—of all parts of them, without exception or distinction. The details of his threefold interpretation of the Veda are worked out by him, in the opening section of his *Ṛg Bhāṣya.* He illustrates his thesis with reference to some forty Suktas of the I Maṇḍala of the *Ṛg Veda.* Ṛks, as lauding particular forms of the Supreme in the powers and forces of nature, are easily susceptible to such higher attunement with the One than other parts of the Vedic literature. That is one reason why they are selected, to demonstrate the thesis. The purpose being merely illustrative, on by a few sūktas have been chosen for treatment.

Madhva's scheme of triple interpretation of the Vedas is a scheme based on the historical (naturalistic), mystic and transcendental standpoints. The first one agrees more or less with the *adhi-bhautika-cum-adhidaiva* (in terms of the physical forces and the gods associated with their workings) interpretation of Sāyaṇa and the modern scholars. The second or mystic line of interpretation interprets such hymns in terms of particular forms of Brahman (or its powers) presiding over the rites and their ingredients and the deity in question (called by these very names). In this case, the epithets used are shown to refer to the Antaryāmin-aspect of Brahman. The third or Adhyātma interpretation pertains to the details of metaphysical relation between the Jīva and Brahman. To

illustrate these three lines of interpretation with reference to the first ṛk of the Ṛg Veda: *Agnim īḷe purohitam*". "In the outward sacrifice, Fire is the first to be worshipped. The Supreme Being immanent in fire is next lauded under the same name and the epithets applied to the Fire-god (Agni). Lastly, in the realm of the inward sacrifice of Jñāna (ātmajñāna) the supreme is praised as the author of the right kind of rapprochment between the senses and one's external environment and experiences which are 'offered' sacrificial offering in the consuming fire of ātmajñāna. The Supreme here is the *kotṛ* or sacrificer (Cf. *Yajñakṛt Yajñabhuk Yajñī*). He is the consuming fire of external reality of bondage in the flames of the transcendental intellect. These and other details of interpretation are worked out by Madhva on the basis of elaborate grammatical and philosophical sanctions and intricate word-symbolisms of a highly technical nature, which only the initiate could follow with ease. The Adhyātma interpretation is often elaborated with great skill and suggestiveness, as for example the Indra-Sūkta referring to the Indra-Vṛttra episode. Scholars are familiar with the 'scientific' interpretation of this hymn given by Yāska, in his *Nirukta* and accepted by the modern scholars according to which the slaying of Vṛttra by Indra is but a figurative description of the natural phenomenon of the production of rain. Yāska calls his explanation that of the Etymologists. He refers to the traditional explanation of the 'Aitihāsikas' (mythologists). Madhva has given us a 'philosophical' explanation of the episode, no less interesting and far more suggestive than Yāska's. According to him, "Vṛttra" represents the concentrated essence of 'ignorance' (Ajñāna), figuratively described as a "cloud", a "serpent" (*ahi*) or a "mountain" (*adri*). Indra is the Supreme Being who slays this demon of ignorance, with his weapon of '*vajra*' i.e. true know-

ledge and confers lasting benefit on the cows (individual selves) which have been imprisoned by the power of ignorance. Ignorance falls vanquished in the fight, sundered of its hands and feet (*apād ahasto* Ṛg Veda i, 32,7a) i.e., to say put out of court, by reason and revelation. We are in an age when Vedic scholarship is taking wonderful strides. Scholars are not wanting who have boldly broken the bonds of language and tradition and discovered in the hymns of the Vedas hidden mysteries of the physical, psychological and biological crosssections of reality. Madhva's approach to the science of Vedic interpretation is designed to meet the spiritual thought-needs of humanity. It is broad-based enough to accommodate the purely ritualistic and *adhidaiva* interpretation of Sāyaṇa and the modern scholars. Tho' the Adhyātmic line of interpretation is alluded to, occasionally, in the older traditional commentaries, there was no systematic attempt at its elaboration till the days of Madhva. He was undoubtedly the pioneer of this movement. *Handsome tributes have been paid to Madhva and his commentators, for this new lead in Vedic interpretation, in the new edition of the Ṛg Veda Samhitā published by the Aurobindo Ashram Pondichery.* As is well-known, Aurobindo has carried the *ārṣa* tradition of Vedic interpretation to the utmost limit and achieved remarkable results at it; tho' the 'Indologists' have not yet accepted his conclusions or the *rationale* of his methods.

POEMS, STOTRAS AND MISCELLANEOUS WORKS

Besides the above-mentioned works, Madhva composed some Stotras and other miscellaneous works, dealing with religious worship, rituals etc. These minor works of his reflect his deep religious nature and devotional fervour. Their composition must have taken place late in his life, after he had completed his arduous task of producing his

major works and organized his system of thought, and strengthened its hold on the people.

YAMAKA-BHĀRATA

This is a short rhyming poem in eightyone verses in various metres, dealing with the exploits of Kṛṣna and his help to the Pāṇḍavas. The work handles with skill full and partial *yamakas*, *prāsa* and other Śabdālaṁkāras including fourquarter rhymes, *ekākṣara* ślokas etc.

NṚSIMHA NAKHA STUTI

This is a short eulogy, in two Sragdharā verses, of the nails of God Nṛsimha.

DVĀDAŚA-STOTRA

Madhva has woven into this short Stotra of twelve adhyāyas many beautiful and profound truths of religion and philosophy. It ranks as one of the foremost Stotras in Sanskrit in Dvaita literature. Echoes of Jayadeva's *Gītagovinda* could be detected in this poem, which is also capable of being set to music and sung.

KṚṢNĀMṚTA-MAHĀRṆAVA

This is an anthology of 242 verses in praise of Viṣṇu from various Purāṇas. It concludes with an exhortation to cultivate love and devotion to the Lord at all times;

जीवंश्चतुर्दशादूर्ध्वं पुरुषो नियमेन तु ।
दशावराणां देहानां कारणानि करोत्ययम् ।।
स्त्री वाप्यनूनदशकं देहं मानुषमार्जयेत् ।
अतःकर्मक्षयान्मुक्तिः कुत एव भविष्यति ?

[From the fourteenth year of his or her life a man or a woman does good or bad deeds which, at the lowest

estimation, entail not less than ten subsequent births. There is thus no hope of our attaining freedom from Samsāra by the annihilation of Karma or exhausting its effects. Bhakti alone is, therefore, the way to release].

TANTRASĀRASAṀGRAHA

The rules governing Vaiṣṇava modes of worship and initiation (*dīkṣā*) fall under Tantras. These are dealt with here. The work claims to be an abridgement of a bigger one of the same title by Vyāsa. Madhva's work contains 442 verses. It deals with the various *mantras* used in Devapūjā, their prescribed modes of chanting with *nyāsa, mudrās* etc., the auxiliaries of. Homa, Kalaśa-pūjā, iconography, construction of temples, casting of images, consecration of idols, renovation of temples etc.

SADĀCĀRA SMṚTI

This is a compendium of codes governing the routine of religious life and conduct of an orthodox Hindu from the standpoint of Varṇāśramadharma.

YATIPRAṆAVA-KALPA

This handbook of twentyeight verses explains the correct mode of adopting Sannyāsa or the investiture ceremony of a monk, the *mantropadeśa* and the administration of the oath of asceticism.

JAYANTĪ-NIRṆAYA

This is a short work in seventeen anuṣṭubh verses dealing with the observance of the Kṛṣṇa.Janmāṣṭamī Vrata, in due form. It is easy to realize the importance of the birth anniversary of Kṛṣṇa to all Vaiṣṇavas. Madhva

was an ardent Vaiṣṇava and he attached great importance to the observance of this Vrata, by his followers, with due sense of devotion and austerity. He enjoins a complete fast on the day which is still rigidly followed by them. Special worship with *arghya* is offered to the Lord at midnight on the eighth day of the dark fortnight of the month of Śrāvaṇa, to mark the time of the incarnation. The fast is broken the next day.

APPENDIX II

THE DEVOTIONAL MOVEMENT OF THE HARIDĀSA KŪṬA

Like other parts of India, Karnāṭaka too has played its part in shaping the history of India and contributing to her development, in the fields of religion and philosophy, art and literature. The distinction achieved by the Karnāṭaka kingdoms of Kadamba, Cālukya, Rāṣṭrakūṭa, and Vijayanagara in the history of South India is well known. In the field of philosophy, it has given birth to some of the most distinguished builders of Indian thought like Madhvācārya (Ānanda Tīrtha), Vidyāraṇya, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsarāya.

The great movement of Vaiṣṇava religious devotionalism, which began to spread and regenerate the masses during the middle ages, had its origin in what is called the Dāsa Kūṭa or the order of Vaiṣṇava palmists and saints, inaugurated in the Karnāṭaka country as a result of the spread of the realistic philosophy of Vedānta propounded in South India in the thirteenth century by Madhvācārya. This philosophy of Vedāntic realism spread over upper and lower Karnāṭaka in the next two centuries and, in the course of time, began to inspire kindred waves and movements of religious devotionalism beyond the confines of Karnāṭaka.

THE CULT OF DEVOTION OF VIṬHṬHALA

This order of the Dāsas (servants of God) was built up by a regular band of saintly souls, who dedicated themselves to the service of the Lord and singing the praises of Hari, wandered from one end of the country to the other. These saints of the Dāsa order centred their affections on Viṭhṭhala of Pandharpur as the patron deity of their order. There is evidence to show that Karnāṭaka

had cultural sway over Pandharpur and its neighbourhood, where the worship of Viṭhṭhala developed in ancient times, though, in later days, the region passed under the political and cultural hegemony of Mahārāṣṭra ; and Pandharpur itself was looked upon as the holy city of Mahārāṣṭra mysticism. But even as late as the time of the Mahārāṣṭra saint, Jñānadeva, Viṭhṭhala of Pandharpur was still spoken of as "कानडा हा विठ्ठलु कार्नाटकु" (त्यानें मला लाविलें वेधीं) the deity beloved of the Karnāṭaka, enshrined in Karnāṭaka.

The saints of Karnāṭaka were thus the first to develop the cult of devotion to Viṭhṭhala, and make it a living faith and a powerful instrument of mass uplift through the aid of their soul-stirring music and *bhajana* in the language of their province. Their example was subsequently taken up and carried further by the saints of the neighbouring region of Mahārāṣṭra, like Ekanātha, Rāmadāsa, Tukārāma, and others. But the essential features of this cult, viz. the emphasis laid on true devotion to Viṭhṭhala and the comparative unimportance of social and caste barriers in the spiritual realm, are to be found no less passionately voiced in the songs of the early Dāsas of Karṇāṭaka than in those of the Mahārāṣṭra saints. The Dāsa Kūṭa may therefore be regarded as the earliest movement of religious devotionalism in the Deccan, when it spread to other parts of upper India and produced kindred movements.

THE CHARACTER OF THEIR TEACHINGS

These saints of Karnāṭaka exercised a powerful religious influence on mass consciousness ; and for the average Kannaḍigas, for women, and for people of the

1 One of the *abhaṅgas* ascribed to Jñāneśvara. Quoted by B. R. Patwardhan, in his paper entitled '*Jñanesvar Kālīn Marāṭhī va Kānaḍī*' pub. in the Jñānesvar-Darsan, Pt. 1 (p. 175) Ahmadnagar, 1934. For further reference and details of Dasa Kuta literature, *see* my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature. Vol. II.*

lower strata of society, not acquainted with Sanskrit, they did what the great writers on the Vedānta had done for the intelligentsia. They composed their songs in racy, colloquial language, which captured the heart and the imagination of the people. In this respect, they differed from the authors of the Tamil *Devāram* and *Prabandham* literature, whose style was highly literary. The Dāsas moved through the length and breadth of the country, singing praises of Kṛṣṇa and Viṭhṭhala, extolling the merits of *jñāna* and *bhakti*, giving wholesome advice to the people in ethics and religion, and rousing the indifferent and pusillanimous spirits by the irresistible attraction of their teachings conveyed through melodious songs in diverse *rāgas* (tunes). Many of them were highly proficient in Sanskrit and in philosophical lore; and the most learned doctrines have been simplified and put in easily intelligible verses, in their works. They were ardent followers of Madhva, and, naturally, tried to show how much more satisfying their own philosophical system was, compared to other ways of thought. Although viewing the world as full of misery and pain, and hence counselling men and women to turn to God to be rid of transmigratory existence, they were zealous advocates of reform and condemned sham and cant in most scathing terms. They criticized pseudo-religiosity, and exhorted their followers to be truthful in thought, word and deed. They directed their reforming eyes to the dark problems of society and offered wholesome solutions by way of self-discipline based on a very high standard of ethics. Unlike the Vaiṣṇava lyricists of Bengal, they did not advocate the erotic forms of personal devotion to God. Their attitude in this respect was more restrained and austere.

THE LITERATURE OF THE DĀSAS

The literature of the Dāsas falls into three groups—general, special, and sectarian. The earliest and most

distinguished Dāsas like Śrīpādarāja, Purandaradāsa, and Kanakadāsa produced a literature that was meant for all classes and communities. The second group is represented by Vyāsarāya, Gopāladāsa and others, who wrote for the Brahmanical world in particular. The third group is represented by the stirring songs of Vijayadāsa, Jagannāthadāsa and others, which were meant for the followers of Madhva and which dwelt exclusively with theological matters. The Haridāsa movement strove to place a complete scheme of religion and morality before the people. It condemned formalism and ritualism in religion and immoderate hedonism in life. It preached the philosophy of *naiṣkarmya*, as interpreted by Madhva, i.e., enlightened action in a spirit of devotion and dedication to God.

The history of Dāsa literature is generally traced from the days of Narahari Tīrtha, one of the direct disciples of Madhva. This literature is very voluminous and many interpolations and corruptions have crept in, owing to its wide diffusion and the lack of proper historico-literary traditions. It is thus difficult to determine the authentic contributions of individual authors. But the songs of particular saints may be distinguished by their style and *mudrikās* (pen-names). The bulk of the literature has been published from Udipi, Belgaum, and Bangalore. Tradition has preserved the names of a hundred saints of this order. The songs of earlier saints like Śrīpādarāja, Purandaradāsa, and Kanakadāsa deserve to be translated into English and other languages.

The initial inspiration of the Dāsas was derived from Madhva himself who has left us some stirring devotional lyrics in such Sanskrit works as *Dvādaśa-stotra* and *Kṛṣṇāmṛta-mahārṇava*. *Madhvavijaya* (xv. 84) alludes to the many *gāthās*, *subhāṣitas*, etc. composed by him, though we have no trace of any composition in Kannada or Tuḷu,

by Madhva. His disciple Narahari is believed to have composed a few songs under the pen-name 'Raghukulatilaka'.

ŚRĪPĀDARĀJA

But the historical founder of the Dāsa Kūṭa was Śrīpādarāja alias Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa Tīrtha who was the head of the *Maṭha* of Padmanābha Tīrtha, at Mulbagal, in the Mysore State. He was at once an erudite scholar of Sanskrit and a passionate devotee; and has poured forth beautiful songs in praise of the Lord under the pen-name 'Raṅga-Viṭhṭhala'. The use of the names of the Lord as *mudrikā*, instead of their own names, as was the practice with the Mahārāṣṭra and other saints, is characteristic of the devotion and humility of the Haridāsas of Karṇāṭaka. Śrīpadarāja's songs are more sublime than those of many others, and possess a happy blending o rhythm and meaning. His sincerity and passionate devotion are alike transparent in his songs. His important pieces are *Bhramara-Gītā*, *Veṇu-Gītā* and *Gopī-Gītā*. There are also many other individual songs of a very high order of musical excellence and literary grace.

VYĀSĀRĀYA

His disciple Vyāasrāya attained fame as the foremost philosopher and dialectician of the Dvaita Vedānta. His erudite Vedāntic classic, the *Nyāyāmṛta*, caused a stir in Vedāntic circles and paved the way for the birth of neo-Advaitism, heralded by the composition of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Advaitasiddhi*. Vyāsarāya was not only an eminent philosophical writer, but also a profound mystic and passionate devotee of God. He succeeded Śrīpādarāja as the leader of the Dāsas, and has left us many exquisite songs of great mystic appeal and devotional fervour in Kannaḍa. He is believed to have had a

mystic vision of Śrī Kṛṣṇa dancing before him, in one of his supreme moments of ecstatic devotion.

More even than for his songs and for his greatness as a Dāsa and as a philosopher, Vyāsarāya's name has come to be cherished as the discoverer of the two lofty geniuses of the saintly order of Karnāṭaka, viz. Purandaradāsa and Kanakadāsa, whose names are on the lips of the people and whose songs are sung to this day, in almost every village and home of Karnāṭaka. They flourished in the sixteenth century during the heyday of the great Karnāṭaka empire of Vijayanagara.

PURANDARADĀSA AND KANAKADĀSA

It is now widely recognized that Purandaradāsa was the father of the Karnātak or South Indian system of music, which was standardized a century or so later, by another son of Karnāṭaka, the celebrated Veṅkaṭamakhī, in his *Caturdaṇḍī-Prakāśā*. He was a native of Purandragada (now in the Poona District) and spent his days mostly at Vijayanagara, where he had settled down, after his initiation into the Dāsa order by Vyāsarāya. He seems to have been a familiar figure in Vijayanagara, during the days of Kṛṣṇadevarāya and his brother Acyutarāya. Purandaradāsa is reputed to have composed a very large number of songs. His songs have topics ranging from the most homely to the most sublime and can often move one to tears.

Vyāsarāya's second disciple, Kanakadāsa, was not a Brāhmaṇa by birth, like Purandaradāsa. He was a person of humble birth and is believed to have been a Kuruba (shepherd), or, more probably, a hunter-chieftain (Beḍa). He belonged to the village of Kāginele (Dharwar District) and adopted, as *mudrikā*, the name 'Kāginele Ādikeśava', the deity of his village. He was a zealous reformer in outlook. The acceptance of Kanakadāsa as a

disciple and prominent member of the Dāsa Kūṭa by the great Vyāsarāya was itself a tribute to the essential humanism of the Dāsa order, in general, and the catholicity of outlook of the great Mādhva religious teacher, Vyāsarāya, in particular.

Kanaka's name is a beloved one in Karnāṭaka. He was a liberal thinker. Caste and creed, in his opinion, were no barriers to *mokṣa*. *Bhakti* alone counted. He was persecuted for his extreme views by the orthodox followers of Vyāsarāya. This fact is alluded to in one of the songs of Purandaradāsa, which says that 'the disciples of Vyāsarāya found fault with him for the favour shown to Kanakadāsa'. But Vyāsarāya is said to have stood firm by his disciple and revealed the true worth and greatness of Kanaka to his other followers. Even to this day *Kanakana-khiḍki* (Kanaka's window) in the temple of Srī Kṛṣṇa at Udipi, bears witness to his fervent devotion to God. Besides many devotional songs, including allegorical ones (called *muṇḍagis*), Kanaka wrote the following pieces: *Mohana-taraṅgiṇī*, *Haribhaktisāra*, *Rāmadhyāna-mantra*, and *Nalacarita*. His portrayal of feelings is extremely vivid and penetrating. He could be most homely as well as sublime, as occasions demanded and rise to the same inimitable perfection of art in both.

VĀDIRAJA AND VIJAYADĀSA

Contemporary with Purandara and Kanaka was another distinguished saint, Vādirāja, who was an erudite Sanskrit scholar and a writer of great eminence in Dvaita Vedānta. He belonged to the historic country of Tuḷuva in Karnāṭaka and was a Tuḷu-speaking Brāhmaṇa like Madhvāchārya, whose faith he adopted. He reclaimed the Mattu Brahmaṇas of South Kanara District to the Vaiṣṇava fold, and kept on very friendly terms with the

community of the Vaiṣṇava Brāhmaṇas of the Gauḍa-Sārasvata group, which began to spread in that district at the time. It is recorded in one of his biographical accounts that he had followers of his creed in Gujarat. *Yuktimallikā*, his *magnum opus*, is a learned metrical work on Dvaita philosophy. He composed many songs in Kannaḍa and Tulu.

The next prominent figure among the Dāsa Kūṭa saints was Vijayadāsa of Chipgiri (Bellary District). He was an ardent admirer of Purundaradāsa, about whose life and works he gives us ample materials. It is from these that we learn the details of the story of the dramatic change in the life of the wealthy but miserly Purandaradāsa, who renounced all his wordly possessions and became a great devotee of Viṭhṭhala.

JAGANNĀTHADĀSA

After the creative period of Purandara and Kanaka, the Kannada-speaking districts of (the former) Hyderabad State seem to have become the most congenial soil for the spread of the principles of the Dāsa cult. Most of the Dāsas who came after Vijayadāsa seem to have hailed from the different parts of this territory, including the redoubtable Jagannāthadāsa (eighteenth century), whose *Harikathāmṛtasāva*, in mixed Kannaḍa, has become the favourite scripture of the lay people of Karnāṭaka. It was in his days that the schism between the Sanskritic Dvaita Vedānta, and the Vernacular Vaiṣṇavism, based on Dvaita Vedānta, found its final expression. The story of Jagannātha's penitence, of his conversion to humility, and of his respect for the Haridāsa order is graphically recorded by his successors.

THE NATURE OF THE DĀSA MOVEMENT AND ITS LITERATURE

The Dāsa Kūṭa movement was essentially a democratic one, in the sphere of religious philosophy, within the

Vedānta. It has many points of similarity with the movement of the Ālvārs and the work done by them. But unlike the Vīraśaivism of Basaveśvara and the Vaiṣṇvism of the Ālvars, it did not become an organized faith of the people, though its influence was felt in all strata of society in Karnāṭaka. It did much for the advancement of the true spirit of religion and ethics, at least among a section of the followers of Madhva. It made no converts, in the ordinary sense of the term, and remained as a movement for religious revival within the framework of the Mādhva system.

The literature of the Dāsas expounded the main principles of the Dvaita system in a popular and attractive form in the language of the people. Such an attempt is in itself a proof of the fact that Mādhva thought was a living force in the country and had a permanent message to give for the betterment of humanity; and that that message was not so much a cold philosophical doctrine as a dynamic way of life. The Dāsa literature deals with the mystic and spiritual experiences of enlightened life. Its appeal is to the religious emotions and, as such, there is very little of the subtle arguments of pure philosophy in it. There is, however, a robust faith of underlying Theism in these songs. The central idea of their philosophy is the existence of an independent, transcendent principle called God. Behind the veil of Māyā, He is the redeemer of human souls struggling from time immemorial to free themselves from the meshes of Prakrti. The grace of God is the means of such redemption from the flesh and the cycle of births and deaths. This is obtained by *bhakti* (devotion) which flows from love of God, to the exclusion of everything else, with a deep sense of the dependence of souls on Him. The songs draw frequently upon the teachings and legends of the epics and Purāṇas to inculcate the spirit of devotion.

There is, however, no reasoned exposition of the philosophy of Madhva, which is the basic philosophy of the Dāsas. The drift of the songs is lyrical and didactic rather than logical and definitive. Hence we cannot expect any reasoned exposition of philosophical doctrines here. Nevertheless, certain tenets of the system like the doctrines of *tāratamya* (gradation of souls), *pañcabheda* (reality of fivefold difference in the universe), the nature of souls, the attributes of God, and the nature of *mokṣa* (liberation) are elaborately dealt with. The songs try to rouse the spirit of man from a life of worldly attachment and turn it Godward. They deal with all aspects of spiritual discipline taught by the scriptures and take us along the path of self-realization. Their philosophical system is just the same as that presented by the great writers of the Dvaita Vedānta, in their original works in Sanskrit.

There are no distinctive religious practices and rituals associated with the order of the Dāsas, except perhaps the congregational prayers at Pandharpur, the initiation ceremony and administering oath of allegiance, and the employment of music, *bhajana* and dancing as part of the devotional discipline.

Like the other redoubtable order of the Vīraśaiva Vacanakāras in Karnāṭaka, the Haridāsas have produced, in Kannaḍa, a remarkably racy, religious and devotional literature, covering diverse aspects of the mystic life, ranging from the various stages of self-search like spiritual quest and yearning, the sense of sin, penitence, dark night of the soul and the vigil, and initiation and discipline, to intuition and the state of beatitude. All these are depicted by these saints in their inimitable songs of realized wisdom. This fact makes the works of these saints part and parcel of the *genre* of literature relating to the religious mysticism

of the Hindus. They have the same claim to universal recognition as have the words of the famous saints in other parts of India, who have left their mark on the spiritual history of the country. The messages of Caitanya, Tukārāma, Mīrābāī, Kabīr, and Nānak have spread all over the country. It is a great pity that nothing is known, outside the school of Madhvācārya, of the value and importance of the contributions of the great Order of the Saints of Karnātaka headed by Śrīpādarāja, Purandaradāsa, and others. It is to be hoped that, when a true and comprehensive history of India will be written, the Haridāsa saints of Karnāṭaka will be given their meed of recognition, for their great contribution to Hindu religious thought.

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Vidyabhushana Dr. B. N. K. Sharma is well-known to Indologists in India and abroad as an authority on the subject of Dvaita philosophy and its texts. He is not only the product of modern University education; but has a solid background of traditional Shastric learning.

He took his M.A. degree in Sanskrit, in 1931, from the Madras University and later his Doctorate also from the same University. He served as Lecturer in Sanskrit at the Annamalai University for a decade. Here, his reputation in the field of both teaching and research was made. He rendered distinguished service to the cause of Shastric learning in the South, as Principal of the famous Sanskrit Colleges at Tiruvaiyaru and Udipi. His subsequent academic connections were with the Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute in the Punjab, and with the Kanara College Kumta (N.K.), as its Principal and with the K. E. Board's College at Dharwar, as Professor. Since 1953, he has been the Head of the Department of Sanskrit and Ardhamagadhi in the Ruparel College, Bombay.

Dr. Sharma's *magnum opus, A History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature (Vol. I)*, published in Feb. 1960, has roused keen interest in University circles everywhere, and among the enlightened public. The current work is a clear and stimulating presentation of Sri Madhva's philosophical teachings, within a small compass, as the best expression of the Theism of the Vedanta and will surely be read with interest by all students of Indian thought and culture.